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Abstract 
 
Although some important scholarly work has been done on race, and whiteness, in 
relation to habit, my account addresses the role of movement in habit through dance. 
Dance is well-suited for exploring habit since dancers cultivate an intimate knowledge of 
their bodies as habitual dancing bodies. I argue that dancing can offer critical insight into 
how habitual modes of being in the world may be shifted and changed. Dancers’ mastery 
of movement not only consists in sedimenting habits within the body, but also involves 
actively exploring how one’s own bodily movement can be altered (Ravn 2017; 
Damkjaer, 2015; Ingerslev, 2013; Legrand and Ravn, 2009). The specialized ability that 
dancers’ have to register, disrupt, and confront their own habitual dancing body is unique. 
Given this, I turn specifically to the experience of learning a new style of dance for an in-
depth exploration of how habitual modes of being in the world can be changed through 
movement. Drawing on my own lived experience of learning Bharatanatyam, a classical 
style of Indian dance, I show that the phenomena of disorientation (Ahmed 2006) and 
hesitation (Al-Saji, 2009) revealed through learning a new style of dance create the 
conditions for double consciousness by disrupting the latent habitual structures within the 
body and subsequently allowing for the resedimentation of habits. By disrupting one’s 
sense of bodily spatiality, experiences of disorientation disrupt the ease, immediacy, and 
flow of pre-reflective movement. The feeling of delay that arises in moments of 
hesitation disturbs one’s habitual sense of temporality and enables one to register residual 
habitual structures in the body as over-determining intentional action. This opens an 
interval of indetermination that enables bodily receptivity, and makes felt the contingency 
of habit (the possibility of becoming otherwise). Experiences of disorientation and 
hesitation are significant because they can open the possibility for double consciousness, 
which can ground critical reflection. I argue that this same process of resedimentation 
revealed through learning a new dance, can be applied to racializing perception as well, 
and can provide an opportunity to understand how to live whiteness differently. 
 
 ii 
Lay Summary  
 
 
Although some important scholarly work has been done on race, and whiteness, in 
relation to habit, my account addresses the role of movement in habit through dance. 
Dancers cultivate an intimate knowledge of their bodies as habitual dancing bodies. I 
argue that dancing can offer critical insight into how habitual modes of being in the world 
may be shifted and changed. Dancers have a specialized ability to register, disrupt, and 
confront their own habitual dancing body. Given this, I turn specifically to the experience 
of learning a new style of dance for an in-depth exploration of how habitual modes of 
being in the world can be changed through movement. Drawing on my own lived 
experience of learning Bharatanatyam, a classical style of Indian dance, I show that the 
phenomena of disorientation (Ahmed 2006) and hesitation (Al-Saji, 2009) revealed 
through learning a new style of dance create the conditions for double consciousness by 
disrupting the latent habitual structures within the body and subsequently allowing for the 
resedimentation of habits. This enables bodily receptivity, and makes felt the contingency 
of habit (the possibility of becoming otherwise). Experiences of disorientation and 
hesitation can open the possibility for double consciousness, which can ground critical 
reflection. I argue that this same process of resedimentation revealed through learning a 
new dance, can be applied to racializing perception as well, and can provide an 
opportunity to understand how to live whiteness differently. 
Keywords 
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 1 
Setting the Stage 
 
In July 2005, Zero Degrees, a dance theater piece created and performed by Akram Khan 
and Sidi Larbi Cherkaoui, premiered at Sadler’s Wells Theater in London England. Based 
on Khan’s own lived experience, the piece recounts the events of a journey across the 
border between Bangladesh and India, and provocatively negotiates the liminal spaces 
produced by borders, particularly when one occupies “dual identities.” Watching Zero 
Degrees for the first time in 2015, I was struck by my own corporeal response to the 
tension underlying the complex rhythmic structure of its choreography.1 The qualitative 
dynamics of the choreography would shift dramatically throughout the piece, with 
sequences of sophisticated synchronicity suddenly interrupted and becoming disjointed. 
Seamless smoothness would return to Khan and Cherkaoui’s stylized gestures, only to 
once again become serrated and scattered. These unexpected oscillations in the dynamic 
flow and direction of the dancers’ movements brought my attention to the connection 
between movement and freedom. The piece made felt the momentum of bodies that can 
move freely in the world, while juxtaposing this with others that cannot. My body 
responded to the oscillation between constrictive and expansive dynamics within the 
choreography with my own posture echoing this juxtaposition. This experience of 
watching the film served as a starting point from which I began to meditate on the 
complexities that enable motility of some bodies, while heavily regulating the motility of 
others.  
 
                                                   
1 Although members of an audience watching a dance may not be not kinaesthetically 
engaged in dancing the dance, they are nevertheless attuned the qualitative dynamics of 
movement that are experienced and constitute the dance they are witnessing through their 
own kinesthetic sense. In other words, ideally, when watching dance an individual 
responds kinaesthetically, “experiencing the dance through his or her on sense of 
movement and postural change” (Reason & Reynolds 2010, 53). In other words, one feels 
the movements of the other through their own body. This has been supported by the 
substantial research on mirror neurons, which are located in the premotor cortex and 
controls motor activities. Mirror neurons register visually the movements of others (C.f 
Lohmar 2006; Gallese 2006). In other words, witnessing the movement of another 
arouses the same pattern of neurological activity in one’s own premotor cortex!  
 2 
For me, Zero Degrees made explicit the fact that in a time of global fear, freedom of 
movement is not granted to all as it grappled with the tensions restricting the motility of 
marginalized individuals socially marked as “Other” – those named as foreigner, 
stranger, criminal, queer, who are followed, monitored, policed, counted, and 
questioned.2  Evidently, some bodies can move into spaces with ease, but others cannot. 
This disproportionality affects people of colour, who are habitually deemed “suspect,” 
are “randomly selected” and “stopped.”3 This is palpable in the opening sequence of the 
piece. Khan and Cherkaoui are seated cross-legged next to each other at the edge of the 
stage. Each is a mirror of the other, poised with their eyes downturned and legs crossed. 
Moments stretch uncomfortably. Our focus is drawn to their hands, which hold the shape 
of a passport. Together their gestures trace the path of the passport as it passes from one 
guard’s hands to another, and another. In unison, they speak: “I watched my passport 
pass through the hands of all the guards and I didn’t let it out of my sight, because 
although it’s just a piece of paper, without it you have no identity.” Hypothetically, a 
passport is a document that is meant to extend the motility of individuals by allowing 
them to cross borders. However, we know that passports do not work this way for 
everyone. A passport has the power to turn the gaze onto its owner, marking them as 
suspicious, out of place, a stranger. Watching as their intricately choreographed gestures 
traced the movement of the passport changing hands repeatedly, I felt tension rising in 
                                                   
2 Scholarly engagement with Zero Degrees has centered primarily on identity, and the 
piece has received enormous praise as a performative embodiment of diasporic identity 
(Cf Mitra 2009; Katrak 2014). Outside of the focus on identity, the piece is often used as 
an example of cultural “fusion” (C.f. Smith, 2008). These discussions situate Zero 
Degrees in relation to debates surrounding diversity and multiculturalism. Although 
terms such as “diversity” and “multiculturalism” have become commonplace in our 
current political and cultural world, they have been widely criticized for being primarily 
descriptive, and “signaling heterogeneity without implied power relations” (Banerji, 35). 
When multiculturalism and diversity are presented in this context as value free, impartial 
indicators of difference it can allow for relations of power and privilege to drop out of 
sight. Much of the scholarly literature addressing Zero Degrees offers a largely de-
politicized reading of the piece. For me, these analyses overlooked how the piece 
registers and critiques relations of power and privilege, and compels questions about 
ethical encounter. 
3 White bodies, on the other hand, are significantly are less likely to be delayed, or 
surveyed to the same degree (C.f. Helleiner 2012; Puwar 2004; Saulnier 2015). 
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my shoulders, and like Khan and Cherkaoui, suddenly “I realise how vulnerable I am.” 
Knowing that vulnerability is not equally distributed, and that some bodies are rendered 
more vulnerable than others (C.f. Butler 2009), this sequence left me asking how to 
confront the expansive mobility afforded to my own white body, simply because of its 
whiteness. This example shows ways that dance can be valuable for posing and 
addressing more direct and pointed questions about the lived dynamics of contemporary 
life, and specifically by bringing to light questions concerning the ways that race is taken 
up in the lived gestures of the body.  
  
Watching Zero Degrees enriched my understanding of the painful contradictions that 
shape and constrain lived experiences of racialized individuals. It also brought my own 
whiteness to the fore and called my attention to the ease with which I move in the world. 
In this project, I bring the living, dancing body together with existential phenomenology 
in order to build on these insights, and explore how habitual modes of being in the world 
may be transformed through movement. This project begins from the assumption that 
contemporary art and philosophy are intertwined. Phenomenologically, artworks bring 
into appearance what recedes to the background in everyday experience and ordinary life 
(Merleau-Ponty 1964; Mallin 1996). Dance specifically articulates the embodied 
dynamics that allow one to encounter the world and shows up how `embodied subjects 
understand, inhabit, and interpret our worlds in and through movement (C.f. Sheets-
Johnstone 2015; Parviainen 1998). However, turning to dancing bodies can be difficult. 
Dance is an ephemeral art form that, unlike most other artistic practices, has an 
ambiguous object status. In other words, dance does not leave an object in its wake that 
can be straightforwardly taken up for analysis.4 Dancing bodies are always exceeding 
one’s grasp, becoming and becoming undone through movement. This characteristic can 
pose problems for integrating dancing within the cognitive-linguistic traditions that 
define/confine thinking and knowledge in academic institutions. Indeed, the methods and 
discourses of the academy do not easily lend themselves to expressing the depth of lived 
embodied experiences. Nevertheless, because of its focus on lived experience and 
                                                   
4 You cannot point to a dance the way you can point to a painting and say “there it is”! 
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embodied perception, existential phenomenology provides a preliminary framework 
through which the living, dancing body can be understood.  
 
My interest in embodied transformation led me to phenomenology and Maurice Merleau-
Ponty’s work on the pre-reflective level of habit and its relation to motor intentionality. 
There are other scholars who discuss habit, but I find that Merleau-Ponty offers the most 
compelling account of the way habits are taken up through bodily movement, which, of 
course, makes it particularly well-suited for an examination of the habitual structures of 
the living, dancing body. For Merleau-Ponty, the capacity for habit expresses an 
intelligence that belongs specifically to our bodies: the knowledge in my hands that 
allows me to type, dance, or play an instrument (PhP, 145). Habit is a bodily 
understanding, rather than either a thetic form of knowledge or an automatic reflex, 
which allows for a cohesion between the subject and their world. Colloquially, habits are 
seen as fixed ways of doing things. However, this reading of habit overlooks precisely 
what habits capacitate people to do: adjust our actions to adapt to or modify our situated 
contexts. For instance, when I hear the hauntingly beautiful drone of the bagpipes at the 
beginning of the tune Ghillie Callum, my body responds by comporting itself towards the 
style of Highland dance. I pre-reflectively feel my bodily intentionality reaching upwards 
as I ready myself to rise on the balls of my feet. By contrast, when I hear the droning tone 
that accompanies Indian music my body reaches down toward the earth5. These different 
situations characterized by their different musical contexts call forth different habitual 
structures because my body is habituated to these specific situations. Despite the similar 
tonal quality of these musical cues, my body is so specifically habituated to these 
different contexts that I respond in accordance to the situation evoked by the sound. 
Habitual behaviors arise in response to a situation that might either be routine and 
expected or unusual and unforeseen. For Merleau-Ponty, habit “expresses the power we 
have of dilating our being in the world,  or of altering our existence” (PhP, 145). 
Certainly, habits predispose one to certain modes of responding to the world by 
anticipating one’s intentional action. However, on Merleau-Ponty’s account, habit is not 
                                                   
5 The drone sound is typically produced by tanpura and describes a continuous harmonic 
or monophonic tone that plays in the background of the music/performance.  
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antithetical to innovation. Rather, there is an improvisational generativity at the of heart 
of our habitual ways of being in the world. One is not, therefore, condemned by the ways 
that (bad) habits of white privilege, for instance, have been sedimented in the body. 
Because habits are a kind of doing rather than a kind of being, there is potential for them 
to be taken up differently.  
 
Although some important scholarly work has been done on race, and whiteness, in 
relation to habit, my account addresses the role of movement in habit through dance. I 
demonstrate that dance is particularly well-suited for exploring habit since dancers 
cultivate an intimate knowledge of their bodies as habitual dancing bodies. Dancers’ 
mastery of movement not only consists in sedimenting habits within the body, but also 
includes an active involvement in embodied exploration of what might be changed in the 
way they move (Ravn 2017; Damkjaer, 2015; Ingerslev, 2013; Legrand and Ravn, 2009). 
Dancers’ possession of a specialized ability to register, disrupt, and confront their own 
habitual dancing body is distinct. Given this, I turn specifically to the experience of 
learning a new style of dance for an in-depth exploration of how habitual modes of being 
in the world can be changed through movement. I argue that the phenomena of 
disorientation and hesitation revealed through learning a new style of dance create the 
conditions for double consciousness by disrupting the latent habitual structures within the 
body and subsequently allowing for the resedimentation of habits. This same process of 
resedimentation revealed through learning a new dance, I argue, can be applied to 
racializing perception as well, and can provide an opportunity to understand how to live 
whiteness differently. 
 
Dissertation Outline 
My first chapter lays the groundwork for the project by outlining the tenets of Merleau-
Ponty’s phenomenological framework and exploring how it has been taken up to address 
dance. Dance is a slippery subject, specifically because of its ephemerality. Unlike other 
art forms, there is no “object” left behind after a dance performance. This characteristic 
poses unique problems for scholarship on dance, because “fixing” dance through 
documentation contradicts its ephemerality. Given this, research in Critical Dance Studies 
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tends to frame dance as either a perpetual disappearance or a text to be read. While these 
approaches have lent insight into social and cultural politics of dance, they nevertheless 
abstract dance from the dancing body itself. A phenomenological approach to dance, on 
the other hand, focuses on dance as an embodied practice that is lived and gives priority 
to articulating self-movement. I explicate Merleau-Ponty’s account of habit, detailing 
how habits are sedimented in the body schema and enable intentional action. Drawing on 
the sensation of “flow” in dance, which refers to the sensation of being “caught up” or “at 
the service of” the dance itself, I discuss how habit enables pre-reflective style of bodily 
comportment and motility in and towards the world to occur seamlessly. 
 
Chapters two and three both concern embodied transformation occurring at the 
perceptual, and bodily level, and at the pre-reflective level of habit. My analysis in 
chapter two is grounded in my own lived experience of learning Bharatanatyam, a 
classical6 style of Indian dance. When learning a new style of dance, one is challenged to 
undo the ways they are accustomed to moving into the world. This venture makes felt the 
pre-reflective styles of comportment, position, posture, gesture that are already reside in 
the dancer’s body. Sedimenting a new style of comportment demands a dancer to actively 
resist the inclinations toward familiar patterns of movement that occur automatically and 
with ease. In this process, one’s body becomes unfamiliar and strange. While this process 
causes discomfort, it also opens new possibilities for movement. Relying on the insights 
revealed through my own experience of learning Bharatanatyam, chapter two teases out 
experiential phenomena I contend are crucial to processes for shifting habitual 
movement: disorientation, hesitation, and double consciousness. This phenomenological 
account of resedimenting habit specifically sets up my investigation of the habitual 
movement in the context of white privilege in chapter three.  
 
Building on the account of resedimenting habit developed in chapter two, I argue in 
chapter three that within a context of racial inequality, white privilege becomes 
embedded within the corporeal structures of the body as perceptual habit(s). I began to 
                                                   
6 This designation with be called into question in chapter four. 
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work though Merleau-Ponty’s account of habit early in 2015 when I audited Helen 
Fielding’s course on Phenomenology of Perception at the University of Western Ontario. 
This culminated in a conference presentation at the 2015 International Merleau-Ponty 
Circle where I discussed habit, racism, and whiteness. Since then, I have found Helen 
Ngo’s (2017) work on the habitual dynamics of racism exceedingly helpful. Her insights 
have had an important influence on my work, and have meaningfully contributed to my 
interpretation of whiteness as a habitual mode of being in the world (2016; 2017). I build 
on extant work on whiteness as habit, drawing on dance to articulate white privilege 
through a pre-reflective style of bodily comportment and motility. I demonstrate that the 
movement of white bodies in and towards the world is underlined by an expansiveness 
characterized by momentum. I use momentum to refer to the ease of movement that white 
privilege affords to white bodies as they move into traditionally white spaces. Momentum 
is felt as a style of comportment and motility that is unencumbered and uninhibited. This 
feeling of momentum captures the sense in which white bodies tend not to hesitate as 
they engage in intentional action. My goal in investigating the ways this momentum takes 
hold in white bodies as a habit of perception is to explore how we might replace this bad 
habit with a better one by slowing the momentum of habitual whiteness, which I argue 
can be accomplished through disorientation, hesitation, and cultivating white double 
consciousness.7  
 
As Iris Marion Young (2005) aptly puts it, “every human experience is defined by its 
situation” (29). Given this, I recognize that I can only write from where I am, and that the 
particularities of my situation as a white, middle-class, femme, queer, mad, able-bodied, 
Canadian, cis-gendered feminist undoubtedly colors my perspective and motivations for 
                                                   
7 Double consciousness is first described by W.E.B Du Bois in The Souls of Black Folk. 
This concept captures a contradiction in self-perception at the heart of the experiences of 
African Americans living in a fundamentally racist society. This contradiction is 
experienced as one views themselves through their own eyes as well as the eyes of their 
oppressors. This creates sensation of “always looking at one’s self through the eyes of 
others” (Du Bois, 9). Given that double consciousness invokes the idea of seeing one’s 
self through conflicting meaning systems, Linda Alcoff has argued that white identity 
ought to establish a form of double consciousness (C.f Alcoff 1998; 2015). I explore this 
concept further in chapter two and three.  
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writing around whiteness. This self-assessment is not meant to be a tokenistic gesture 
towards intersectionality, but instead serves as reminder of the fact that I do not leave 
these dimensions of myself behind when I write. Because I draw on my own experiences 
of inhabiting a white world in and through a white body in order to articulate the habitual 
momentum that comes to animate white bodies within this context, I think it is important 
to disclose the ways in which the perspective I am presenting here is limited by my own 
context.8 How I experience my whiteness is dependent upon how I am situated 
specifically within a given field of racial positions and must be negotiated within relation 
to a multiplicity of racial logics that are context-dependent. As a result of this positioning, 
the perspective on whiteness and white privilege given in chapter three is specific to a 
North American context. 
 
In chapter four, I critically situate my own participation in Bharatanatyam in light of 
critical race and post-colonial feminist scholarship and question how these histories of 
domination are implicated in my own engagement with this dance form as a cultural 
outsider. The contemporary practice of dancing Bharatanatyam reflects a long and 
complicated history of entanglements. It is a history marked by British colonialism, 
Indian nationalism, post-colonial migration, and is further mediated by questions of 
gender, sexuality, race, caste, class, and other dimensions of identity. The weight of these 
histories give rise to complex meanings when they coalesce in living bodies in the 
present. I frame this analysis as an exercise in double consciousness, that takes stock of 
my own complicity in the perpetuation of systemic racial inequality. I come into a world 
where the figure of the female Indian dancer already exists and continues to be 
consumed and appropriated by Western subjects. In this chapter, I consider: 1) the role 
that habit plays in the perception and perpetuation of cultural stereotypes, and 2) the pre-
                                                   
8 The way that I take up Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy is also informed by these factors. It 
is no secret that historically phenomenology has been committed to a fundamentally 
white, male, heterosexual, transcendental subject. In spite of this, I believe the insights 
that have come out of this school of thought may be imbued with new meaning and 
relevance in our contemporary moment, particularly when they are put into conversation 
with feminist phenomenology and critical race studies (C.f. Alcoff 2006, 2015; Al-saji 
2014; Ngo 2017).  
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reflective orientation to the world that underlies and compels culturally appropriative 
acts. Drawing on historical literature, I will first show that habit plays an important role 
in linking what is perceived as a racialized exotic other (here the figure of the female 
Indian dancer) by the dominant (white Western) subject to its immediately felt effects on 
the racializing body. Next, I explore the operation of cultural appropriation as a 
distinctive style of pre-reflective movement. As I will show, the sense of mastery that 
defines acts of cultural appropriation is made manifest in and through uninhibited 
movement in and towards the world.    
 
As with all projects, this one has established its own momentum, carrying forward its 
own questions. Given this, I conclude by summarizing the overall project and reflecting 
on areas for further research. I find myself returning to concerns that this project has 
raised surrounding intersubjectivity, double consciousness, and responsibility. The spirit 
of this project has been to find a way of moving forward and as such I frame these 
avenues for future research around that goal.  
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Chapter 1 
 
1 A Phenomenology of Dance 
 
Dance s t r e  t  c  h   e    s  across the ocean. It hides out in 
basements, in kitchens, and bedrooms. It is practiced defiantly 
and wildly; on sticky floors, in seedy bars, and under neon lights. 
A sensuous knowing passed between; a gift of comportment that 
is HERE in this body I call mine. Dance does not disappear. It 
nestles. Woven in with jingle bells9. 
 
Dance is a slippery subject, specifically because of its ephemerality. Unlike other art 
forms, dance does not leave an object behind after its performance. This poses distinctive 
problems for scholarship on dance, because “fixing” dance through documentation 
contradicts its ephemerality. Given this, critical research on dance tends to frame dance 
as either a text to be read or a perpetual disappearance. It is without question that 
scholarly work within critical dance studies has meaningfully contributed to an 
understanding of the ways that dance practices are caught up in cultural politics and 
relations of power and privilege. However, understanding dancing bodies in this way 
reflects historical contours of disciplinary development within the academy. Specifically, 
the growing scholarly interest in postmodernism and post-structuralism (and within them 
deconstruction, feminist and gender studies, postcolonial, philosophical and 
psychoanalytic criticisms and so forth) has had a significant influence on reshaping the 
field10 of dance studies (C.f. Franko & Nordera, 2016; Foster 1996). Although I certainly 
do not challenge the importance that such studies have, both for the field of critical dance 
                                                   
9 Long after my grandmother had forgotten my name and my birthday she could still sing 
all the words to jingle bells.  
10 Feminist approaches have been influential within this context. As Ann Daly (1991) 
notes, “the inquiries that feminist analysis makes into the way that the body is shaped and 
comes to have meaning are directly and immediately applicable to the study of dance, 
which is, after all, a kind of living laboratory of the study of the body – its training, its 
stories its way of being and being seen in the world” (2).  
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studies and for discussions of how identity is conferred through dance, these studies do 
not come very close to capturing the phenomenon of dance itself and how it is 
experienced. On these accounts dance is not framed as an embodied knowledge in its 
own right – rather, it is reduced to examples and illustrations that are taken up by scholars 
to confirm or demonstrate “the power of a theory through its consumption under its 
explanatory or interpretive framework” (Mallin, 1996, 417). While discursive approaches 
have lent insight into social and cultural politics of dance, they nevertheless abstract 
dance from the dancing body itself. In this chapter, I argue that a phenomenological 
approach to dance offers a valuable embodied alternative for understanding how dancing 
is a uniquely embodied art form. The phenomenological account of dance I outline will 
demonstrate that dance does not disappear, but for dancers dwells in their very 
corporeality.  
 
I begin by contextualizing the phenomenological approach that I take up in relation to 
contemporary critical research on dance. First, I critique the understanding of dance as a 
bodily text. When dance becomes a bodily text, what happens to bodily knowledge? 
Drawing on phenomenological accounts of dance, I contend that Merleau-Ponty’s notion 
of the lived body is better able to capture the experiential and expressive nature of dance. 
Next I explore how the ephemeral nature of dance has been taken up. I argue that 
discursive accounts which present dance as an art form defined by disappearance 
(Lepecki, 1996, 72; Phelan 1993; Franko 2011) also limit our understanding of what 
dance is and how it is experienced by abstracting dance from the dancing body. This is 
followed by an in-depth exegesis of Merleau-Ponty’s account of habit. This account will 
explain the role that habit and intentionality play in embodied subjectivity. This provides 
the foundation for the arguments I make in the chapters to follow. I conclude by drawing 
on Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of habit, the body schema, and sedimentation to 
articulate the dancing experience of “flow.” This term is often used in music and sport to 
describe “a state in which the athlete feels fully immersed and ‘in the zone’ in their 
activity” (Hardes, 2016, 283). I will show that the experiential phenomenon of flow 
results from a dancer’s bodily expertise and is related to pre-reflective bodily movement. 
My examination of embodiment not only highlights the potential of bodily beings to learn 
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new manners of moving, but demonstrates the ways in which movements itself has 
epistemological value. In other words, dance has the potential to reveal how new 
knowledge arises in and through movement. 
 
1.1 Dance as “Bodily Text” 
 
Dance invites ambiguity. It will take on different meanings depending on the angle of 
your approach. Until the mid-1980s, the majority of dance scholarship was made up of 
“historical narratives, aesthetic valuations, or auteur studies of great dancers or 
choreographers” (Desmond, 1997, 1). While the importance of these works must not be 
dismissed, particularly in the field of dance history, their main objectives were to 
delineate aesthetic categories, describe the characteristics of a style and technique, or to 
establish a more comprehensive picture of the historical context in which certain forms of 
dance developed, leaving the operation of social and cultural ideologies within dance 
practices largely unexamined (Desmond, 1997, 13). More recent scholarly research, 
however, has brought more rigorous theoretical perspectives to bear on the social and 
cultural politics of dance by  bringing theoretical concepts and methods from different 
disciplinary contexts to bear on “the subject of dance”. By introducing more complex 
questions about ideology, subjectivity, representation, social construction, and regulation, 
scholars engaged in critical theory established new frameworks for studying dance. What 
was once a discipline dominated by aesthetic and historical analysis has subsequently 
given way to studies that examine the ways in which dance works as a social practice.  
 
Neither the body nor bodily practices such as dance are neutral. The meaning of dance, 
who dances, or how they dance, is situated in a context of other socially meaningful ways 
of moving. Dance practices, like other embodied social-cultural practices, are responsive 
to the world they are embedded in. Like everyday codes of movement, dance is always 
mediated by social and cultural ideologies, and the parameters of what is deemed 
acceptable movement within specific contexts is highly regulated. From this perspective, 
dance, like all social practices, is always embedded within dominant social structures and 
ideologies. Given this, scholars maintain that by examining who dances, with whom, 
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what ways or why, one can gain significant insight into how changing ideologies of 
gender, race, class, or sexuality are negotiated (C.f. Desmond 1997; Wolff 1997; Foster 
1996, 2011; Franko 1993, 2011). One might consider, for instance, why some dance 
practices are prohibited for some members of a social group and not others. The 
introduction of the tango in Europe and North America at the beginning of the nineteenth 
century exemplifies this well. As Savigliano (1995) has shown, before tango became 
integrated into ballroom dance it incited moral panic. The style, which originated in 
working-class port districts of Buenos Aires, was considered too sexually dangerous for 
“respectable” (white upper-class) women to participate in and was framed as a variable 
pipeline to sex work.  
 
Critical approaches to dance highlight the role that dance practices play in both the 
preservation and disruption of dominant social norms. Close examination of the display 
of female bodies in classical ballet, for instance, has been widely critiqued for 
perpetuating normative gender roles and reinforcing traditional heterosexist constructions 
of femininity by presenting the female dancer solely as the “bearer and object of male 
desire” (Daly 1991). Dance practices may be a site where social ideologies can be reified 
or re-imagined, re-inscribed or resisted. Drawing on insights from critical race and 
postcolonial theory, dance scholars have also addressed questions concerning belonging, 
national identity, and race alongside the performance of gender and sexuality in dance. 
By examining the transnational movement of salsa, for example, scholars such as Lisa 
Gonzalez (1999) have demonstrated the important role dance plays in the construction of 
identity within diasporic communities. Stavros Karayanni’s (2004) study of Middle 
Eastern dance (often referred to as belly dance) as an object of cultural appropriation is 
another excellent example. Through an examination of “Oriental dancers” and their 
encounters with Western colonialism, Karayanni argues that Middle Eastern dance has 
been taken up to support the interests of Orientalism.  
 
It is without question that scholarly work within critical dance studies has meaningfully 
contributed to an understanding of the ways that dance practices are caught up in cultural 
politics and relations of power and privilege. Although I certainly do not challenge the 
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importance that such studies have, both for the field of critical dance studies and for 
discussions of how identity is conferred through dance, these studies do not come very 
close to capturing the phenomenon of dance itself and how it is experienced. Rather, they 
tend to posit both the body and dance as objects, specifically texts to be deciphered rather 
than a bodily knowledge taken up and lived by embodied subjects (C.f. Kozel 1997; 
Grosz 1994). 
 
As Elizabeth Grosz’s (1994) explains, the metaphor of the “textualized body” presents 
the body as a surface “ready to receive, bear, and transmit meanings, messages or signs, 
much like a system of writing” (117). There is a problem with understanding the body as 
a text. Bodies are not texts. To treat a body like a text is to objectify, and abstract it from 
its fundamental agency. And so, even though much of this literature claims to take an 
interest in “the body”, dancing bodies are not described in these accounts; there is no 
pain, no tears or sweat, no injuries, not stiffness, no movement that extends beyond the 
keyboard. What is lost in these accounts is what dance is, and how it is lived. For 
instance, in Corporealities (1996) Susan Foster describes dancing as “a representational 
practice that explores rigorously strategies for cultivating bodily signification” (xii). In 
this description, she assumes here that the syntax of dance seamlessly maps onto the 
syntax of language. When dance becomes the body of theory, what happens to bodily 
knowledge? When we think about the dance this way, the body becomes a residue, a 
remnant of something left over when a dance ends. Too often, the body is made to 
conform to the theory at hand, or else left out altogether. As will be shown, a 
phenomenological approach overcomes this problem by beginning from a living body11, 
rather than a text.  
 
                                                   
11 For Merleau-Ponty, body is neither a biological object or a vessel for subjectivity. 
Rather “I am my body” (PhP 150). This means that my body is not an objective body, but 
a lived body that is situated within and practically engaged with a world.  
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1.1.1 Dance and the Lived Body  
 
Phenomenologically, lived experience always relates to an embodied subject, as opposed 
to a disembodied object of investigation. Dance scholars, notably many who are 
themselves dancers, have found Merleau-Ponty’s existential phenomenology well-suited 
to the study of dance. His insight into embodiment,  perception, intentionality, and 
spatiotemporally have had a significant impact on the field. Dance literature includes 
several phenomenological studies of the experience of dancing. I give a brief overview of 
some of the most prominent of these studies: Sondra Farleigh’s Dance and the Lived 
Body (1987) and Maxine Sheets-Johnstone’s The Phenomenology of Dance (2015).12 
Drawn to the richness of Merleau-Ponty’s account of embodiment, these scholars appeal 
specifically to his phenomenology. What unites these analyses of dance is a shared 
interest in the lived body. After articulating this concept, I will give a brief overview of 
these texts. This serves as a general introduction to phenomenological conceptions of 
dance, as an embodied art form, and how dance relates to embodied dancing subjects.13 
Rather than a text, this understands dances as tied to the lived body and lived experience.  
 
The body beats at the heart of Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy. He maintains that one’s body 
is the very possibility for one’s engagement in the world. Although I can experience my 
body as an object, it is my living phenomenal body that directs me towards my world. 
This is to say that the body is lived. Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of the lived body 
(Lieb) describes the body as the seat of subjective experience. Although this is contrasted 
with the material, biological, physical body (Körper), the two are not district aspects of 
                                                   
12 Parviainen (1998), like Farleigh and Sheets-Johnstone, is concerned with the lived 
body; however, unlike the two listed before her, she emphasizes the intersubjective 
aspects of the lived body. The lived body, she explains is necessarily socially, culturally, 
and historically formed. She situates dance within a social field “constituted by the 
network of the relations of artists, art works, critics, art specialists, theorists, art schools, 
buildings for art, art journals etc.” (1998, 91).  
13 As an overview, my discussion does not exhaust all concepts found in these studies; 
instead I sketch out their basic themes. Later, I gather together these works alongside 
Merleau-Ponty to give an account of dancing embodiment with attention to the role of 
habit.  
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one’s embodied experience.14 In her text, Dance and the Lived Body (1987), Sondra 
Farleigh draws on phenomenology to develop a descriptive aesthetics of modern concert 
dance. She turns to the concept of the lived body with the specific goal of rejecting the 
mind-body dualism of the Cartesian subject. As she points out, dualistic language 
pervades much of the literature on dance. This language, of course, reinforces the view 
that the body is “simply material substance and mechanical physiological process, moved 
by something other than itself; and that ‘mind as pure thought escapes the material 
body’”( Fraleigh, 1987, 9). Dance is frequently described as an art form that uses the 
body as an instrument. This attributes agency to “the mind”, understood as be 
fundamentally dis tinct from, and in command of, the body. For Farleigh, the lived body 
offers a way of overcoming this dualism because it allows for a richer understanding of 
the ways the body, movement, self, and agency are intertwined. The lived body, she 
explains, is better able to capture the expressive nature of dance.  
 
Maxine Sheets-Johnstone’s text, The Phenomenology of Dance, has also been very 
influential. She provides a phenomenological description of dance, focusing on dance as 
a kinetic phenomenon; she gives a detailed account of the lived qualitative dynamics of 
movement. In a dramatic departure from objective and empirical studies of movement, 
where movement is often reduced to discrete spatial and temporal categories, Sheets-
Johnstone’s detailed analysis demonstrates that as a lived body caught in the act of 
forming and performing dance, a dancer’s movement creates its own spatiality and 
temporality.15 As she points out, “neither dance nor the lived experience of dance exists 
apart from the creation and presentation of the concrete thing itself” (2). Dancers take 
                                                   
14 The differentiation that Merleau-Ponty draws between the material sensible body 
(Körper) and the living body (Lieb) is not absolute. These dimensions of embodied 
experience intertwine. As I will explain later in the chapter, the sensible body and living 
body are “not two different kinds of being,” but rather “two divergent ways in which 
being is” (Morris, 2010, 145). 
15 It should be noted that much of this literature focuses exclusively on “concert dance”, 
or dance that is performed in a theatrical setting for an audience. Although she grounds 
her discussion in concert dance, she does explicitly state this in her text. This reveals an 
implicit assumption of what dance is – as something that involves choreographers, 
dancers’, and audiences in a presentational context. 
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their bodies with them. Bodies that sweat and sway, step and stretch. Their bodies are 
part and parcel of the dance that is created in the moment. In other words, dancing is 
something that living bodies do.  
1.1.2 Dance as Disappearance  
 
The ephemeral nature of dance is part of what makes it so enigmatic. In performance, 
dance is effervescent and incessantly escapes one’s grasp. Unlike other art forms, no 
tangible object remains in the wake of a dance performance . As Marc Franko (2011) 
points out, unlike theater, which commonly works from a script, or music, which often 
has a score that offers some stability to counter its fleeting nature, dance is not 
accompanied by a form of textual notation that can function as “a universally legible 
form of textual record” (329).16 In this sense, dance is understood to be unique in its 
ephemerality and effervescence. However, these characteristics also make dance a 
particularly slippery art form, one that poses unique challenges to scholarly analysis 
because “fixing” dance through documentation contradicts its ephemerality. Questions 
surrounding the ephemerality of dance tend to present dance as perishable, existing only 
briefly before dissolving before our eyes. From this perspective, dance is figured as 
incessantly disappearing. In this section I trouble discursive accounts of dance as an art 
form that “vanishes” (Lepecki, 1996; Phelan 1993). I do not dispute that ephemerality is 
an important and unique feature of dance. Dance is lived ephemerally. Rather, I question 
the way that disappearance is privileged within scholarly discourses on performance, and 
asks how this limits our understanding of what dance is and how it is experienced. 
Obscuring this experience means that we cannot learn from it. I will show that 
positioning dance as disappearance (an art of erasure) bifurcates the dancer and the dance 
and in so doing I expose limits of the theoretical assumptions guiding this understanding 
of the body and subsequently ephemerality. 
 
                                                   
16 I do not intend to neglect movement notation systems altogether (Laban for example 
has been very influential), but arguably this is not a system that is regularly used by most 
dancers.  
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The growth of performance studies in the 1990s has also had a significant impact on 
scholarly work on dance, with “performance” serving as a broad term under which dance 
falls. Here, “performance” not only captures the live spatiotemporal event of executing 
choreography, it also gestures to the diversity and indeterminacy of the medium itself. 
The affinity between dance and performance theory is established through the similarities 
in their ephemerality, which has now become a cornerstone of performance studies (C.f. 
Schneider 2001). Beyond simply being transient, momentary, or lacking permanence, 
ephemerality captures how performances “cease to be at the same moment as it becomes” 
(Macmillian, 2006, 1). This is especially true for dance, since dance appears in the 
liveliness of the present moment, unfolding in and through a dancer’s body as an 
expressive event. In this context, the ephemerality is framed in terms of transience and 
impermanence –  as an ephemeral art form dance exists only temporarily. Maricia Siegel 
(1972) for instance, famously describes dance as existing “at a perpetual vanishing point. 
At the moment of its creation it is gone” (1). From this perspective, dance belongs only to 
the present, but a present specifically framed as brief and fleeting. Dance is presented as 
having no physical durability or permanence. Consequently, dance is figured as a 
perpetual disappearance.  
 
The most influential articulation of what has been dubbed the “disappearance thesis” can 
be found in Peggy Phelan’s seminal work Unmarked: The Politics of Performance 
(1993). Here, Phelan forwards an ontology of performance that gives primacy to 
ephemerality and maintains that performance “becomes itself through disappearance” 
(146). Both dance and performance theory are conceptualized according to a central 
ontological claim that performance disappears. This perspective,  frames performance as 
an fleeting event of momentary presence, one that is defined through its inevitable 
absence (Phelan 1993, 148-152).  This is reflected in Merce Cunningham’s (1979) 
description of dance performance: “… it gives you nothing back, no manuscripts to be 
stored away, no paintings to show on walls and maybe hang in museums, no poems to be 
printed and sold, nothing but a single fleeting moment when you feel alive” (90). The 
theoretical emphasis on disappearance positions dance as “an art of self-erasure”, 
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presenting dance as being in perpetual tension with presence (Lepecki, 125). On these 
accounts, dance is always doomed to disappear.  
 
Understanding ephemerality as disappearance has sparked debate regarding the 
im/possibilities of documenting performance. Since performance is bound to the present, 
questions surrounding what is lost, gained or changed in the process of “fixing” dance 
through documentation been given considerable attention. The relationship between the 
document and the original is complex and tenuous. Phelan maintains that: 
Performance cannot be saved, recorded, documented, or 
otherwise participate in the circulation of representations of 
representations: once it does so, it becomes something other 
than performance. To the degree that performance attempts to 
enter the economy of reproduction it betrays and lessens the 
promise of its own ontology (1993, 146).  
In other words, she posits that performance is erased through documentation. 
Documentation of performance, she maintains, is impossible. Once a performance is 
recorded, documented, or  is disseminated as a representation it becomes something 
altogether distinct from the performance in its “original” form. She claims that 
consequently “the document of a performance is only a spur to memory, an 
encouragement of memory to become present” (147). Ironically, the perception of 
transience and impermanence seems to motivate a strong desire to document live 
performance. Because one cannot capture a performance and contain it in the present, it 
must be “translated” into something that endures in spite of the passage of time. Active 
steps must be taken to “save” the performance from oblivion through documentation or 
notation. Even those who fight fiercely to document performances approach performance 
in terms of impermanence. However, since documentation is thought to compromise the 
existence of performance17 in the here and now, it is believed that such documentation 
                                                   
17 Not having a system of notation and documentation has implications for dance history, 
since “failure to document leads directly to the erasure of dance itself” (Reason, 2006, 
23). Allegra Fuller Snyder also touches on this. As she explains, “video made it easier to 
capture movement in time and through space, the ephemeral aspect of dace was 
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erodes the very nature of dance’s being. Given this, Phelan frames the reproduction of 
performance as a “betrayal” (Phelan, 1993, 146). Discussions that revolve around loss, 
lack, and absence underscore the relation. From this perspective, any record of 
performance is thus only ever an inadequate resemblance.18  
 
Dance does pose problems for documentation and writing. In the process of writing, 
dance is changed, fixed on a page, converted into something it is not. Dancing and 
writing are paired in a vexed relationship. However, that something is lost in the 
translation between embodied experience and writing is the case for all lived experiences. 
As soon as you describe the body you are producing it. This problem is not unique to 
dance. In other words, I think critical dance scholars are perhaps overzealous in 
bemoaning dance’s disappearance and the inability to truly capture dance in writing. I 
will address this more fully when discussing the phenomenology, but descriptions of 
embodied experience can also open different lines of thought.  
 
Establishing new directions in dance studies coincided with widespread scholarly interest 
in “the body”, specifically the cross-disciplinary fascination with “the body as discourse” 
                                                   
becoming less and less of an issue” (Johnson and Snyder, 1999, 7-8). By enabling 
documentation, video allows us to “save” dance from disappearance.  
18 It is perhaps not surprising that an art form that so resists reproduction is largely 
ignored in capitalist society. Focusing on disappearance, ephemerality and self-erasure 
has opened up new avenues for scholars to reflect on performance as undermining 
neoliberal consumption and commodification. This is because performance compromises 
mechanisms of reproductive representation that enable the continued flow of capital. As 
an ephemeral art form grounded in disappearance, performance cannot be sold because it 
is gone before it is over, and consequently resists traditional lines of commodification and 
capital. Only “a limited number of people in a specific time and place can have an 
experience of value which leaves no visible trace” (Phelan, 1993, 149). Lepecki (2012) 
argues, for instance, that dance’s ephemerality “demonstrates the possibility of creating 
alternative economies of objecthood in the arts, by showing that it is possible to create 
artworks away from regimes of commodification and the fetishization of tangible 
objects” (15). This also flies in the face of normative functioning of archives, galleries 
and museums, as structures of capital (C.f. Phelan 1993; Lepecki 2004; Wakefield 2015). 
Again, I want to stress that I am not suggesting that these approaches to dance do not 
have value or have not meaningfully contributed to our understanding of dance. Rather, I 
maintain that phenomenological approaches to dance offer an alternative to these 
discursive approaches that can speak to dance as an embodied art form.  
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or as a “cultural object” (Foster, 1996, xii). However, Kozel (1997) notes that “despite 
having bodies and dance in their titles” many contemporary scholarly analyses of dance 
within the arts and humanities are “concerned only tangentially with bodies and dance 
performance” (95). When discourse takes center stage and bodies are framed as texts to 
be read or condemned to perpetual disappearance, the materiality of dancing bodies is 
lost. In effect, this ontology abstracts “dance” from the material bodies of the dancers and 
indirectly imposes a dualism severing the relation between the subject and object.19 One 
can observe this dualism in the very questions that frames these analyses of dance. For 
instance, when guided by questions such as “where are the sites for dance to rest once it 
is over? Where does the dance go to?” dance scholars suggest that the dance was at some 
point somewhere else, as if dance has a life independent of the dancer’s body (Lepecki, 
1996, 74). The focus on discourse has distanced these analyses of dance from the living 
dancing body which brings dance into appearance. 
 
Whether performance disappears or remains after it ends, it must first appear (Wakefield, 
2015, 173). How does dance appear? In and through the body of the dancer, i.e. an 
embodied subject caught up in movement, who labours to form/create and perform a 
dance in the present. How does disappearance account for the vital presence of dance in a 
dancer’s body? What of the materiality and affectivity of dance? Positing dance as 
disappearance completely disregards the materiality of the dancer who is bodily-engaged 
in the unfolding of the dance itself. As Grant notes, performance studies was born within 
a scholarly environment where the concept of presence was being heavily critiqued and 
deemed highly suspect. Distrust in the “metaphysics of presence” lead to a fixation on 
absence (C.f. Phelan; Lepeki; Franko). However, as Fraleigh writes, “I cannot be my 
dance until I do my dance” and “I am concretely in it and all there can be of it” (Fraleigh, 
1987, 32, 34). From an embodied perspective, dance cannot be understood apart from the 
dancer to which it corresponds. To approach dance phenomenologically is first and 
foremost to understand dance as a lived experience, as it is directly apprehended in the 
immediacy of its appearance. In the next section I draw on Merleau-Ponty’s account of 
                                                   
19 The binary relation between subject and object that is also imposed between presence 
and absence. 
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expressivity alongside dance to explore how dancer and dance overlap while dancing. 
 
1.1.3 Expressivity: Dance as a Mode of Being  
 
Dance is largely unaddressed by Merleau-Ponty. He briefly touches on it in the 
Phenomenology of Perception, but his reflections on art are mostly confined to music and 
visual arts. Despite this, his thoughts on the role of the body in aesthetic expression are 
useful for clarifying the reversible relation between the dance and the (body of the) 
dancer described by Fraleigh and Sheets-Johnstone. This begins from an understanding of 
the body as expressive, or “a living knot of significations” (PP 152, 153). The body does 
not cause expression; it is itself an “expressive space”; or “the very movement of 
expression” (Pp, 147). In this way, “the expressed does not exist apart from the 
expression” (PP, 169). Whether considering musical notes, paint and canvas or the 
actor’s body, Merleau-Ponty maintains that the body does not signify or translate 
meaning. Bodily expression accomplishes meaning, bringing it into existence by 
installing this meaning in the body itself. “The operation of expression”, he writes: 
does not simply leave to the reader or the writer himself a 
reminder; it makes the signification exist as a thing at the very 
heart of the text, it brings it to life in an organism of words, it 
installs signification in the writer or the reader like a new sense 
organ, and it opens a new field or a new dimension of our 
experience (PP, 188).  
In keeping with this reading of the expressivity of the body, the dancer actualizes a 
dance. Donald Landes (2013), who has worked extensively on Merleau-Ponty’s account 
of expressivity, explains that “the body does not signify a mode of existence, it brings 
sense into existence by becoming that sense, just as a sleeper only expresses sleep by 
becoming that which she is imitating, calling forth the visitation of sleep in an active 
passivity” (89). Just because you are asleep does not mean that consciousness is not 
there; rather, sleep discloses another way that consciousness is (C.f. IP). In performance, 
then, we might think of dancing as a mode of being of the dancer, since dancers live 
through the event of dancing. The dance cannot be detached from its sensible appearance.  
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The dance is held by the body of the dancer. Dancers bring a dance into appearance. The 
dancer does not translate brute movements into dance; dancers actualize and accomplish 
the dance. Dance “grasps my body, and its hold upon my body circumscribes the zone of 
signification to which it refers” (PhP, 244). In other words, as an embodied art form 
dance is inextricably linked to the body of the dancer. As Sondra Fraleigh describes:  
The body and the dance are inseparable. The body is the dance, and 
the dancer is the dance; the body is concretely there in the dance. 
The body is not an instrument of dance; it is the subject of dance. 
The body cannot be an instrument, because it is not an object as 
other instruments are (Fraleigh, 1987, 31-32). 
Sheets-Johnstone (2015) echoes this sentiment explaining that “a dance [as it is formed 
and performed] is experienced by the dancer as a perpetually moving form, a unity of 
succession” (16).  It is clearly stressed by both Sheets-Johnstone and Fraleigh that in 
performance the dance that is being performed cannot be considered an object apart from 
the dancer. Instead, dancers become one with the dance as it is formed and performed – 
that is, they live through the movement of dancing.  
 
In the event of performance, the dance and the dancer “complete and unified 
phenomenon, an illusion of force, whose meaning suffuses the whole and derives from 
the uniqueness of the whole” (Sheets-Johnstone, 2015, 30). This way of understanding 
dance as lived does not do away with the notion that when performed a dance is fleeting, 
ephemeral, and effervescent; always “in the process of becoming the dance which it is, 
yet it is never the dance at any moment” (Sheets-Johnstone, 2015, 16). Instead, it offers 
an understanding of dance as intertwined with the dancing body in the thickness of the 
present. In the following section I explicate Merleau-Ponty’s account of habit, detailing 
how habits are sedimented in the body schema and enable intentional action. Drawing on 
the sensation of “flow” in dance, which refers to the sensation of being “caught up” or “at 
the service of” the dance itself, I discuss how habit enables pre-reflective style of bodily 
comportment and motility in and towards the world to occur seamlessly. 
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1.2 Phenomenological Framework 
  
Phenomenology is the study of the phenomenon of experience. The task of 
phenomenology is not so much to depict “experience, but rather to catch experience in 
the act of making the world available”, or how it comes in to appearance (Noë, 2004, 
176). Or, to grasp experience as it is lived by an embodied subject in the world20. As 
Merleau-Ponty (2012) explains, “the world is not what I think but what I live” (PP, xxx). 
This approach sets out to capture a moment of experience as it is rooted in the “soil of the 
sensible,” or the concrete and sensuous materiality of the world “such as it is in our lives 
and for our bodies,” and to articulate it as such (EM, 122).21 A phenomenological 
approach is decidedly focused on first-person subjective experience, and suspicious of the 
claims of objectivity which have come to define contemporary scientific approaches to 
experience.22 Unlike other approaches to experience, phenomenology is premised on the 
understanding that experience cannot be reduced to the study of objective phenomena. 
Merleau-Ponty is critical of the operational and mechanistic style of thinking that 
underlies positivist approaches to understanding. Such an approach posits a view from 
above (no-where); a pure spectre who “manipulates things and gives up living in them” 
(EM 121). In so doing, positivist approaches see and represent themselves as 
autonomous, mistakenly assuming the world can be made transparent.  
 
To the contrary, phenomenology maintains the impossibility of apprehending phenomena 
in their totality. Phenomena are not “out there” as abstract things separate from our 
experience. Rather they exist at a deeply corporeal level, forming part of an existential 
                                                   
20 In this context, ‘world’ encapsulates the natural, social, cultural, historical, and 
geographical environment. The individual subject is understood to be deeply intertwined 
with the world in which they find themselves situated (VI, 60). From a phenomenological 
perspective, there is no “pure being.” Rather, meaning is arises as “the sense that shines 
for at the intersection of my experiences and at the intersection of my experiences with 
those of others that a sort of gearing into each other” (PhP, xxxiv).  
21 Lived experience is structured in relation to spatial and temporal horizons. This means 
that experience is always embedded within a social, cultural, historical context.  
22 Here I am not suggesting that we discard objective science research. Rather, I am 
gesturing to the problems that arise when  objectivist science research is viewed as the 
only viable research, and when it fails to take context and rationality into account.   
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unity with the subject of experience. One perceives the world from within it. This not 
only means that the subjective perspectival dimensions of experience cannot be 
abstracted out, but also that one can only ever have a partial view of the world. There is 
always something that exceeds our grasp, an invisible that supports and sustains what is 
visible. For example, Merleau-Ponty shows in “Eye and Mind” that a painting can 
present its viewer intuitively with the structures that enable one to see the visible world in 
the first place. To see a mountain, for instance, it is necessary “not to see the play of 
shadows and light around it” (EM, 128). To make the mountain visible a painter must 
learn to see the dynamics of light and shadows which remain invisible in everyday vision. 
The aim of phenomenology is not simply to expose the invisible, stripping it of its 
obscurity and rendering it visible. As Merleau-Ponty notes, “if coincidence is lost, this is 
no accident; if Being is hidden, this is itself a characteristic of being, and no disclosure 
will make us comprehend it” (VI, 122). There is always a slippage, a gap, a difference 
which prevents a complete fusion. What phenomenology attempts to understand is the 
interrelation between the subject and the world as it is given in experience, and the 
conditions of possibility that enable experience to take shape as such. Because Merleau-
Ponty maintains that there is never full disclosure of the invisible, this undertaking 
always gestures beyond itself. In this way, phenomenology does not forward an 
abstracted or finite notion of “Truth”.  
 
1.2.1 Embodiment  
 
For Merleau-Ponty, embodied subjectivity unfolds in and through the extraordinary 
overlapping of the subject and their world. From this perspective, a subject and their 
world mutually encroach upon each other. This encroachment is such that embodied 
subject and world cannot be specified independently. For example, what I perceive in the 
world is directly related to my history and situation as a subject and so the subject 
encroaches upon world, but also what I can perceive is directly related to the natural, 
social, etc., environment in which I am embedded and in which I develop as a sensing 
subject, and so world encroaches upon subject. Embodied subject and world are thus 
understood as co-constituting and interdependent and the intimacy of this bond means 
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that the world shapes and constrains subjectivity and our ways of being in the world (VI, 
138). 
 
Lived experience is always understood in relation to the embodied subject to which it 
corresponds.. One’s body is both visible/tangible and that which sees and touches. His 
account aims specifically to undermine the dominant Cartesian framework that severs the 
relation between body and mind in a way that is dualistic and absolute (C.f. VI). And so, 
his phenomenology challenges one to think about what might proceeds, or move beyond 
this subject/object divide. Far from an inert mass, on his account the body is understood 
as a porous and receptive “pivot of the world,” which is caught up in in the movement of 
orienting itself in accordance with its surroundings (PhP, 84). Merleau-Ponty understands 
the body as being the locus of one’s experience of the world. My body is visible and 
mobile, sensible and tactile. And yet, with the continual instillation of my body in the 
world of things, I find that my body is not a thing among things, but instead the very 
possibility for my active engagement with world. Although I can experience my body as 
a thing, it is my living phenomenal body that takes me towards my tasks. As explained in 
section 1.1.1, Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of the lived body (Lieb) describes the body 
as the seat of subjective experience. Although Merleau-Ponty does make a distinction 
between the lived body (Lieb) and the material sensible body (Körper), he does not to 
posit these dimensions of embodied experience as in opposition with each other. Sentient 
and sensible “are not two different kinds of being, but two divergent ways in which being 
is” (Morris, 2010, 145). In embodied experience, we witness the reversible interrelation 
between sensible and the sentient as incongruent counterparts that intertwine but never 
fully coincide. This is how I am able to experience my body as simultaneously the body I 
touch, and also the body that touches. It is the overlap and interplay of these dimension of 
existence that define embodiment23. From this perspective, one’s body is not “an object 
among objects,” nor is it merely a vessel for subjectivity. Rather one’s body is “that by 
                                                   
23 In other words, “there is on ontological distinction between the ‘I’ and the body as one 
lives it” (Morris, 2004, 111).  The lived body and the physical body are understood as co-
constituting. While the materiality of one’s body may set the parameters for one’s 
possibilities, for instance, one is never wholly determined by their physical being. 
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which there are objects” (PhP, 92). The body is not separate from intelligence. It has its 
own intelligence—a bodily logos that is expressed in the very ways that one takes up and 
moves into the world. From this perspective, we do not have bodies. We are bodies. 
Merleau-Ponty writes: “I am not in front of my body, I am in my body, or rather I am my 
body” (PhP, 151).  
 
1.2.2 Intentionality 
 
Intentionality is considered a central concept within the phenomenological tradition. It 
captures a sense of directedness of embodied perception. The body is the locus of 
intentionality, and is inherently tied to the bodily capacity for motility and the 
“directedness” of our intentions. According to Merleau-Ponty, the motor experience of 
the body is “not a particular case of knowledge; rather it offers us a manner of reaching 
the world” (PhP, 141). Intentionality is not a mental representation. Rather it is “a skillful 
bodily responsiveness and spontaneity in direct engagement with the world” (Carman in 
PhP, x). In such occasions, “my movement is not a decision made by a mind, an absolute 
doing which would decree, from the depth of a subjective retreat, some change in place 
miraculously executed in extended space” (PhP, 124). He subsequently argues that bodily 
intentionality is best understood as a bodily sense of “I can,” rather than an “I think” 
(PhP, 139). The “I can” of the body is precisely the experience of harmony between 
intention and action, which projects “the aim to be accomplished and connects the body’s 
motion towards that end in an unbroken directedness” (Young, 2005, 146).24  
                                                   
24 The possibilities that are opened up in the world are dependent upon the limits imposed 
one’s bodily sense of “I can.” For Merleau-Ponty, the “I can” expresses a relationality 
between self and world and reflects the conditions of the world as imposing limits on 
one’s sense of intentional action. This point is significant because of the way that social 
norms govern how one perceives their own possibilities of engagement in the world. Iris 
Marion Young, for example, famously identifies feminine bodily existence as being 
overlaid by an “I cannot,” which occurs as a result of gendered inequality. This “I 
cannot” severs the otherwise “mutually conditioning relation between aim and 
enactment”, because it “simultaneously reaches toward a projected end with an ‘I can’ 
and withholds its full bodily commitment to that end” (Young, 2005, 36). As will be 
expanded on in later chapters, the expansiveness that animates white bodies is expressly 
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Bodily intentionality thus establishes harmony between intention and action, allowing 
one to take up and move into their world in a purposeful directed fashion without the 
need of one’s explicit attention (PhP, 146). In other words, the capacity for motricity, 
which, as an original intentionality, allows one’s lived body to meet the solicitation of the 
world, is not solely a function of reflective thought. Rather, Merleau-Ponty characterizes 
intentionality as pre-reflective. He explains, “my body has its world, or understands its 
world without having to go through representations, or without being subordinated to a 
symbolic or objectifying function” (PhP, 141). When one is caught up in their world, 
their sense of their own bodily motion remains at the margins of experience. We tend not 
to focus on our own movement itself; rather we are attentive to accomplishing something. 
I apply lipstick, I tie my shoe, I light a candle, I lock the door behind me. I do not have to 
think of how, where, when—I am already reaching for my coffee. When engaged in 
actions such as these my movements are smooth, and continuous; the flow uninterrupted 
by a need to calculate where my body is, or how to execute my own movement.25  
 
Bodily intentionality is not a movement in thought, but rather is at work prior to explicit 
thought, and resides below the level of one’s reflective engagement with, or thoughts 
about, the world. Recall that for Merleau-Ponty, intentionality is specifically not an “I 
think” (PhP, 139). Instead, the intentionality that characterizes the lived body and 
embodied subjectivity is pre-reflective. Phenomenological accounts of subjectivity stress 
that there are two ways in which one can be aware of ourselves: “through observational 
                                                   
contrary to the sense of hesitancy described here, and rather encapsulates a style of being 
in and towards the world that is unencumbered and reflects a sense of ease.  
25 Bodily intentionality cannot be reduced to motility alone. As Merleau-Ponty explains, 
our bodily intentionality is underlined by an intentional arc which unites motility with 
perception, cognition, sense, and affect (PhP, 137). Breaking from the colloquial 
understanding of the senses as having distinct and defined boundaries, Merleau-Ponty 
maintains that our senses are synesthetic. And so, I hear the hardness of my pen as it falls 
to the floor, and I see the softness and warmth of my sister’s scarf in the folds of its 
fabric. Our bodily intentionality not only reflects this entwining, but also is the means of 
their unification through the body’s lived orientation in and toward the world (PhP, 141). 
Further, the intentional arc “projects around us our past, our future, our human milieu, 
our physical situation, our ideological situation, and our moral situation” (PhP, 137).  
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reflective self-consciousness (self-as-object) and through non-reflective forms of 
consciousness (self-as-subject)” (Jenkinson, 2017, 33). The term pre-reflective, then, 
captures an implicit awareness that precedes higher order forms of self-consciousness. 
This captures the agentive and affective dimensions of the body and “corresponds to the 
bodily mode of givenness of intentional objects of consciousness” (Legrand, 2007, 505). 
  
1.2.3 Habit and Bodily Being in the World 
 
I am particularly drawn to Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of habit as a kind of 
“knowledge in our hands”, one that relieves us of the task of consciously interpreting our 
perceptual experience as it unfolds (Php, 145). Colloquially, habit often gets a bad rap. 
Seen as a fixed way of doing things, habits are thought to doom individuals to endless 
cycles of repetition. As many scholars, have indicated, habitual actions occur absent 
one’s explicit attention. For instance, I am usually oblivious to the fact that I touch my 
face. When my attention is focused on a good book, or sitting watching a movie, my 
fingertips make their way to my mouth, my eyes, my nose, my forehead, and my hair. I 
am only awakened to the fact that I touch my face so much by being asked not to touch 
my face! My propensity for touching my face exemplifies the common understanding of 
habit as a “lack of control or conscious intention” (Ngo, 2016, 848). However, Merleau-
Ponty’s account presents habit as having existential significance, since it enables a 
“primordial attachment to the world” (PhP, 341).  As Ngo (2017) explains, Merleau-
Ponty describes habit as “a certain mode of moving in and responding to the world that is 
marked with ease, familiarity, and confidence” (3). When caught up in habitual actions 
one’s movements are smooth, and continuous; they flow uninterrupted by explicit 
thought. This allows for a sense of cohesion between the subject and their world. For 
instance, since I am able-bodied, I approach and walk up the stairs, reach for my keys, 
and unlock the door, with a sense of ease. I do not need to pause to calculate the precise 
heights of the steps, and I am not encumbered by the worry that I might not make it to the 
top (again, a privilege based on my own able-bodiedness). When one can rely on habit 
there is no need to imagine the positions of our body or calculate the trajectory of our 
movement in and towards the world in order to enact our intentions. Habit, on this 
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account, is presented as a bodily understanding, rather than a thetic or thematized form of 
knowledge that is reflective or conceptual, or an automatic reflex. In other words, habits 
operate pre-reflectively. This account of habit is grounded in two central 
phenomenological concepts: the body schema and habit.  
 
1.2.4 The Body Schema 
 
The hold that one has upon their body, as a power for action in and towards the world, is 
made possible by a body schema, which sketches out within the structure of one’s body a 
field of past, current, and possible positions, orientations, and actions. The postures, 
positions and movements are knotted together as a meaningful core that makes up the 
body schema. As Merleau-Ponty explains: “I know the position of each of my limbs 
through a body schema” (PhP, 100 - 101). What does it mean to say that the body bears a 
schema? For Merleau-Ponty this schema is not simply a copy or a global awareness or 
the body, but rather a “manner of expressing that my body is in and towards the world” 
(PhP, 103). The positions, orientations, and actions that are sedimented within the 
corporeal schema make up a dynamic and open system of equivalences. Understood as an 
open and flexible structure that binds intention with action, the body schema is best 
characterized as dynamic and responsive. Unsurprisingly, this schema is not a geometric 
plan of fixed positions and postures. The body schema is not a rigid model that represents 
the body as an assemblage of parts or a collection of points. It serves as a reservoir for 
our acquired understanding of, and manners of relating to, our world, and expresses the 
dynamic organisation of one’s body as an open system of current positions, postures, 
movements, and “an infinity of equivalent positions” which envelope each other and rise 
up to meet the solicitation of the world (PhP, 139; 142). This not only captures the 
situated spatiality of bodily existence, but also highlights the intuitive understanding of 
one’s own body as well as the tacit ways in which one inhabits the world. Merleau-
Ponty’s notion of the body schema is “not merely an experience of my body, but rather 
an experience of my body in the world” (PhP, 142).  
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One might think of the body schema as a hollow of non-thetic knowledge that holds the 
orientations and powers of one’s body that renders the body capable of performing 
physical tasks pre-reflectively. It is important to note that the kind of embodied poise or 
readiness that is made possible by workings of the corporeal schema is not a function of 
reflective thought. As Merleau-Ponty explains, “my body has its world, or understands its 
world without having to go through ‘representations,’ or without being subordinated to a 
‘symbolic’ or ‘objectifying function’” (PhP, 141). In other words, the operation of the 
corporeal schema does not occur at the level of explicit consciousness. I do not, for 
example, stop to formulate a specific plan for action if I find myself thirsty as I am 
writing. Instead, I simply reach for my glass. Rather, this concept speaks to bodily means 
of knowing and understanding the world. As Merleau-Ponty explains, the body schema 
acts as “an immediately given invariant by which different motor tasks are instantly 
transposable” and enables one’s intentional action in the world to unfold absent of 
conscious intervention, attention, or judgement. (PhP, 142).26 As will be shown, residual 
structures accumulate over time within the body schema. The structures that make up the 
body schema are “acquired and developed through our perpetual movement in and 
toward the world” (Jenkinson, 2017, 70) (C.f PhP). Recall that these structures are open 
and contingent. Not only does this means that they are able to being changed, but it also 
illustrates that they can be taken up in a different of contexts. In this way, the body 
schema is a “system of equivalences” (PhP, 142); a skilled ballet dancer, for example, is 
more likely to be proficient (than a non-dancer) at dancing the waltz as well. And yet, as 
Ngo (2017) observes, “a trained ballet dancer, for example, will take to breakdancing 
differently than a street dancer, because each have come to move to music and inhabit 
their bodies in different ways” (4). As we will see, when one acquires a skill, the body 
                                                   
26 It should be noted here that there is some stickiness around the use of the term 
“corporeal schema”, specifically with regards to its relationship to the notion of a “body 
image.” In his writings, Merleau-Ponty sometimes exchanges the term “body schema” for 
“body image” and uses the terms interchangeably. Although he does not draw a specific 
distinction between the two terms, as Wiess (1999) explain, he maintains that 
“consciously focusing on one’s body already presupposes a more primary, pre-reflective 
way of experiencing the body” (2). As such, during experience, the body schema it is 
“not available to consciousness in experience as an explicit object of experience” 
(Jenkinson, 2016, 936).  
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schema is reworked to incorporate a new dynamic of position, posture and movement 
(C.f. Merleau-Ponty, Php, 143). As these structures are called upon more and more to 
facilitate one’s engagement with their world, they become habitual. It is only once 
patterns of gesture and response have become habitual that they can then be called upon 
pre-reflectively to facilitate the meeting of our intentions with action.  
 
1.2.5 Habits and Inhabiting 
 
The capacity for habit expresses an intelligence belonging specifically to our bodies; the 
“knowledge in my hands” that allows me to type, dance, or play an instrument (PhP, 
145). Habit enables us to inhabit the world. The spatial orientation that habits provide 
offer embodied subjects ways of taking up and moving in and towards the world. More 
precisely, it extends the reach of our intentions and gestures within a “motor space” that 
is sketched out before us (PhP, 141) (C.f. Wiess 2008; Ahmed 2006). However, habits 
also come to inhabit us, becoming incorporated within the spatiality of the body itself. As 
Merleau-Ponty explains: “to habituate oneself to a hat, an automobile, or a cane is to take 
up residence in them, or inversely to make them participate within the voluminosity of 
one’s own body” (PhP, 145). Typing on a keyboard exemplifies this well. Once the 
movements involved in typing on the keyboard become habitual they are guided by 
intention and do not require one to know the objective positions of letters and keys in 
order to type. Instead, the keyboard is given to the proficient typist as a power of 
expression rather than rows of keys. This occurs because the space of the keyboard has 
been integrated into their bodily space.  
 
One might also examine the relationship between a dancer and their shoes to demonstrate 
this phenomenon. Particularly in the case of percussive dance forms, which are highly 
rhythmic and rely on the precise execution of foot-based dance patterns (such as tap 
dance, step dance, clogging, or highland dance), the relationship between the dancer and 
their shoes is very important. The shoe helps to accentuate the interchange between a 
dancer’s feet and the floor. Just as the typist’s movements are guided by intention rather 
than a knowledge of the objective locations of the letters and keys on a keyboard, I do not 
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know what the distance is between my shoes and the floor. Instead, I sense the kind of 
sounds that can emerge through the exchange between my feet and the floor.27 I settle 
into my shoes by taking them up and dancing with them. Once the space of my shoes is 
integrated into my bodily space, my shoes are given to me as a power of expression 
rather than as protective covering for my feet. 
 
1.2.6 The Living Present: The Temporal Structure of Habit 
  
Instead of framing temporality as an  abstract “object” of investigation, Merleau-Ponty’s 
phenomenology forwards an understanding of temporality as a facet of our being. 
Temporality is inherent to subjectivity. This interpretation of temporality focuses on 
grasping time as it is lived. The living present encompasses “the whole past, everything 
foreign, and the whole of the thinkable future are reanimated” (PrP, 90). This is not to say 
that the past and future are simultaneous. Temporality prevails by “piling up, by 
proliferation, by encroachment, by promiscuity” (VI, 115).  This reflects the Husserlian 
movement of temporal protention, retention, and primal impression, wherein the subject 
remains anchored in the past while simultaneously extending themselves toward the 
horizon of the future. From this perspective, time is understood as being structured by 
virtual envelopment or coexistence, rather than succession. The co-existence of the past 
and present is not a fusion of the two, however; rather, “past and present are Ineinander, 
each enveloping-enveloped” (VI, 268). In a passage from the Phenomenology of 
Perception (2012), Merleau-Ponty writes: 
“The present still holds in hand the immediate past, but without 
positing it as an object, and since this immediate past likewise 
retains the past that immediately preceded it, time gone by is 
entirely taken up and grasped in the present. The same goes for 
the imminent future, which will itself have its own horizon of 
imminence. But along with my immediate past, I also have the 
horizon of the future that surrounded it; that is, I have my actual 
                                                   
27 I expand on this relationship in chapter two.  
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present seen as the future of that past. Along with the imminent 
future, I also have the horizon of the past that will surround it; 
that is, I have my actual present as a part of that future (PhP, 71-
71).  
This quotation captures the thickness of the present. The present is gathered around the 
“anticipation of some unknown (but perhaps expected) future” as well as “in retention of 
the imminent (or even distant) past” (Jenkinson, 2016, 948) (C.f. VI, 267-8). Experience, 
then, is held together by gearing into the horizons of the past and future.  We are at once 
“oriented by the past” and “pulled toward an anticipated future” (Jenkinson, 2016, 948).  
 
1.2.7 Open Temporality of Habit 
 
Habitual actions occur within in the ‘living present”. This means they are enacted in a 
field of presence that envelopes the horizons of both the past and future. Habitual 
movement initiates a link between this moment and a future moment, while also 
enveloping the instants that precede it (PhP, 141). As Ngo (2017) explains, “habits look 
at once to the past and the future, while being instantiated in the present. That is, the 
phenomena of habit functions outside a chronological scheme of time held together 
through a linear chain of the past-present-future” (4). In other words, the temporality of 
habit is synchronic and characterized by ambiguity. On one hand, habit reflects an 
accumulated past. On the other hand, each new (present) enactment holds a projected 
future. This temporal ambiguity is central to habit and can be observed in the double 
movement of sedimentation, which at once looks to the horizons of both the past and the 
future, while also being instantiated in the present. 
 
1.2.8 The Double Movement of Sedimentation  
 
As Ngo (2017) observes, Merleau-Ponty often evokes the motif of sedimentation to 
describe the process through which habits are laid down in the body. Following this 
metaphor, habitual patterns of movement are describes as being “deposited” in the living 
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body. There they coalesce as a series of latent structures. The capacities gathered here in 
turn serve as a ground or base for being in the world. As a metaphor, sedimentation helps 
to capture how habits accumulate over time in the body schema, and “attests to the 
weightiness of the past in the present lived body” (Ngo, 2017, 4). As Ngo (2017) 
reiterates, “the sedimentation analogy is useful insofar as it allows us to tell a story of the 
past as it comes to be grounded and remain immanent in the present” (4). Indeed, in the 
enactment of habitual movement we witness the body as it carries forward its past. In 
other words, the sedimented past bears upon the present, structuring perception in the 
present by affording certain ways of moving in and towards it. This points specifically to 
the ways that sedimented structures provide the background for experience and 
engagement in the world. Although Ngo (2017) is critical of how this metaphor is taken 
up, it is still helpful for revealing sedimentation as a process through which structures of 
behavior come to be integrated in the body.  
 
Sedimentation occurs over time. As behaviors or experiences are repeated, they 
eventually form flexible corporeal structures which themselves endure, but not simply as 
a remnant of the past. As Merleau-Ponty explains: “sedimentation is: a trace of the 
forgotten and thereby a call to thought which depends on itself to go farther” (IP, 58-59). 
Through sedimentation “sense is deposited… but not as an object left behind, as a simple 
reminder or as something that survives as a residue. [It is deposited] as something to 
continue” (IP, 9). In other words, sedimentation implies a future orientation. The past 
enlivens the present while also influencing that which is to come. By instituting a familiar 
pathway for our movement, habit sketches out in advance how we might relate to the 
world. The more habits are called upon, the deeper they burrow into the body. The paths 
traced by habit lend a certain shape, direction, and sequence to our movements. Because 
of this, habit predisposes us to particular lines of action, or movement in and towards the 
world. Habit takes up “the intentions that proceed it, and it creates an intention out of it 
which survives it and will go farther, and by which there is forgetfulness of its origins” 
(IP, 51). We can think of habit then as instituting a tendency, or as projecting a line of 
potential action. Through habit, Merleau-Ponty explains, one’s experiences are endowed 
“with durable dimensions, in relation to which a whole series of other experiences will 
 36 
make sense, will form a thinkable sequel, a history” (IP, 77). Habits, he continues, 
“deposit a sense in me, not just as something surviving or as a residue, but as the call to 
follow, the demand of a future” (IP, 77). In this way, the capacity for habit reflects the 
complex temporal intertwining that is central to embodied subjectivity.  
 
1.2.9 Beyond Repetition: Temporal Openness and the Generativity 
of Habit 
 
In habit, we witness an opening up of a new enactment of a motor task. This is significant 
because it points to the generativity of habit; a quality which is often overshadowed by 
the dynamics of sedimentation and repetition. Habits are commonly seen as 
predetermined ways of doing things; habitual actions are viewed as “fixed” and 
subsequently doom individuals to endless cycles of repetition. However, this can lead one 
to overlook what habit capacitates people to do: adjust our actions to adapt to or modify 
to our situated contexts. As an able-bodied woman, I can walk up stairs even when the 
stairs are different heights! I can use someone else’s keyboard with only minor typos! No 
matter the vessel, I can and I will drink my coffee (with only minimal spillage)! Habitual 
behavior arises in response to a situation which might either be routine and expected, or 
unusual and unforeseen. For Merleau-Ponty, “habit expresses the power we have of 
dilating our being in the world, or of altering our existence” (PhP, 145). One is not, 
therefore, condemned by the ways that habits have been sedimented into my corporeal 
schema. Because habits are a kind of doing rather than a kind of being, there is potential 
for them to be taken up differently. Although habit certainly predisposes us to a mode of 
responding to the world, it does not, however, institute a bare recurrence of specific acts.  
Framing habit solely in terms of rigid repetition however, makes them appear antithetical 
to innovation, and obscures the improvisational generativity of habit. 
 
I turn to Merleau-Ponty’s account of habit rather than Pierre Bourdieu’s notion of habitus 
because I find habitus, is overly deterministic. Habitus, like habit, indicates an orientation 
in the world. This is grounded in a theory of embodiment that is consistent with Merleau-
Ponty’s understanding of the active interchange unfolding between self and world. 
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However, Bourdieu’s habitus is specifically focused on the incorporation of the social 
world into the body. For Bourdieu, habitus encapsulates a set of learned patterns of 
meaning, beliefs, behaviors, and tastes that are historically constituted and acquired 
through socialization. Bourdieu defines habitus as:  
The conditionings associated with a particular class of 
conditions or existence produce the habitual, systems of 
durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures 
predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as 
principles which generate and organize practise and 
representation (Bourdieu, 1990, 53).  
Certainly, Bourdieu’s work on the social dimensions of habit helps to make sense of the 
connections between one’s own habits and the habits of others; however his account has 
little to say about movement and is less focused on articulating the bodily experience of 
habit. The all-encompassing role that Bourdieu attributes to habitus leaves little room for 
the expressivity and changeful dynamics of habit to shine. For Bourdieu, our 
embeddedness within a particular class (and its associated habitus )limits her ability to 
apprehend it as such. By contrast, Merleau-Ponty’s account of habit speaks to the process 
of habit formation itself as a dynamic and creative bodily process. He shows that 
embodied subjects can be expanded through the acquisition of new bodily habits. 
Additionally, Merleau-Ponty maintains that examining our habitual responses to the 
world can also enable new interpretations of these responses. Merleau-Ponty (2012) 
asserts,  
by renouncing a part of his spontaneity, by engaging in the 
world through stable organs and preestablished circuits, man 
can acquire the mental and practical space that will free him, in 
principle, from his millieu and thereby allow him to see it (89).  
For Bourdieu, all other social factors (gender, race, age, sexuality etc.) work through 
class-based habitus (C.f. Bourdieu, 1990). He seems to say that socioeconomic status 
alone determines habitus. He arrives at this conclusion in part because he assumes that 
those within the same social class share a common experience of the world. This 
tendency towards universalism can be seen in his claim that:  
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The practices of members of the same group, or, in a 
differentiated society, the same class, are always more and 
better harmonized that the agents know or wish, because, as 
Leibniz again says, “following only (his) own laws,” each 
nevertheless “agrees with the other”. The habitus is precisely 
this immanent law, lex insita, inscribed in bodies as identical 
histories, which is the precondition not only for the co-
ordination of practices but also for practices of co-ordination 
(Bourdieu, 1990, 59).  
The argument that those who belong to the same social class attribute the same meanings 
to various different cultural practices because of their shared habitus is persuasive. 
However, I am suspicious of Bourdieu’s claim that this collective perspective is 
“inscribed in bodies as identical histories” (59). This universalizing conception of the 
subject dismisses ambiguities and dissonances that inflect one’s being in the world. The 
concept on its own lacks the explanatory potential for an account of embodied 
subjectivity where the subject is multiply constituted, fragmented, and intersectional. 
Although this shortcoming might be remedied by applying habitus alongside a multi-
dimensional logic of intersectionality (C.f. Crenshaw, 1991; Silva 2016), I find Merleau-
Ponty’s view of habit as “dilating our being in the world” can account for the more 
generative aspects of habit, including the unique ways marginalized subjects inhabit a 
habitus.  
 
1.2.10 Habits as Held: Rethinking Sedimentation as Activity-
Passivity 
 
In addition to Merleau-Ponty’s work on habit and sedimentation, in this section I also 
draw on the recent work of Helen Ngo (2017), who has expanded on the notion of habit 
as held by the body. Ngo (2017) observes that the imagery of sedimentation evokes a 
sense of passivity and fixity (38). In the field of geology, sedimentation refers to “the 
process in which materials get deposited on a surface (passivity), and once sedimented 
the materials solidify and remain fixed in their layers and order (inertia)” (Ngo, 2017, 
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38). However, on Merleau-Ponty’s account, the sedimented structures that ground habit 
do not form “an inert mass at the foundation of our consciousness” (PhP, 131). Rather, 
they are understood to have “an open sense, which develops by means of proliferation, by 
curves, decentering and re-centering, zigzag, ambiguous passage, with a sort of identity 
between whole parts, the beginnings and end” (IP, 48-49). Recall that for Merleau-Ponty, 
the body schema that habit draws on is itself flexible and contingent. The body schema is 
continually reworked, caught up in a persistent process of renewal. As a consequence, 
acquisitions made through habit are never fixed, permanent, or absolute. Indeed, habits 
“feed off my present” to engender an orientation in and towards the world (PhP, 132). 
This account does not align well with the view of sedimentation as a primarily passive 
process. In fact, understanding sedimented structures of the body schema as such 
obscures the creative innovation at the heart of Merleau-Ponty’s account of habit (PhP, 
131-132). Habits are not simply deposited in our bodies as inert unchanging structures, 
“but rather extend and fill out existing bodily orientations and dispositions” (Ngo, 2016, 
863).   
 
Ngo’s (2016; 2017) discussion of habit introduces a greater sense of activity into the 
process of sedimentation outlined by Merleau-Ponty. Ngo (2017) shows that 
sedimentation is not wholly passive, as the colloquial use of the word might imply. A 
closer examination of sedimentation reveals that habits are held by the body rather than 
deposited in the body. This suggests that habit is continuous and requires corporeal 
receptivity. The sedimented structures that enable our active engagement in the world are 
not static or. Consequently, “the stability of our sedimented structures of behaviour is 
relative; sedimented structures provide stability but this stability can be undone over time 
(or intentionally) unless the structures are maintained” (Jenkinson, 2017, 79). This 
flexibility is important because opens up the possibility of freedom and spontaneity and 
presents behavior as mutable and subject to change. As Jenkinson (2017) explains, “if our 
sedimented structures were fixed like cement, this would preclude the kinds of learning 
that involve the modification or change of specific behaviors relative to contexts” (79). 
This means that on Merleau-Ponty’s account, the acquisition of habits is never complete. 
Habits are constantly evolving shaping and constraining our being in the world.   
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Expanding on the geological metaphor of sedimentation, Ngo (2017) makes the astute 
observation that sedimentation depends on the receptivity of the surface onto which new 
materials are deposited. As she explains, in geological sedimentation, “the depositing of 
materials is passive insofar as surfaces do not solicit them;” however, “they do receive 
them” (Ngo, 2017, 38). This reception however, depends on some level of compatibility 
between the new material and the surface in question. She explains: “the surface contains 
a receptivity to the material, with its own edges and formations codetermining which new 
materials get deposited, and how” (Ngo, 2017, 39; Ngo 2016, 863). Receptivity forwards 
a livelier interpretation of sedimentation and points to the active way that our bodies take 
up and enact habits. Implied is that sedimentation of habits also depends upon an 
openness or readiness to take them up.  
 
Ngo (2017) observes that the Latin root of sedimentation (sedere) has a double meaning: 
it gestures to “settling” but also of “sitting”. She argues, this expanded definition allows a 
new and more active sense of sedimentation to emerge., since “sitting entails an active 
moment; it involves a holding of the body” (Ngo, 2017, 39). Although one remains in one 
place and might appear still when sitting, one must actively sustain this posture. One 
might appear inactive, but sitting takes effort. One’s body must work to maintain a sitting 
position over time. Infants are not born with, but develop the ability to sit up by 
themselves. It takes months for an infant to develop the necessary muscular strength in 
their neck, upper and lower back, that will allow them to balance and stabilize their torso 
so that they can hold a “sitting” position. Speaking of the body’s familiar and habitual 
motility within a home-space, Merleau-Ponty writes: “this word ‘sedimentation’ must not 
trick us: this contracted knowledge is not an inert mass at the foundation of our 
consciousness” (PhP, 131). He continues, describing the way his body continues to 
“hold” the dimensions of his home, explaining: “I still hold ‘in my hands’ or ‘in my legs’ 
its principal distances and directions and only if a multitude of intentional threads run out 
towards it from my body” (PhP, 131). Another salient example can be drawn from my 
previous account of the typist (mentioned in section 1.2.5.). Recall that the typist does not 
“know” the locations of the letters on the keyboard explicitly, but instead the keyboard 
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itself is integrated into the typist’s bodily schema. Here, we can think of the typists’ 
knowledge as being held in their hands. In either case, the reference to holding 
demonstrates that habits are also active and continually activated.  
 
As we have seen, habit relies on the capacity for motricity, which, as an original 
intentionality, allows the body to meet the solicitation of the world, as well as the flexible 
structures of the body schema. The enactment of habitual movement is not a simple 
repetition of that which has come before it. Even in routine habitual behaviors we witness 
an opening up of a new enactment of a motor task. This is important because it means 
that I am not, therefore, condemned by my habits. There is always potential for habits to 
be taken up differently, and to introduce new habits. As Merleau-Ponty puts it, “the 
resumption of the past in the present leaves it in its originality, does not truly surpass it, 
does not flatter itself to contain it all [in its entirety], plus something else” (IP, 59). The 
past  “creates a question, puts it in reserve, makes a situation that is indefinitely open” 
(IP, 22). Although they are anchored in the past, habits are not static entities, but instead 
are held in our bodily horizons. 
 
 
1.3 Being Thrown: A Phenomenology of Flow in Dance 
  
Back stage. 
We would huddle.  
Hop-one, hop-two, up to the corner round-and turn, pas-du-bas, pas-du-bas, and, high-
cut, high-cut, high-cut, high-cut.  
Speaking in rhythms, breathing in beats. Using our hands as feet and arms as legs. 
Marking movement, sealing sequences in skin.  
Only to step on stage and realise I have forgotten everything I know of this dance.  
All of it.  
All but gone until it isn’t.  
 
Dancers, as skillful movers, possess dance as practical bodily knowledge - what Merleau-
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Ponty would describe as knowledge “in the hands” (PhP, 131). In this section I will show 
that dance relies on and articulates the embodied dynamics that allow us to encounter the 
world, revealing how embodied subjects understand, inhabit, and interpret our worlds in 
and through movement. By closely examining the sedimentation of habitual movement 
that allows for flow in dance to be achieved, one can describe in more concrete terms 
how habits become familiar ways of using the body, instituting corporeal tendencies and 
orientations in the world. I argue that interpreting dance through Merleau-Ponty’s 
articulation of the habit body provides a better characterization of the embodied nature of 
dance and better captures the dancing experience of “flow”. I draw on the concepts of 
habit, body schema, sedimentation and intentionality to articulate this experience. The 
experiencing phenomenon of flow is shown to be the result of the dancer’s bodily 
expertise and related to pre-reflective bodily movement. Although flow is a significant 
phenomenological component of dance that is valuable in and of itself, since I take up 
this concept in a subsequent chapter to describe and explain pre-reflective bodily 
intentionality in racialized embodiment, my discussion of flow here is meant to provide a 
foundation for further investigation of how to transform pre-reflective bodily movement 
in subsequent chapters.  
 
I wish more people knew what it felt like to actually dance. I’m not 
referring to the difficulty of learning technique or combination. I 
mean the part that comes after everything clicks. When your most 
focused mind, your most mouldable body, and your truest spirit all 
intertwine at the highest level. That point will look different for 
everyone, of course, but I wish everyone could attempt to reach it at 
least once. It can literally feel like flying. 
– Fana Tesfagiorgis, Alvin Ailey American Dance Theater.  
 
In the above excerpt Fana Tesfagiorgis articulates a beautiful moment “after everything 
clicks”. She gestures to her own skillful body, the body that already “knows” a sequence 
of movement. In dance, the term ‘choreography’ is used to refer to the organization of 
bodily movement. Broadly, it provides a guideline, or plan, which sets down in advance 
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the kind of actions performed as well as their sequence or progression (C.f Foster, 2010). 
The term was first used in the early Eighteenth Century to describe the practice of 
notating dances. The word ‘choreography’ derives from two Greek words: “choreia, the 
synthesis of dance, rhythm, and vocal harmony manifest in the Greek chorus; and graph, 
the act of writing” (Foster, 2010, 69). Although this term was originally meant to capture 
the patterning of movement observed in dance, it is also applied in a number of different 
contexts where the structuring, arranging, and regulation of movement are important. For 
instance, when framed as arranging or organizing bodies in motion choreography may 
describe the movement of cars, the flight of birds, or the coordination of traffic lights for 
commuter flow. This being said, I use the term choreography to refer to the specific 
combinations of movements and steps that come together to form a sequence. But what 
does it mean for the body to know a piece of choreography? Tesfagiorgis’ description 
does not include a rundown of the choreography that has been deposited in her body. She 
does not go through steps mechanistically. Instead, her cohesion with them imparts a 
“feeling of flying”. This is the moment when dance comes alive for her, not as changes in 
positions, but as a dynamic interplay of forces which recoil and expand, rise and fall, and 
suddenly shift direction.  
 
I associate the “feeling of flying” described by Tesfagiorgis with what some dancers or 
musicians describe as “flow”. Flow is a term often used in music and sport. In the context 
of sport, the term is typically used to describe “a state in which the athlete feels fully 
immersed and ‘in the zone’ in their activity” (Hardes, 2016, 283). One is operating in an 
intuitive state. By closely examining the sedimentation of habitual movements that allow 
for flow in dance to be achieved, one is able to describe in more concrete terms how 
habits become familiar ways of using the body, instituting particular corporeal tendencies 
and orientations in the world that unfold pre-reflectively. In this section, I draw on 
phenomenological descriptions of my own lived experiences of dancing and situate them 
alongside other accounts from professional contemporary dancers engaged in the expert 
performance of skilled movement.  
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When caught up in dancing there is a sense that it is being called forth, rising up from 
beneath my feet. Sometimes it feels like my body is dancing on its own, that the dance is 
dancing me. As is the case in everyday movement in and towards the world, I do not 
think of movement when I dance. Rather, I am possessed by movement, and fully 
immersed in its unfolding. When dancing, I do not think of choreography and execute a 
series of specified movements mechanically. In other words, I do not go through the 
motions step-by-step.28 Instead I feel the movements brought forth as a dynamic whole. 
Choreography flows forth from my body on its own and I feel myself to be at the service 
of the dance itself. My body seems to react through dance before I explicitly know what I 
am doing. This produces an interesting sensation: one in which there is both a greater 
sense of “control” of the body alongside a decrease in self-consciousness. Merleau-Ponty 
reflects on this idea, drawing on Proust. When performing, “the performer is no longer 
producing or reproducing the sonata: he feels himself and the others feel him to be at the 
service of the sonata; the sonata sings through him” (VI, 151). There is cohesion between 
the musician and the music such that the musician does not possess music; the music 
possesses them. 
 
Knowledge of dance is pre-reflective. First, dancers do not have time to think about 
choreography when performing: “some parts of it are very fast and unless it’s in the body 
– once you start having to think about the next step – you’re going to be behind” 
(Parviainen, 2011, 640). Through repetition, practice, and rehearsal, sequences of 
movement are sedimented as habit. Interestingly, Purser (2017) notes that dancers often 
describe the process of learning, remembering and performing choreography (i.e. 
sedimenting) as a way of “getting” a sequence of movement “in/into the body” (322). 
Getting movement into the body requires the execution of choreography to occur without 
a dancer’s explicit attention. For instance, patterns of movement - hop-brush-beat-beat, 
Pas-de-Basque, Tai-tai ta-ta, Tai-tai thom - have nestled deep in the structures of my 
corporeal schema that they flow without needing to explicitly remember them. One 
dancer explains, “to really know a choreography you don’t have to think about it” 
                                                   
28 Here I use ‘mechanically’ to encapsulate the reduction of a sequence movement to 
disparate parts and positions.  
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(Purser, 2018, 323). It is only once a sequence of movements becomes habitual that it 
transpires instantaneously and unconsciously. Often thinking about what movements are 
supposed to come next actually impedes movement. As Merleau-Ponty notes, “thinking 
about movement destroys movement” (PhP, 280). For instance, if I am focused on 
thinking ahead to what movements are coming up in a sequence of choreography, my 
movements in the present suffer. I might, for example, add an extra beat, initiate a 
sequence with the wrong foot, or lose the rhythm of my steps completely.  
 
Second, dance is pre-reflective in in so far as dancers usually do not “know” the steps 
involved in a piece of choreography in an explicit or reflective way. Knowing 
choreography is “characterized by the movements being available to the dancer at a pre-
reflective level as he or she performs a sequence, without the need for conscious 
reflective thought” (Parviainen, 2011, 262). Once a dancer is habituated to a piece of 
choreography it becomes integrated into their bodily space. As with the typist who does 
not know the objective positions of the keys on their keyboard, neither does a dancer 
know the precise or exact locations of her arms or legs in an objective sense. Describing 
how an organist perceives an organ, Merleau-Ponty maintains, “he does not learn the 
objective positions for each stop, and each pedal, nor does he entrust such positions to 
‘memory’. During the rehearsal – just as during the performance – the stops, the pedals, 
and the keyboards are only presented to him as powers of such and such emotional or 
musical value, and their position as those places through which this value appears in the 
world” (PhP, 146-147). For the skilled organist, because they have already sedimented 
habits for playing an organ, the organ is an expressive space where they feel at home. 
This enables the various keys and pedals to appear as open musical possibilities through 
which a melody may be grasped. Similarly, I do not know the specific distances or 
directions my body travels when I am dancing a specific sequence of movement. I don’t 
move my foot 30 cm to the right to a specific location in objective space. Rather, my 
body is a power for dancing. As one dancer explains, once habituated to a piece of 
choreography, “I just remember the point as in I remember the leg going there and then 
that will link with what’s coming next which wouldn’t directly mean the next step but 
just something in the next phrase” (Purser, 2018 323). As Sheets-Johnstone (2015) notes, 
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neither the dancer nor the dance exist “totally at any one point in space or at any single 
instant in time”, but express a becoming towards a future (29). Importantly, this is not 
meant imply that dancers are automatons. Not a complete withdrawal: “for when I am 
dancing, the rhythmic movements are released from my body without a need to make 
them deliberately – and yet I am guiding my movements according to the gesture and 
rhythm I feel” (Fuchs, 2003, 2).  
 
What we also learn from this description is that the “feeling of flying” feels good. So 
good she wishes others could feel it too. This shows up an important qualitative aspect of 
habitual movement: this intertwining is sensed as ease and comfort. Being in your body, 
for a dancer, is a sense of being comfortable, and feeling grounded, of being situated, and 
able to gear into the world. Dancers have diverse relationships to their bodies. Given this, 
I do not wish to overgeneralize how dancers feel their own bodies in motion or suggest 
that their dancing experiences are defined solely through a sense of comfort. For instance, 
when examining dancers’ perception of pain and injury, Helen Thomas and Jennifer Tarr 
(2009) found that dancers frequently distinguish between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ pain. These 
findings suggest that sensations of ‘good’ pain might also occur while caught up in 
movement. I am also aware of how my focus on comfort could elide the experiences of 
aging dancers and how they enact their embodied aging in and through dance (C.f. 
Coupland 2013).  The sense of being comfortable that I evoke here is meant to capture 
the felt sense of ease that arises through the unity of aim and enactment that is 
characteristic of pre-reflective movement. For example, one dancer captures the 
experience of being in the body she has when dancing: “So that’s kind of to be in your 
body – how it sits – that I’m comfortable here and that I’m correct within my presence 
there. [Louisa]” (Purser, 2018, 45). This sentiment is echoed in another participant’s 
description of being in harmony with the body: “It’s peaceful, its comfortable, you know, 
it’s pleasurable so it’s like a, mmm, its really difficult to explain, it’s just there, it’s in 
your body and you know it’s good and everything’s working, you know?... em, it’s quite 
hard to explain. [Marco]” (Purser, 2018, 45). When dance is sedimented as habit it 
enables one’s movement to flow with ease and lends an overall sense of comfort. This is 
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significant since it is precisely these felt experiences of comfort and ease that are 
uprooted in the resedimentation of habit.  
 
 
1.4 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has laid the groundwork for the rest of my project by outlining the tenets of 
Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological framework, paying specific attention to his account 
of habit. For Merleau-Ponty, habit is an essential feature of embodied being and an 
integral component of what it means to exist as a lived body in a world. The capacity for 
habit expresses an intelligence that belongs specifically to our bodies. Although habits 
are often thought to be a fixed way of doing things, habit, in fact, enables us to inhabit the 
world, providing an orientation that allows embodied subjects to move in and towards the 
world. Bringing this account to bear on dance has helped to demonstrate the way that 
habits enable pre-reflective bodily movement. As I have shown, when dance is 
sedimented as habit, it is able to flow forth with ease. In chapter two I take up dance to 
explore how habit may be transformed. As I will demonstrate, the disruption of habit 
creates discomfort through profound sensations of disorientation, hesitation, and double 
consciousness.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 48 
Chapter 2 
 
2 Dancing Bharatanatyam: Resedimenting Habit Through 
Movement 
 
In this chapter, I take up dance as a method for inquiring into embodied transformation – 
transformations occurring at the affective, perceptual level of the lived body, and 
particularly at the pre-reflective level of habit. I begin with a question: How does one 
access the generativity of habit and shift our habitual modes of being in the world? I 
contend that dancing can offer critical insight into how habitual modes of being in the 
world may be shifted and changed. Specifically, I examine how the phenomena of habit 
is brought to light while learning a new style of dance – here Bharatanatyam, a 
“classical”29  style of Indian dance. Learning a new style of dance disrupts the habitual 
ways a dancer has learned to move into the world. As the body schema is enriched with 
new and unfamiliar dynamics of comportment, the pre-reflective styles of comportment 
that already reside in a dancer’s body are brought to the forefront of their awareness. 
These are those familiar movements that occur automatically and with ease. Learning a 
new style of dance involves actively registering and resisting one’s inclinations towards 
these habitual patterns of movement. Through this process, one’s dancing body becomes 
unfamiliar and strange. While this causes discomfort, it also opens new possibilities for 
movement. This phenomenological analysis sets up my investigation of the habitual 
movement in the context of white privilege in chapter three.  
 
Taking my own dancing body itself as a “site of discovery”, I traced a number of changes 
in my own sensory-motor experiences as I transitioned from a beginner to novice 
Bharatanatyam dancer over a three-year period. Relying on the insights revealed through 
this experience, I tease out two experiential phenomena I contend are crucial to processes 
for shifting habitual movement: disorientation, and hesitation. First I show that, by 
                                                   
29 As will be elaborated on in chapter four, “classical” is a fraught term that in this 
context is laden with the weight of colonial encounters. Despite the contention that 
Bharatanatyam has its roots in antiquity, there is agreement among dance scholars that it 
is, in fact, of “contemporary” origins. 
 49 
disrupting one’s sense of bodily spatiality, experiences of disorientation disrupt the ease, 
immediacy, and flow of pre-reflective movement. Next, I demonstrate that the feeling of 
delay that arises in moments of hesitation disturbs one’s habitual sense of temporality. 
This allows one to register the residual habitual structures in the body as over-
determining intentional action, and opens an interval of indetermination that enables 
bodily receptivity, and makes felt the contingency of habit (the possibility of becoming 
otherwise). Experiences of disorientation and hesitation are significant because they can 
open the possibility for double consciousness, which can ground critical reflection.  
 
Taking up the mirror as metaphor for reflection, I conclude with a discussion of double 
consciousness where I examine how learning a dance form that is culturally removed 
from my own experience has impacted the way that I feel/move/think in general. The 
image of my white body reflected in the mirror in my Bharatanatyam class provided a 
visual reminder of my difference and position as a cultural outsider. Although mirrors 
gesture to questions surrounding oppression, objectification, self-surveillance, by 
considering the ways that dancers engage with the mirror as both a means for self-
awareness, self-correction, I explore how the mirror offers a dancer’s a way to perceive 
their own bodily movement from the “outside”. This outside perspective is necessary for 
adjusting one’s own movement in accordance to others.  
 
I begin this chapter with a short introduction to the dance history embedded in my own 
habitual dancing body and tracing some preliminary observations about the shifts in my 
sensory experience. Next I briefly outline some distinctive features of Bharatanatyam and 
describe some unique aspects of its movement vocabulary. The purpose of this section is 
to familiarize readers with some vocabulary that I will draw on throughout the chapter. 
This is followed by a methodological section explaining how I have taken up dance as 
part of my research process. I do not use dance as a tool, a resource to be mined, an 
example, or illustration. Rather I situate dancing itself as my method of inquiry, and 
appeal to sensuous knowledge delivered through my dancing body. This required me to 
become more attuned to my own bodily sensations while dancing by “listening-to” my 
body. I conclude this section by negotiating the tenuous relationship between dance and 
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writing. This methodological section is followed by a phenomenological analysis that 
teases out how experiences of disorientation, hesitation, and double consciousness arose 
in the context of learning Bharatanatyam.   
 
2.1 Expanding the Habitual Dancing Body 
  
Dance is particularly well-suited for exploring habit, since dancers have an intimate 
knowledge of their bodies as habitual dancing bodies. When performing, a dancer does 
not simply move through choreography, but choreography moves through her.30 This 
intertwining arises specifically because the dynamic patterns of movement that make up a 
given sequence of choreography are held by the dancer’s body, sedimented as habits 
within the body schema. Dancers’ habitual dancing bodies are oriented by their past, i.e. 
the dynamic patterns of movement that are held by their bodies and anticipate future 
movement; they are pulled towards a possible future. However, dancers’ mastery of 
movement does not only consist in sedimenting habits. Their expertise also entails an 
active involvement in embodied exploration of what might be optimised, modified, and 
changed in the way they move (Ravn 2017; Damkjaer, 2015; Ingerslev, 2013; Legrand 
and Ravn, 2009). This is necessary not only for optimizing one’s performance, but also to 
be able to “change their way of moving according to the different aesthetic and 
expressive demands characterizing the performances of which they are part” (Ravn, 
2017, 59). A dancer’s ability to register, disrupt and confront their own habitual dancing 
body is unique. Given this, dancing can offer critical insight into how habitual modes of 
being in the world may be changed.  
 
Bharatanatyam is a classical style of Indian dance that originated in Southern India in the 
state of Tamil Nadu. For the purposes of this chapter, I will not yet explain the larger 
social cultural context within which Bharatanatyam is embedded.31 Instead I focus on the 
embodied experience of dance training itself. When I began Bharatanatyam, my 
                                                   
30 Reviewed in chapter one.  
31 This will be addressed in chapter four.  
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movements were tentative. I was not sure of myself. My arms felt awkward and my 
wrists would ache for days after class. I was always thinking of what movement came 
next and rushing my body to get there on time. Adavus remained series of positions and 
postures set in place one after another and felt as separable sequences. When learning a 
new style of dance, one is challenged to undo the ways they are accustomed to moving 
into the world. Through this experience I found myself confronted with the pre-reflective 
habitual structures already sedimented within my dancing body, and the way these habits 
overdetermined my intentional movement.  In other words, this venture makes felt the 
pre-reflective styles of comportment, position, posture, gesture already residing in my 
habitual dancing body.  
 
At this point, it is relevant to outline some of my own dance history, since this history 
grounds the habitual ways I embody dancing. I arrive at the dance studio already laden 
with techniques of comportment, posture, and position, familiar ways of taking up space 
and time through movement. Comportment, as it is used within phenomenology, 
encompasses a multitude of capacities and dimensions of being (habit, intersubjectivity 
etc.) For Merleau-Ponty, ‘comportment’ arises in and through one’s embodied, and 
affective (and cognitive) engagement with the world. From this perspective, comportment 
gestures to the wholistic engagement of an individual with the world. The phrase “dance 
technique” refers to “movement vocabulary, skill, style and method” associated with a 
dance form (Parviainen, 2003b, 160). Dance positions are also an essential part of dance 
technique. Here, ‘position’ refers to the precise placement or arrangement of a dancer’s 
body while dancing. Posture, on the other hand, refers to the alignment of a dancer’s 
body as a whole. Movement vocabulary produces an overall aesthetic, which is 
comprised of a set of dynamic postures, positions held together as a system of movement. 
Dance technique provides a framework which enables and constrains kinaesthetic 
potentials.  
 
With consistent practice the dance techniques associated with a style are sedimented 
within a dancer’s body, becoming habitual. As habitual, dance technique traces out in 
advance familiar patterns of movement which then guide both dancer and dance. My 
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habitual dancing body has been shaped by the techniques of “Western” theatrical dance 
traditions, ballet, modern and contemporary dance. My embodiment is also informed by 
my background as a Highland dancer, a solo percussive form of step dancing developed 
in the Scottish Highlands. Each of these dance styles are distinct, having their own 
techniques and desired aesthetic outcomes. Each lends specific ways of being/dancing in 
the world and inhabiting space and time through movement. Although I was conceptually 
aware of the corporeal impact these styles had on my embodiment, the process of 
sedimenting a very different technique allowed me to hear, to see, to feel the existence of 
these structures within my body. Taking up Bharatanatyam made me aware of the force 
of my habitual dancing body, particularly my habitual dancing body as shaped by my 
training in Highland dance.  
 
I sensed many similarities and differences between Highland dance and Bharatanatyam. 
For example, I felt a familiarity when holding the proud upright stance of arimundi. I felt 
echoes of Highland dance in this posture, standing with my knees turned out, back 
straight and shoulders back. Given that I am already accustomed to holding this posture, I 
assume it with ease. However, I also immediately sensed a significant difference from 
within this same posture: the leg positions. To stand in arumindi one’s hips are open like 
a book from the center of the body and both legs are bent at the knee. This aspect of the 
stance sharply contrasts with the basic starting positions of all the forms of dance that I 
previously had experience with. This difference in position made itself known 
corporeally not only as a sense of discomfort in the moment, but also in the days after in 
my thighs, shins, and Achilles tendons. Over time, however, assuming this posture 
(re)shaped my body. By repeatedly taking up the stance itself I gained the strength and 
flexibility in the hips to deepen the stretch and create what is considered a more 
impressive and aesthetically pleasing shape. It took deliberate effort and persistence for 
me to become habituated to arimundi. It became more comfortable for me to hold this 
position because, if you recall, I was being taught three hours a week, practicing at home, 
and doing specific exercises and stretches to increase the strength of my thighs and the 
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flexibility in my hips. Now arimundi has receded to the background, supporting the 
becoming of my movement.32  
 
Learning a new style of movement not only involves sedimenting unfamiliar dynamics of 
comportment made up of new manners of posture and positions, but also involves 
actively registering and resisting the habitual structures already held by the body schema. 
Learning Bharatanatyam demanded that I actively resist my inclinations toward familiar 
patterns of movement I am accustomed to through my training in Highland dance. This is 
easier said than done. My habitual Highland dancing body, informed by my background 
in Highland dance, seemed to intrude. Specially, I noticed how the habitual positions and 
postures held in my dancing body would over-determine and anticipate my movements. 
However, over time I found that instead of being determined by the dance techniques 
sedimented in my body in advance, my habitual dancing body became more receptive, 
and open to change. 
 
Dancing Bharatanatyam over a prolonged period, I identified a number of changes in my 
own expression and perception of the dance form. Bharatanatyam is statuesque, exacting, 
and precise. These qualities are felt in the movement of the dance form itself. As a 
beginner, I felt and expressed the above qualities by engendering my movements with a 
sense of sharpness; my arm gestures cut through the air, slicing it like a knife. Swoosh, 
like an arrow shooting out from my center. Primed toward a desired position, I aimed my 
arm movements with the intent of a markswoman. As the form began to settle deeper in 
my body, as I learn how to hold it, and let myself be held by it, I noticed the sense of 
sharpness within certain gestures began to soften. My movements still felt swift and 
crisp, but I became aware of a gliding sensation, as though I was sailing across the studio 
floor. My movement was more balanced and controlled but also more relaxed, which 
helped me to feel more confident. As one becomes a more proficient dancer within a 
given style learn “an overall sense of what the movement feels like” (Hansen, & Ravn, 
2013, 209; C.f. Ravn, 2017). Instead of sensing adavus (steps) as independent pieces 
                                                   
32 This example also demonstrates that one often senses both complimentary and 
contradictory dynamics of comportment, posture, and position simultaneously.   
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brought together to form a sequence of choreography, as one would when they are 
learning for instance, I became to sense movements holistically. I no longer associated 
specific movements with specific qualities, but with an overall style of poise. When 
movement begins to flow like this it opens new possibilities of expression and again 
proves that one’s sense of mastery is never totalizing.  
 
2.2 In the Beginning…  
 
I did not start Bharatanatyam with the self-conscious intention of taking it up as a method 
of inquiry. Rather, I found myself suddenly caught up by its gestures and rhythms in a 
way that was totally unexpected.33 I was initially drawn to Indian Classical dance after 
watching Zero Degrees (2005) by choreographer Akram Khan. His choreography 
integrates contemporary dance with Kathak (a “classical” style of Indian dance 
originating on Northern India).34 After watching the piece, I felt a strong desire to feel the 
dance in my body. I had a sense that holding the movements was important for 
understating the dance. This makes sense phenomenologically. As Merleau-Ponty 
explains “I have no other way of knowing the human body than by living it, that is, by 
taking it up for myself the drama that moves through it and by merging with it” (PP, 
                                                   
33 I was hooked immediately. It was as though had been bitten by a Bharatanatyam bug. I 
was stamping in the grocery store, at the checkout line, while waiting to catch the bus. I 
would watch youtube videos of Bharatanatyam while I ate lunch. Over Christmas my 
sister watched politely as I danced in the kitchen. I showed her all of the adavus (steps) I 
had learned and whined about my lack of thumb flexibility. I danced on the beach and 
stretched while I watched television with my partner (Game of Thrones; West World; 
Stranger Things). Suffice it to say, this project is not impartial. It is embedded in social 
relations and affected by my own emotions, desires, and choices. I was drawn back to 
Vidya Natarajan’s classes because I liked her and she is a beautiful dancer. I feel good 
about myself when I dance. Dance class instills me with a felt bodily, aural, and 
kinesthetic sense of pleasure. 
34 Like Bharatanatyam, Kathak is classified as one of the major forms of Indian classical 
dance. Unlike Bharatanatyam, which originated in Southern India, the emergence of 
Kathak is traced to Northern India. While both dance forms are highly rhythmic and 
incorporate elaborate gestures and complex footwork, they differ in their stylistic 
qualities. For instance, Bharatanatyam is danced in what is call a “half-seat” position 
(aramandi) where both the dancer’s legs are bent at the knee, while Kathak is danced in a 
standing position. Additionally, the two forms are accompanied by different music.  
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205). What might I learn by taking up a style of “classical” Indian dance and learning to 
feel the unique contours of its qualitative dynamics with my body? And so, when I came 
upon a beginner’s class in Bharatanatyam being taught in the city I lived35, I thought to 
myself, why not try?36  
 
As a feminist researcher, I am cognisant of my ethical responsibility in regards to 
representing someone’s lived experience. Although I was not planning to conduct 
interviews with other participants in my dance class, as a feminist researcher I am keenly 
aware of the importance of transparency in research. Because of this I made sure to 
inform my teacher, Vidya Natarajan, as well as the other dancers in the class, of my 
project and made sure they understood that I would be addressing my own dance practice 
and lived experience of learning Bharatanatyam. I found myself a part of a supportive 
community of dancers. As my research progressed, I felt it was important to have 
someone on my committee with both a practical and historical understanding of 
Bharatanatyam, someone who could evaluate the accuracy of my descriptions of various 
positions, postures, or steps. As a cultural outsider, it is my ethical responsibility to turn 
to someone from within the community with deeper understanding of Bharatanatyam to 
ensure correct representation of the dance form. Fortunately, Vidya Natarajan was happy 
to join my committee to read and provide feedback on my descriptions of Bharatanatyam 
as well as the historical analysis I develope in chapter four.  
 
From the outset, I should say that I am still new to Bharatanatyam and my learning is far 
from finished. Over the first year of my introduction to the form I made steady progress 
with the basic steps (adavus) that make up the foundation of Bharatanatyam technique. 
Throughout this time, I attended a one and a half hour beginners dance classes once a 
week. After my beginner class was finished, I would stay and observe the advanced class 
that followed. Gradually I joined in the advanced class as well. Initially I timidly 
                                                   
35 London Ontario, Canada, November 2015. 
36 Although I did not have a practical understanding of Bharatanatyam, I did come to the 
class with what is probably an inordinate amount of knowledge about Hindu religious 
traditions. Through my studies in pursuit of a master’s degrees in religious studies I 
already had an essential foundational knowledge of Hindu traditions and mythology. 
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followed along in the back of the studio, stumbling through steps I was not yet ready for. 
Of course, I was not as skilled as the more advanced dancers, but in time I could keep up. 
I lost my apprehension about my inexperience getting in the way. I was dancing about 
three hours a week in the classroom environment and practicing at home daily. During 
this time, I also had the privilege of participating in several live performances. I cannot 
convey how incredibly generous it was for my teacher to incorporate me in these 
performances whenever possible. Including me meant that she had to make a specific 
effort to structure the choreography in such a way as to allow for several dancers at 
different levels of experience and proficiency to come together smoothly. The role that 
the pressure of performing plays in motivating the drive to grasp the intricacies of 
movement is a factor that is not to be underestimated. When there is more at stake, you 
practice with more determination.  
 
In what follows, I sketch a description of Bharatanatyam by gathering together some of 
the formal characteristics and fundamental principles most obvious to dancers and 
viewers. Conducting a phenomenological analysis of Bharatanatyam requires, first and 
foremost, a description of Bharatanatyam – that is, a description of Bharatanatyam as it is 
danced. Whether you privilege the perspective the dancer, choreographer, critic, 
researcher, or the audience, dance is grounded in the immediate experience of movement. 
By detailing the internal logics upon which the dance is grounded, I will highlight the 
qualitatively felt dynamics of its movement as it is created, formed, and performed. I will 
begin with a description of Bharatanatyam technique. Without fixing it in place, I capture 
a glimmer, a momentary crystallization of Bharatanatyam as it lives and breathes in the 
body.  
2.2.1 Distinctive Features of the Form 
 
Bharatanatyam is made up of three elements: natya (drama), nritta (abstract dance), and 
nritya (expressive dance). Performances incorporate each of these elements in varying 
degrees depending on the context. Natya, refers to the dramatic aspect of stage 
performance revolving around the enactment of a given narrative (Khokar, 1979). 
Traditionally, Bharatanatyam draws its narrative content from Indian epic stories and 
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mythology. The dancer depicts many different characters, from goddesses, gods, and 
demons, to the heroes and heroines of Indian drama. Dancing in this context cannot be 
understood in isolation and must be understood as intertwined with drama and music. 
Nritta involves dynamic movements that unfold complex rhythmic patterns. This aspect 
of Bharatanatyam is decidedly abstract. The movements that make up nritta are not 
intended to convey specific meaning. Instead, the aim is to create an array of rhythmic 
patterns and shapes in coordination with music (Khokar, 1979). This involves a 
combination of footwork, synchronized with eye, head, neck, hand, torso, and arm 
movements. The knee, hip and shoulder joints constitute the key points from which these 
movements originate in both the lower and the upper body.  
 
While nritta is concerned solely with rhythmic articulation and complex rhythmic 
patterns of movement in dance, the object of nritya, on the other hand, is to convey 
specific moods, or sentiments, and generate emotional experience. Nritya is closely tied 
to the concept of abhinaya, which refers specifically to the expression of emotion. 
Emotional expression in Bharatanatyam occurs through: 1) bodily gesture, including the 
use of mudras, head, body, limbs and feet, 2) facial expression, making full use of the 
eyes, eyebrows and lips, 3) dress, or costuming, jewelry and makeup, and 4) song 
(usually a vocalist who accompanies a dancer in performance) (C.f. O’Shea 2007; 
Jeyasingh 2010; Vatsyayan 1977; Khokar, 1979). Abhinaya is unique because instead of 
conveying an abstract aesthetic experience, or narrating a particular story, it seeks to 
express the inner experience of the dancer (or the character portrayed by the dancer) such 
that it might also be evoked in the audience.37 This aim is premised on a specific 
understanding of the audience-performer dynamic, which is grounded in an important 
theoretical concept within Indian philosophy and aesthetics known as rasa. Rasa theory, 
remarks Priyadarshi Patnaik, (1997), “deals with the various kinds of emotion and how 
they are depicted, inferred, and transmitted through a work of art” (3). Rasa is a felt 
                                                   
37 Personally, I find abhinaya is the hardest, because it requires you to let yourself truly 
inhabit an emotional state. To do so with authenticity means making yourself vulnerable 
and present in the given moment to express emotion in this way. This is not easy to do. 
For those who have learned to shut down their emotions, or fear the effects of holding 
difficult emotions present in the body, abhinaya can be daunting.  
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quality “that functions on different levels – as in emotion, aesthetic pleasure, or a taste in 
the mouth (sweet or salty)” (Katrak, 2014, 17). As Kapla Vatsyayan explains, rasa 
describes “aesthetic experience from the point of view of the artist, the aesthetic/artist 
object, and the evocation of a similar, if not identical experience in the aesthete/receptor 
or audience” (Katrak 2014, 17). This is possible because of the porosity that defines that 
audience-performer dynamic.  
2.2.2 Dance Vocabulary 
 
For the sake of clarity, before I proceed I must first lay out some vocabulary specific to 
Bharatanatyam.  
 
Mudra 
It is late January, 2008. I sit in my usual spot. There, on the cold 
linoleum floor of my “Introduction to Hinduism” class, the invited 
dancer brings to life dry “test words”. I am held at the end of her 
gaze. She brings together her thumb with her index and middle 
finger, stretching and separating her other two fingers: 
katakaamukha. Drawing her hand back towards her chest, she pulls 
tight the string of Shiva’s bow, and lets her arrow fly.  
April 2017 
 
Mudras are another defining feature of Bharatanatyam and are a vital aspect of the 
expressive and emotive dynamics of the dance form. The mudra, katakaamukha, 
mentioned above is now familiar to me. It is an example of one-handed mudras, but there 
are also many mudras that are formed using two hands.  As with all the mudras, 
katakaamukha can be taken up in a myriad of ways, to convey many different meanings. 
One might use them to describe things and objects, or to depict different actions, such as 
picking flowers, holding or putting on a necklace or garland, or, as in the above example, 
pulling the string of a bow. Sometimes mudras are deployed to capture a sense of place, 
bringing into focus the setting in which the events of a given narrative occur. They can 
also be used to describe abstract concepts, such as truth, beauty, or the passage of time. 
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By forming katakaamuka in my right hand, holding by my temple and rotating my wrist 
in a circle, for instance, I can convey knowledge or wisdom. Mudras carry their meaning 
within the context of dance as a whole; they mean nothing “without the emotions of the 
dance and the bodily gestures to give [them] texture and context” (Srinivasan 2012, 34). 
Although mudras appear often in the adavus and in nritta, in this context they are 
considered purely decorative. When used in nritya, however, mudras carry specific 
meanings and symbolic significance, which gives mudras a central role in abhinaya.  
 
Mudras are not static entities. Although they are connected to specific meanings, it is 
understood that these meanings are not fixed. The dancer explores the elasticity of the 
mudras, in the service of expression (C.f. Khokar, 1979). The mudras form a 
kaleidoscope of variation from one to another that shows the richness of the dancer’s 
imagination. Like the adavus, the mudras provide the dancer with a flexible and dynamic 
structure that is used to creatively explore. This allows for improvisation and novel 
interpretations. Srinivassan (2012) captures the multiple meanings generated through the 
creative use of mudras in her description of allapadma, the open-handed mudra of the 
lotus flower. Alapadma, she explains, “can be an elegant lotus flower one minute and the 
next it can be the bright sun, the roundness of a face, a beautiful body, the ripples on a 
river; it can describe birth, ecstasy, and even show enlightenment” (Srinivasan, 2012, 34). 
As Srinivassan illustrates in this quotation, virtuosity is found as the dancer learns to 
explore the use of the mudras in a nuanced way. However, within the context of their 
expressive use, mudras are not used in isolation.  
 
Adavu 
I stand in the basic “half-sitting” posture, arimundi; upper 
body erect, legs bent with my knees turned out, shoulders down 
and back straight, my weight is centered, wrists bent at the 
waist, palms facing out. The old wood floor creaks under my 
feet. My teacher’s feet slap against the floor as she 
demonstrates an adavu. Her feet are so loud, it is amazing. I 
wonder that the floor does not crack open under her and 
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swallow her whole. 
October 2016 
Training in Bharatanatyam begins with the adavus. An adavu is a rhythmic coordination 
of leg, foot, arm, hand, eye, head, and neck movements. As the basic units of dance, 
adavus provide the foundational structures from which dance compositions are built. 
There is a whole lexicon of adavus. Each adavu is made of stance (vertical with feet in 
parallel, arimund/half-sit/demi plie, mundi/full-sit/grande plie), foot positions, arm lines 
and patterns for the hands (C.f. Khokar, 1979). The eyes are used to give focus to the 
lines created by the arms by following them; turning one’s head to direct the gaze. The 
corpus of adavus are often compared to an alphabet, grammar, or syntax. As mentioned 
earlier, adavus can be taken apart, rearranged, and put together endlessly, providing a 
flexible structure for the style. I think that what Arnold Haskel says about the pirouette38 
and fouetté39 in Ballet could also be applied to the adavus in Bharatanatyam: “These… 
are the musical notes, limited in number, in themselves nothing. The effect depends on 
how they are combined and executed. It is this classicism that is helping the dancer to 
express herself, that leaves her so gloriously free, if only she is big enough” (Jeyasingh, 
2010, 185). Each adavu is bound to a temporal structure, called a tala.40 A tala has a 
fixed length made up of a certain number of “beats” (isochronous unites of time) ranging 
from three to nine. Adavus articulate a specific rhythmic pattern, by accentuating certain 
beats within a given tala cycle to create a sequence, or rhythmic pattern (C.f. Nelson, 
2008). With these definitions in mind, I will now articulate dance as phenomenological 
method.  
 
2.3  Dance as Inquiry: Phenomenological Method  
 
Learning Bharatanatyam is first and foremost a sensuous experience grounded in the 
body, and dancing has been an important part of my research process. I position my own 
dancing body itself as a “site of discovery” and take dancing as an embodied method of 
                                                   
38 A movement common in ballet where the dancer spins on one foot.  
39 A pirouette performed with one leg raised to the side.  
40 I expand on this concept later in the chapter.  
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research (C.f. Kozel, 2008; Cancienne & Snowber, 2003; Snowber, 2012). This is 
premised on a phenomenological understanding of the body as a site of knowledge, 
where thought and practice, thinking and doing, mind and body are entwined (Kozel, 
2008, 29). From this perspective, the body is both the object of knowing, and the vehicle 
for acquiring knowledge through tactile kinetic sense (Parviainen, 2011, 641). For 
Merleau-Ponty, reflection is not only shaped by embodied experience, but the body itself 
has its own logos. In other words, one’s body has its own distinctive means of 
understanding and interpreting the world. This “living thought” exists beneath the 
objective and detached knowledge of the body (Kozel, 2008, 55). 
 
The phenomenological method seeks to down the stream of everyday engagement in the 
world to create a descriptive attitude. Description is a central part of the 
phenomenological method. Description is not understood as a blind or uncritical practice, 
but in fact helps to reveal the conceptual assumptions that underlie theories and practices, 
and in so doing open up new manners in which to comprehend or interpret what is being 
researched. This (ideally) drives one not only to question what we know of the way 
things are, but to try and understand the way something is made to appear: why and how 
something is perceived as such. This approach “reveals the depth and complexity of 
phenomena which are usually covered over in our habitual, unreflective attitude of 
perceiving and judging what we experience” (Simms & Swarska, 2013, 9). Bringing 
together dance and phenomenology begins from the presumption that contemporary art 
and philosophy are not mutually exclusive enterprises. In Art Line Thought, Sam Mallin 
(1996) develops a phenomenological methodology for engaging with art that is grounded 
in both lived experience and reflection. Artworks, like philosophy, provide ways of 
reflecting on questions concerning existence.  
 
Phenomenologically, art works bring into appearance what recedes to the background in 
everyday and ordinary experience (VI; Mallin, 1996; Fielding, 2015). Artworks “present 
us intuitively with the structures that we use normally to intuit the perceptual world” 
(Mallin, 1996, 282). By reflecting on the phenomena that such works of art hold present 
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one can bring into appearance dynamics of the worlds in which they are embedded. 
Dance does this through movement (C.f. Sheets-Johnstone, 2015; Parviainen, 1998).  
 
Merleau-Ponty maintains that when encountering an artwork we perceive “according to” 
it. This posits that artworks are not something passive that we simply “looking at”. Rather 
they participate “in the material, significatory, sensible, and affective texture of the real” 
(Fielding, 2015, 283). Rather they can inflect perception and creatively contribute to 
deepening our understanding of the world in which we find ourselves. Along with 
academic disciplines, research methods themselves proceed us, speak us. Research 
methods frame the kinds of questions we ask, setting out in advance the forms our 
questions can take. Within this context, as Loveless (2015) suggests, “it becomes crucial 
to ask, when examining our research practices: which stories animate us, and why?” (54). 
What alternative ways of thinking about knowledge production are foreclosed by our 
current methods of research? Each time I return to the dance studio I find myself more 
astonished by not only what I find there, but also by what being there leads me to find in 
my own body. As I demonstrated in chapter one, dance offers significant insight into the 
role of movement in perception, understanding, and expressing embodied existence.41 
And yet, dance is too often rendered illegible by the structures of disciplinary value at the 
university.42  
 
Practice-based types of research do not just offer an alternative to more traditional 
research methodologies, but rather, and more importantly, allow for “access of different 
forms of knowledge” (Reason, 2010, 197). As a form of inquiry, dance offers new routes 
                                                   
41 I do not want to disregard the way that this primacy I am lending to movement might 
perpetuate a latent ableism. The scope of this project has not allowed me to dive further 
into this issue, however, I think it would be a fruitful area for further research.   
42 “Part and parcel of questioning the stranglehold of disciplinary legibility on our 
practices in the university, as teachers, as researchers, as colleagues, today, we must 
attend to the ways that the disciplined university, with its merit boards and granting 
agencies, are structured to ass-ess faculty outputs on the basis of contribution not to ‘new 
knowledge’ in general but to new knowledge within a discipline. This often renders those 
who would work practicetheoretically both illegible and, in the most hostile of 
assessments, suspect” [emphasis added] (Loveless, 2015, 53). 
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to acquiring knowledge, and moving new/illegible ways of knowing into being. This 
approach echoes recent developments in the emerging field of “arts based research” 
(ABR). ABR is grounded in an understanding of artistic practices as ways of knowing. 
Subsequently, the process of actually doing an artistic practice can provide access to 
embodied knowledge. To clarify, Shaun McNiff (2008) describes ABR as “a process of 
inquiry whereby the researcher, alone or with others, engages in the making of art as a 
primary mode of inquiry” [emphasis added] (24). In other words, research happens 
through the very practice of artistic expression itself.  
 
Dance articulates meaning through the sensuous and non-cognitive regions of the lived 
body, which are underlined by movement43. Dancing can open a space for renewed 
questioning, generating new possibilities for knowing, expression, and imagination, but 
only if you teach yourself how to listen to your body. How does a researcher approach 
the task of awakening themselves to the sensuous experience of dancing and learning 
dance to describe the myriad textures of this process? Taking up dance as a means of 
phenomenological inquiry required me to become more attuned to my own bodily 
sensations while dancing. Drawing on the insights of Parviainen (1998) and Irigaray 
(2008), in the following section I outline the steps I took to listen to my dancing body to 
attune myself to my own bodily sensations while dancing. 
 
2.3.1 Listening-to the Dancing Body 
 
I do not seek or presume to “grasp” Bharatanatyam in its totality. I have touched only a 
glimmer of its inexhaustible depths. My goal when approaching Bharatanatyam alongside 
phenomenology has been to let myself be guided by dance itself, to lend epistemic 
privilege to the living, breathing, dancing body, and take seriously the sensations and 
reflections that bubbled up in the midst of movement. This is not an “add dance and stir” 
approach where the includsion of Bharatanatyam is little more than symbolic. Instead, my 
goal has been to allow my experience with dancing Bhartanatyam to “change the logics 
                                                   
43 Of course, the lived body is not separate from cognitive-linguistic aspects of existence.  
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that structured its inclusion in the first place” (Lovelace, 2015, 53). Each time I return to 
the dance studio I find myself more astonished by not only what I find there, but also by 
what being there leads me to find in my own body. I have tried my best throughout this 
project to let these surprises guide my thoughts to different places.  
 
Parviainen (1998) uses the phrase “listening to the body” to describe a practice of 
becoming sensitive to one’s embodiment (130). Following Irigaray’s (2008) 
understanding of listening-to, not as a way of “grasping something” but as an opening for 
cultivating relationality, I position “listening-to the body” as an exercise in developing a 
capacity for attentiveness. Rather than understanding listening as a way of integrating 
something into one’s own worldview, I am interested in the way that listening-to the 
body can open one’s own world to something different. As Irigaray (2008) explains, 
“listening-to” is “a way of opening ourselves to the other and of welcoming this other, its 
truth and its world as different from us, from ours” (232). When listening to the dancing 
body, one must develop an attentiveness to differences in movement qualities, alterations 
within one’s body, as well as an attunement to phenomenal sensation. As Snowber (2016) 
suggests, listening to the body “might not make sense in the moment, but it is rooted in 
the senses” (56). In the following section I outline some strategies I took to become more 
attuned to the knowledge embedded in my body and surface through sensation.   
 
2.3.2 Attuning to Sensation 
 
Learning in dance occurs at the level of the body through sedimentation and results in 
material transformation of one’s own body and ways of being in the world through 
movement. When acquiring skill and knowledge, a dancer must become deeply attuned to 
how they sense movement. Dancers are not just skillful movers. Their skill and training 
relies on cultivating a sensory awareness of their own bodies in motion and compels them 
to explore and methodically examine movement qualities in fine detail (Parviainen, 2011, 
641). It has been shown that dancers, through the acquisition and performance of dance, 
develop a heightened sense of bodily awareness and a kinaesthetic sensitivity to flow of 
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their own movement, “its amplitudes, its shifts in direction, its modulated intentions, and 
its singular manners of projection” (Sheets-Johnstone, 2012, 49). To get at the sensations 
that arose while learning Bharatanatyam I developed a strategy for deepening my bodily 
awareness and becoming more sensitive to sensuous experience grounded in an open 
questioning. Cultivating an open sense of questioning “lets the perceived world be rather 
than posits it” (IV, 101-102).44 This (ideally) drives one not only to question what we 
know of the way things are, but to try and understand the way something is made to 
appear: why and how something is perceived as such.  
 
I put together a series of perceptually oriented questions to heighten my awareness of my 
own bodily sensations. I did not seek specific answers for these questions. Rather, they 
were designed to help bring my attention to the present moment and ground myself 
within here and now of my body. Some example questions include:  
 
Where are your feet? What does the floor feel like? 
What do you hear? Are you breathing? 
Are you in pain? Where do you feel tension? Do your limbs feel heavy/light? 
Where is your weight? What are you thinking about? 
As intended, these questions offer a starting point from which to suspend one’s reflective 
thought and attend to the phenomenal experience of one’s body. I posed these questions 
to myself before and after dancing.45 This not only helped me to turn off the treadmill of 
the day’s anxious thoughts and attune myself to my own bodily sensations, it also alerted 
me to specific bodily changes that unfolded over time. I have come to think of it as a 
fluid set of practices aimed at helping me cultivate new ways of listening-to my body 
                                                   
44 This open sense of questioning, however, has lost its footing in academic contexts 
where hermeneutics of suspicion prevails as, what Eve Sedgwick (2003) has called, a 
“mandatory injunction rather than a possibility among possibilities” (125).  
45 I have since realised that this pattern mirrors the structure of a class in Bharatanatyam. 
Bharatanatyam classes always begin and end the same way: with the namaskar. It is a 
ritual that sets a class in motion and brings it to a close. It is a specific phrase of 
movement (varying regionally) signals that begin and the end of dancing. More 
significantly, however, it enacts a prayer of thanksgiving and reverence; apologizing to 
the earth for stomping on her so hard, thanking the gods, teachers and peers.  
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(C.f. Snowber, 1997; Snowber, 2012; Parvianinen & Aromaa, 2017). Soon my whole 
body was an ear listening for the subtleties of my own movement. This process or open-
questioning generated a lot of sensuous material, which was documented in rough 
descriptive notes taken before, during and after dance class.46 These notes were 
invaluable for identifying movement qualities and bodily sensations, registering the 
changes to my body, and modifying my own movements. These bodily findings became 
the basis for further exploration and reflection.  
 
To solidify the embodied method for listening-to my body, I highlight some concrete 
examples of the shifts in sensual experience I encountered while learning Bharatanatyam. 
These examples show the way sensuous information about one’s moving body is used to 
form new bodily knowledge. Attending to bodily sensations, such as the burning tension 
in my thighs, the ache in my wrists, or the stiffness of my thumbs, I learned how to 
prepare for, recover from, and become better at Bharatanatyam. Based on this sensuous 
information, I discovered specific places within my body where I needed to increase my 
strength or flexibility: hips, shins, wrists, fingers, ankles, neck, shoulders, Achilles 
tendons. I explored stretching my physical limits by increasing and decreasing speed, and 
observed how a proper warm up and stretching routine helped stabilize my stance when 
dancing at different speeds. I found that my body was affected by differences in 
temperature. The cold and the heat have their advantages and disadvantages for the 
dancing body. During the winter, the cold makes my feet stiff. I am more sensitive to the 
hardness of floor. On the other hand, the warmth of the summer helps to increase the 
flexibility of my joints. But the heat also makes me tire faster. I noted differences in my 
body and mood before and after dancing. If too much time past between dance classes I 
could feel this affecting my body. Like a bicycle left outside over winter, after longer 
breaks from dancing I could feel my body become rusty. Being out of regular practice 
impacted my stamina and procession. I observed a greater range of motion in my wrists 
as they became looser and easier to twist in different directions. My fingers had become 
                                                   
46 I unpack the process through which I understood this note-taking further in an 
upcoming section.  
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more limber, agile and dexterous as I became more comfortable forming mudras. I 
became less breathless as my legs grew stronger.  
 
Performing Bharatanatyam also presented new challenges and initiated a new set of 
bodily skills. For example, I learned how best to pace myself between the fast and lactic 
acid-building rhythmic jatis and the more leisurely pace of the abhinaya potions of a 
piece. I became adept at anticipating quick rhythmic shifts and crisp changes in bodily 
position and learned to stretch out the intervals between beats. I learned to quiet my 
body’s urge to anticipate the next step and elongate moments of stillness. Repeated 
practice helped me observe the movements of other dancers in fine detail and adjust the 
character of my own movements accordingly. My participation in dance class also gave 
me access to other dancers’ ways of conceptualizing their own dance practices and their 
ways of holding their bodies. In this setting dancers learn/practice technique and 
choreography together.47 Although dance classes were structured around one teacher, 
learning is often collaborative and my bodily knowledge of Bharatanatyam was 
developed in dialogue with others. Other dancers played a crucial role in encouraging me 
to build bodily knowledge. I modified my own ways of executing adavus as I discerned 
the intricacies of others’ techniques; the diagonal angle at which one retracts their heel 
from the floor while stomping, the temporal nuances expressed in the neck, eyes, 
eyebrows, or the soft grace of a hand as it grazes the shoulder. Not only would we work 
as a group or partners to explore or build choreography, but through my observations of 
others’ movements, and their observations of mine, I “corrected” my mistakes and 
refined my execution of certain movements.48 
                                                   
47 This research took place in a supportive community of learners who were made aware 
of my project.  
48 I think an obvious next direction to take with my research would be to incorporate the 
voices and perspectives other dancers more directly. Insights gained from formal and 
informal semi-structured interviews with dancers, for example, might allow me to 
strengthen and expand my analysis in different directions. Although interviews can 
provide a rich source for understanding embodied experience I chose to limit the scope of 
this project to focus on self-movement. As I have indicated, this project become clearer 
little by little over time and from within my own engagement with the dance style itself.   
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2.4  Dancing with Writing 
 
Academic institutions are founded on a tradition of thought and knowledge that is 
grounded in written language. Given this, it is not surprising that an embodied kinesthetic 
art form grounded in movement dance is not as intuitively integrated within the 
cognitive-linguistic demands of the academic context. As I established in chapter one, 
with discursive approaches there is a tenuous relationship between dancing and 
documentation, which understands dancing and writing as being fundamentally at odds. 
To write about dance you must turn it into something else, fix it in amber, render it still 
by transforming bodily movement into written language. Not only does this perspective 
turn dance into an passive object of investigation that abstracts agency and movement 
from the living dancing body, but it also removes agentive movement from the writing 
body as well (not to mention the reading body). Of course, writing dance is not the same 
as dancing dance. However, we often also take for granted that writing and thinking are 
themselves practices; “thought is a practice, movement is a practice, writing is a practice, 
making art is a practice” (Kozel, 2008, 73). These are corporeal experiences grounded in 
embodied action, they are things that one does. 
 
Conventional understandings of research elide the impact of researchers’ bodily affective 
dispositions on their research and writing practices. One often forgets that their body is 
actively involved in writing, reading, and thinking. Like dance, writing involves 
movement; writing is a different kind of movement from dancing, but it is movement 
nonetheless. Jana Milloy (2005) beautifully captures the movement of writing: “The 
whole body is poised in between and resonates with movements, spilling towards words 
that mark out their journey along the markings of the page. Running between blue lines” 
(547). Here, Milroy vividly depicts the liveliness of handwriting as a dynamic movement. 
Although the movements one embodies when typing on a keyboard might initially appear 
subtler, when one is more attentive to their movement they are easy to spot:  
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bending forward;  
leaning back 
bending forward;  
leaning back 
 
tracking, glancing, fingers prancing  
 
twist and turn  
and  
crack  
my  
neck 
         April 2018 
I concede that something of dance always exceeds writing. Indeed, there will always be a 
leap that occurs from movement to written language. And yet, dance and writing are both 
accomplished by lived bodies. Ideally, when I am writing, my own body remains in the 
background of my experience and my fingers chase words across the keyboard. But 
writing can involve a lot of sitting. I do not recall when my shoulders started to slouch or 
my back begin to bend; my body comes into my awareness when it becomes sore from 
sitting. While attending to my body and its movement while writing, I began to wonder: 
does sitting shape how we apprehend dance? How might getting up out of my chair lend 
itself to different insights into dance? Rather than assume that dance and writing are 
mutually exclusive objects, throughout my research process I have found dancing and 
writing have intertwined and reciprocally influenced each other. In what follows, I 
outline the distinct ways that I have explored this intertwining: dancing while writing and 
writing while dancing.  
 
2.4.1 Getting out of the Chair: Dancing While Writing 
  
It has been while dancing that I have discovered new possibilities of thought and 
movement. During the more formal writing process, my chair became constraining. It 
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became a constrictive space that I resisted. Words can be slippery when wet; they can be 
hard to hold on to. I have had problems pinning them to the page. In the beginning I 
found myself dancing instead of writing… dancing to avoid writing. When feeling 
overwhelmed, dancing has become an escape, a refuge, a hollow to hide in. It is 
challenging to use written language to describe the multisensory enactments of a dancer’s 
knowledge. The sensations of dance, as they are felt from the “inside” are difficult to 
remake into a text. The prospect of transforming my kinesthetic understanding of dance 
into prose made my body tense up and my fingers freeze. During the more formal writing 
process I struggled to find joy in inhabiting language through the keyboard. I did not yet 
trust or properly value the knowledge embedded in my body and materialized through 
movement. Words seemed to slide off the page and pool at my feet. I was confronted by 
my own paralysis. Gloria Anzaldua (1987) also captures the way that writing can express 
itself in the body in a sense of discomfort.  
Writing produces anxiety. Looking inside myself and my 
experience, looking at my conflicts, engenders anxiety in me. 
Being a writer feels very much like being a Chicana, or being 
queer – a lot of squirming, coming up against all sorts of walls. 
Or its opposite: not being defined or definite, a boundless, 
floating state of limbo where I kick my heels, brood, percolate, 
hibernate and wait for something to happen (94). 
I relate viscerally to these words. Why does writing cause such discomfort and anxiety? 
There are many ways to answer this question, and I do not have space to expand on them 
here, but I found great comfort in learning I was not alone in this feeling. And so, I kept 
on dancing. I have found the best way to get unstuck is to MOVE! Now when words 
won’t come, sometimes I can dance them out. I have found it helpful to improvise 
movement when I am lost for words. Sometimes I dance to let what has no words, those 
things that exceed language, be given a voice within my body. As Snowber (2012) writes, 
“dancing opens us to our breath, the tongue of language that is rooted in our bodies” 
when we write from our sweat, our words uncover knowing that we did not know (58). 
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Getting up from my chair when I get stuck on an idea, a knot of thoughts too twisted and 
tangled, very helpful for working through ideas. I might take a break from writing to 
move and stretch or jump around. Movement moves my ideas to the surface. I have tried 
to be attentive to the ideas that come up unexpectedly and intermittently in the midst of 
dancing. After all, “ideas do not come after the experience, they do not come before, they 
permeate it like tendrils” (Kozel, 2008, 29). Pausing to stretch has stretched my thoughts 
in different directions. What might the experience of feeling one’s own movement 
“vocabulary” stretching, disclose about the potential for habitual modes of comportment, 
posture and gesture to shift and change? What new perspectives might be prompted by 
experiencing such shifts? How might movement deepen my grasp of a concept or work 
through an idea? I needed a method for writing Bharatanatyam that would allow me to 
get up out my chair. Ann Cvetkovich’s (2012) words on working through problems 
encountered while writing in the pool resonated with me. She describes seeing “the twists 
and turns of an intellectual problem” at the bottom of the pool (51). She continues:  
the black lines against aqua blue are a path to inspiration. The 
rhythm of breathing and the ease of the stokes keep my body 
flowing, and, with it, my mind. When the breathing panic 
subsides somewhat and it’s possible to think again. By the end 
of the swim, I usually have some glimmer of an idea about 
how to tackle whatever writing problem I arrived with 
(Cvetkovich, 2012, 51). 
Cvetkovich’s description of how, for her, swimming helps with thinking and writing 
captures the way that our bodies are not only actively involved in writing, reading, and 
thinking, but how these practices overlap.  
 
I established a practice of oscillation between writing and dancing. This approach helped 
me to discover and develop my ideas from within my encounters with Bharatanatyam. 
Dancing while writing also fosters rich and textured descriptions of dance as it is lived 
and experienced. When one is closer to the actual concrete lived experience of dance, if it 
is held by your body, it can be revisited. Stepping away from my chair I might return to a 
sequence of movement to recall details of its tone and texture. I repeat a gesture several 
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times, attending to how it feels to execute it. Is it jagged or smooth? Does it feel angry? 
Back and forth from my chair: stomping, counting, writing, sweeping, jumping, typing, 
pausing, thinking, checking, turning. Writing becomes not just a recording of details but a 
process by which we are awakened to the details of experience (Cancienne & Snowber, 
2003).  
 
2.5  Following Bread Crumbs: Writing While Dancing 
 
Apart from dancing while writing, I have also integrated writing into dancing. As has 
been explained, the phenomenological method places great importance on what is given 
in the immediacy of experience, but recognises there is no pure, unmediated experience. 
Lived experience, as explained in chapter one, brings with it the past body, past 
experiences, and a world with it in anticipation of a (possible) future. One must encounter 
something to gain an understanding of that something. Whether one is considering arts or 
phenomenology, one must endlessly return to the moment of encounter. After all, 
“without it we would ask no questions” (VI, 159). The next step involves a lot of writing, 
the goal of which is to describe rather than explain a given phenomenon. Here, writing 
makes its way into dancing in a form of rough documentation: “notes”. I wrote 
descriptive notes during dance class. In this case, writing while dancing is more frantic: I 
scramble over to my journal at the end of a sequence of movement and scribble 
something down. One might call this a kind of data retrieval, which preserves “raw 
sensory data received immediately from the senses, as well as memories and imaginative 
constructs” (Kozel, 2008, 52). My notes were not eloquently composed. At first they 
were purely to help me practice. For example, I had many beat sequences written down 
so that I could practice them at home. Here are some examples:  
 
7 beat – takita ta-ka di-mi 
 
(Alarippu) 
Thisram = 3x2, 6 beats per cycle 
tha, thai tham, kitathaka, thai, tha thai, kitathaka. 
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di, da, da di da, da-di! (tai, tai-tai-tai)49 
In this case, notes helped with the process of corporeal sedimentation, since they aid in 
one’s ability to take up the steps outside the studio.50 In other words, notes aid in “getting 
[choreography/technique] in the body”. The goal is to sediment a given sequence 
properly. Once you “get it in your body” and your body understands, it can once again 
hold/be held by the dynamic flow of the movement. As was mentioned in chapter one, 
there is not a specific universal system of notation for dance. From my experience, 
dancers develop their own forms of notation for describing steps, and choreography. 
These might include short hand names for sequences of steps and their order of 
execution. It is common to find stick figures with arrows, or tactile descriptions such as: 
“big”, “quick”, “start right”, and “to the side”. These are not disembodied observations, 
they begin with one’s lived body oriented in space, and oriented in relation to other 
bodies in space.  
 
Writing while dancing resulted in a lot of material. I have maintained records detailing 
my engagement with Bharatanatyam in dance class, performance, and practice for a 
period of three years (and still ongoing). Over this time, I amassed a large collection of 
detailed notes. My notes included observations, descriptions, reminders, insights, bodily 
sensations. Although fragments of my notes can be found scattered throughout this 
dissertation, most of them are not included here. Rather, these notes became anchorage 
points, providing a basis or foundation for more formal writing and reflecting. I worked 
to extrapolate and extend the insights captured in these fragments alongside the sensory 
structures deposited in my body through dancing Bharatanatyam. As I allowed myself to 
be open to the richness and complexity of Bharatanatyam, my descriptions became more 
concrete. I took many notes at the edge of the studio floor. These scribbles became like 
                                                   
49 This sequence was particularly difficult for me to get. I stumbled on the space between 
“da,” and “da-di” and ended up arriving at the final beat too late and losing the rhythm 
along with it the (tai, tai-tai-tai). I danced this phrase in the living room, I spoke it to 
myself in the shower, I stomped it out while I did the dishes, and I squealed when finally 
got it!  
50 This was also the purpose of the many phonetic interpretations of Tamil and Urdu 
words, names of dancers, or things to google later. 
 74 
bread crumbs; a trail of words that would lead me back to the moment, to a felt sense of 
something. Later, after class (on the bus, in my bed, on my chair) I would return to these 
short hand observations, using them as a touchstone and site for further reflection and 
investigation. In time, observations found in my notes began to expand my thinking and 
writing in different directions. These notes did not lead me to specific “answers”, but 
helped me to make connections that later became the grounds for further questioning. In 
time, I shaped this material into something that is acceptable in a text-based world.  
 
2.6  Resedimenting Habits through Disorientation and Hesitation  
 
It is common across many styles of dance to begin by learning the leg and arm aspects of 
a movement sequence separately. As in other forms, learning adavus begins with the feet 
and the legs. Tai-tai-ta-ta, Tai-tai-thom. Heel-stomp, heel-stomp. 1-2, 3-4. The leg 
patterns are practiced extensively on their own, such that the pattern can become habitual. 
Learning the adavus is accomplished through rigorous training involving arduous acts of 
repetition. For example, adavus are practiced on both sides of the body and in three 
speeds, with the pace doubling and then tripling in succession. This is because the 
patterns of foot and leg movements must become habitual so that they can flow on their 
own. Only once you “get” the leg and foot work of an adavu can the arm gestures then be 
added. This way your attention can be focused on accomplishing the correct arm 
movements with the assurance that your legs will be doing what they are supposed to “on 
their own”. Through this layering one begins to sense an adavu holistically.   
 
It is not enough to “get”51 an adavu, to sediment it within the corporeal schema. One 
must also expand the possibilities of that adavu, stretching one’s bodily spatially while 
dancing such that the possibilities it offers to expression are able to broaden. While I had 
gained a bodily grasp of basic steps and sequences so that they sprung up with ease in 
practice, my bodily spatiality felt confined or constricted when dancing. Although I felt 
                                                   
51 I am using “get” to evoke the sense of “getting in” evoked in chapter one. Dancers 
describe the process of choreography getting sedimented into the body as habit as 
“getting it in” the body (C.f. Purser, 2018).  
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comfortable with the steps, I could not take them up to “travel” within the space of the 
studio. Traveling explicitly involves taking up space in a different way: you are trying to 
make your movements expand, so they take up more room and extend the pathway of 
your movement into different directions. My sense of comfort when inhabiting a dance 
sequence was linked to executing that movement in one spot. I felt most comfortable 
dancing in place, executing movement in one spot while facing the “front” of the 
classroom. I marveled at the more advanced dancers, whose movements extended out 
into the space of the class. How could their legs reach so far? I watched them in the 
mirror, or from the front of the classroom. More advanced dancers could easily change 
the orientation of their movement to find new routes across the floor. In contrast, I felt 
suddenly uncertain with the possibilities afforded to me by the adavus to inhabit space 
and “inaugurate the link between a here and a there” (PhP, 141). I lost the sense of ease 
within my habitual dancing body as I found the world as an obstacle; I could not extend 
my habitual dancing body to move towards the world.  
 
The space between here and there suddenly transformed my body once again into 
something unfamiliar. My legs felt heavy and became mysteriously slow. The feeling of 
stability and alignment I had cultivated suddenly disappeared as I struggled to redistribute 
the weight of my body. While movements flowed when they stayed in one place, when I 
tried to venture out in other directions my feet would falter and throw me off balance. 
Uncertainty pervaded my legs, making them suddenly unsteady. I could see my own 
hesitancy in my body reflected in the mirror: a wavering. My execution became “messy”: 
my upper body tipped forward, arms slackened and my gestures and stomps less precise 
(both spatially and temporally). The passages between my movements’ phrases became 
stunted and discontinuous. I did not sense the space around me as open to, or available 
for my movement to unfold. Rather, I felt constricted, enclosed and positioned by the 
surrounding. I didn’t accomplish much distance, remaining close to my original spot. I 
became preoccupied with thinking about my passage from one place to another, as if I 
were the spectator of this passage rather than accomplishing it. I consciously focused on 
arriving at my next position “on time”. I traveled from one location in the studio to 
another disjointedly. I fell out of sync with the other dancers. I arrived late to the next 
 76 
beat. This difficulty expresses a discontinuity between an aim and the one’s ability to 
achieve that aim, which is subsequently felt corporeally as a tentativeness. As I became 
more familiar with the technique and choreography, the space of the floor began to 
stretch, and the intervals between beats elongated.  
 
Learning Bharatanatyam has been a challenge and a joy. The experience has not only 
demonstrated to me just how powerful is the force of habit, but also illustrated how 
engagement in creative embodied practices can register habits and also open bodily 
responsiveness through experiences of disorientation and hesitation. In what follows, I 
explore the concrete ways that experiences of disorientation and hesitation revealed the 
strength of the hold of the habitual structures within my body schema, and yet also their 
potential for change. By disrupting one’s sense of bodily spatiality, experiences of 
disorientation disrupt the ease, immediacy, and flow of pre-reflective movement. 
Hesitation disturbs one’s habitual sense of temporality. This allows one to register the 
residual habitual structures in the body as over-determining intentional action, and opens 
an interval of indetermination that enables bodily receptivity, and makes felt the 
contingency of habit (the possibility of becoming otherwise). 
2.6.1 Disorientation  
 
Disorientation is a bodily feeling. It is felt in the moment when the world you inhabit 
becomes strange. One of the biggest obstacles I experienced when learning 
Bharatanatyam was adjusting to a new manner of using my feet. Taking up foot positions 
dramatically different from those habitual ways I hold my feet as I take them to dance 
disrupted the relation between my feet and the floor. I found the space of the floor no 
longer comfortably extended my movement. Adjusting to this new way of relating to the 
floor with my feet upset my sense of bodily spatiality, and disrupted the ease, immediacy, 
and flow of pre-reflective movement towards the floor. This experience of disorientation 
is a profound disruption to habitual perception. The floor felt strange and my feet lost 
their sense of direction.  
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As I have shown, habits rely on the residual structures of the corporeal schema to sketch 
out a potential line of action, making use of the sedimented past in order to anticipate a 
possible future. This is what allows me to step in time with my world, to conform to its 
rhythms. In moments of disorientation, however, I find myself suddenly offbeat; late, 
early, out of sync. This is a profound disruption of perceptual habit. What would 
otherwise recede into the background in ordinary experience suddenly makes itself 
present. The disruption of habit means that the body cannot grasp its world. To explain 
disorientation properly, I must first review what it means to be “oriented” in space. 
Starting from the position that human subjects are engaged in an open and reciprocal 
relationship with the world, Merleau-Ponty argues that through one’s body, spatiality is 
experienced in terms of situation, orientation, and movement (PhP, 260-262). Orientation 
is a spatial term that captures the habitual bodily spatiality. As explained in chapter one, 
embodied subjects are situated in and towards the world; they have a particular 
perspective and orientation within space. Approaches to spatial perception have 
traditionally characterized space as separate from the actions and interests of living 
bodies. From this perspective, space is conceived as a container for action and is defined 
by a clearly established and objective structure (Morris, 2004). Viewed as such, the 
relation between space and bodies is assumed to be one-directional, since, as David 
Morris points out, it begins “with a space already understood in terms of a geometrical or 
objective model and looks into it to see how the body interacts with it” (2004, 5).52 This 
reduces bodies to objects in space. However, Merleau-Ponty explains, this view is not 
consistent with the perceptual experience of the living body. A phenomenological 
account of the perceptual experience of spatiality, posits bodies as inhabiting space, 
rather than residing within it. To assert that space is dependent on bodily inhabitance is to 
maintain that space is not given, nor is it independent of the bodies that occupy and move 
into it (C.f. PhP).  
 
                                                   
52 This way of understanding space is increasingly being challenged across disciplines by 
exploring the relational and dynamic aspects of spatial perception. Philosophers such as 
Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari (1987) and Brian Massumi (2002, 2010), and Henri 
Lefebvre (1994) and geographers such as Doreen Massey (2005) have all meaningfully 
contributed to a new appreciation of space as produced though relational activity. 
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Phenomenal space is thus presented as being shaped by the purposefulness of the body; 
space takes shape as a field of action. Merleau-Ponty clarifies this point when he asserts 
that “what counts for the orientation of the spectacle is not my body, such as it in fact 
exists, as a thing in objective space, but rather my body as a system of possible actions, a 
virtual body whose phenomenal ‘place’ is defined by its task and by its situation. My 
body is wherever it has something to do” (PhP, 260). Bodies and space are understood as 
co-constituting. Consequently, space both marks and is marked by bodies.53 We feel most 
oriented when there is a sense of cohesion between oneself and the world. In fact, by 
orientating oneself in the world one works to habituate themselves to their environment. 
Indeed, as Edward Casey (1987) explains: “the main function of orienting is to effect 
familiarization with one’s surroundings” (151). Merleau-Ponty refers to this as being 
“geared into the world.” As he explains: “My body is geared into the world when my 
perception provides me with the most varied and the most clearly articulated spectacle 
possible, and when my motor intentions, as they unfold, receive the responses they 
anticipate in the world” (PhP, 261). To be oriented, then, is to be met with what one 
anticipated. To feel “at home” in the world in this way lends a sense of comfort. As Sara 
Ahmed (2006) characterizes it, “the word ‘comfort’ suggests well-being and satisfaction, 
but it also suggests an ease and an easiness” (134). As we will see, experiences of 
disorientation undermine one’s habituated grasp on their world and disrupt the 
seamlessness that animates one’s intentional action. Feelings of comfort and ease are 
subsequently replaced with discomfort and uncertainty. As Edward Casey (1987) puts it, 
“to be disoriented, or even simply unoriented, is to find the same surroundings 
unfamiliar, unheimlich” (151).  
 
When one is unanchored from their habitual modes of relating to the world, the world 
itself becomes unfamiliar. I am not met with what I had anticipated.54  The familiar ways 
                                                   
53 This being said, it is important to bring feminist analysis of alterity to bear on this 
understanding of space, since spatial regulation has been identified by a number of 
scholars as an important technique through which bodies come to be marked by 
difference (Alcoff (2005); Ahmed (2000); Puwar (2004)). This point will be expanded 
upon shortly.  
54 Perhaps I expect a step, but my foot never meets the stair. Instead, I slip on empty air.  
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that one has of moving into and taking up their world unravel. As a result, the world no 
longer extends one’s reach. This is exemplified in Merleau-Ponty’s discussion of George 
M. Stratton’s pivotal experiments on vision. When an experience of disorientation is 
produced through retinal inversion, where retinal images in the eye are turned upright 
through the use of special goggles such that the perceiving subjects’ sense of up and 
down is disturbed, subjects describe the world as “unreal” and uninhabitable (PhP, 255). 
A similar effect arises if an individual perceives “the room they are in through the 
intermediary of a mirror reflecting the room at a 45-degree angle” (PhP, 259). In this 
example, the subject feels as if they are leaning to the side as they navigate the room. As 
Merleau-Ponty describes it, in these circumstances the subject “first sees the room as 
oblique” (PhP, 259). 
 
Charles Taylor offers a beautiful description of disorientation. He writes:  
 
“In those rare moments when we lose orientation, we don’t know 
where we are, and we don’t know where or what things are either; we 
lose the thread of the world, and our perceptual field is no longer our 
access to the world, but rather the confused debris into which our 
normal grasp on things crumbles” (Taylor, 1989, 4). 
 
When experiencing a moment of disorientation, all of a sudden one feels out of place; 
unmoored. In such experiences, the cohesion and orientation of one’s intentional 
movement towards one’s tasks is interrupted, and as a result there is no longer a union 
between one’s intentions and their realization. One’s first intentions towards a movement 
becomes apparent through their disruption, allowing one to take notice of movements that 
occur automatically, and frequently feel comfortable easy or familiar. This not only 
breaks a pattern of behavior but brings attention and charge to a moment that would have 
otherwise passed without remark. Such moments ask us to consider how we move into 
the world and to actively question our perceptual experience. Moments that once were 
easily and automatically filled by my movement in and towards the world, through 
disorientation, have the potential to become uneasily and consciously unfilled. This 
feeling of unsettlement is unsettling. It is uncomfortable to be disoriented. 
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2.6.2 Sounding Feet 
 
As mentioned, Bharatanatyam is a percussive style of dance. The sound of dance is a key 
component of percussive dance forms. In this context, one’s feet hold importance for 
articulating audible rhythms. However, it would be wrong to confine the beat absolutely 
to one’s feet. Rather, rhythm unfolds in between foot and floor. Certainly, sound arises 
through the contact of the foot and the floor, but rhythm occurs as a relationship of 
exchange and differentiation between the foot and the floor. The foot must pull back from 
and return to the floor to create a rhythmic pattern. As Jessica Wiskus (2013) explains, 
rhythm is instituted retrospectively: “it turns back from the second note to the first in 
order to recover the interval of silence between the two” (9). Although rhythm is 
commonly thought of as “a series of definite articulated sounds”, the intervals of silence 
between articulated sounds are what creates a pattern (Wiskus, 2013, 9). In other words, 
it is the non-coincidence of each articulate beat that holds a rhythm together. Read 
through this lens, one might think of the sounding of movement in percussive styles of 
dance as arising through a relation between foot and floor. It is by meeting with and 
deviating from the floor that one’s feet hold open differing intervals of time between 
articulated beats. Dancers play with those intervals, folding the sound of their own 
movement within the fabric of accompanying music.  
 
As a dancer trained in a percussive style, one develops a kind of “closeness” to the floor. 
I do not become the floor or coincide with it completely. Instead the relationship between 
my feet and the floor is one defined by proximity through distance (spatial and temporal). 
The distance, or “thickness”, that separates my foot from the floor, simultaneously brings 
the two together, allowing for an exchange. Intervals separate the beats created through 
the contact between my feet and floor, and hold together a rhythmic pattern. Differences 
in foot positions change the way the foot relates to the floor and the qualities of the sound 
generated through this interaction. In this way, differences between various styles of 
dance can be heard. For instance, one can hear a difference between the brushing action 
of the toe in its soft contact with the floor that makes a sweeping sound, and the hard, 
strong, singular, resounding, beat created as one plants the heel on the floor. 
Bharatanatyam sounds different than Highland dance, for instance.  
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One of the first, and biggest hurdles I faced while learning Bharatanatyam was 
determining how to settle into a new manner of relating to the floor through my feet. I 
was introduced to foot positions dramatically different from those habitual ways I hold 
my feet as I take them to dance. With these new positions came new ways of creating 
rhythms. Adopting the basic stance, arimundi, one raises and strikes the foot flat on the 
floor. The underside of the foot remains parallel to the ground as the foot is lifted and the 
sole brought down on the floor in a heavy stamping step. This stomp creates a loud slap. 
In Bharatanatyam, this stomping movement is a recoil. The sole of one’s foot connects 
with the surface of the floor only to withdraw with swift precision. When your body is 
familiar with this way of stamping you learn that you do not actually need to stomp hard 
to make a loud sound. The desired sound created by striking one’s foot is to be generated 
from the space created between the arch of your foot and the floor.55 Stomping in this 
way might be a basic step, but it is also a fundamental aspect of the form itself. I found 
learning to stomp correctly difficult. The angle of my ankles felt uncomfortable. A 
tightness extended up my shins. My heels felt tired and sore. These sensations are 
illuminating. They make felt the past of my body, the residual habitual structures that 
ordinarily guide my dancing body. The taken-for-granted habitual ways of holding my 
body and relating to the world through movement are suddenly perceivable in the act of 
taking up a different set of dynamic postures, positions, and ways of extending through 
space. This flat foot did not seem to accommodate an easy flow of movement. It felt 
strange to initiate movement and articulate rhythm by stomping my foot flat on the floor.  
 
2.6.3 Reshaping My Feet  
 
The relation between my feet and the floor had previously been defined through the balls 
of my feet and my pointed toes. My first forays into Bharatanatyam made suddenly clear 
how my history as a Highland dancer was a specific influence on what positions my feet 
                                                   
55 The heels can also contribute to rhythm: the leg extends and the heels planted on the 
floor with the foot inclined at a 45-degree angle to articulate the beat.  
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feel most comfortable in (what feels comfortable). Highland dance is done on the balls of 
the feet. Here, the “ball of the foot” describes a foot position where: 
The pads of the toes and ball of the foot are in contact with the 
ground, with the instep arched. 
The ball of the foot is used to strike the floor, creating a strong down-beat. My pointed 
feet also aim towards audible rhythms: shuffles, springs, brushes, and hops. Foot 
positions are often first things taught when one is learning to dance. As a Highland 
dancer, one of the first things I (must have) learned was how to shape one’s foot into a 
“point”.56 As frequently as the phrase “point your toes” is used in the classroom, it is 
misleading since it is not simply one’s toes at work in shaping one’s foot into a “point”. 
In fact, pointing the foot requires the full engagement of all muscles of the foot: 
Bend your ankle towards the floor. Push the ball of your foot 
into the floor and away from you. This creates opposition so 
the foot springs up from the floor. Elongate the muscles in 
your leg extending the stretch through the top of your foot to 
lengthening the toes. Contract muscles of the instep/arch of 
your foot and extending the toes down towards the floor. Do 
not crunch your toes in an effort to make your foot curve.  
I do not really remember learning to take up these foot positions. These acquired ways of 
positioning my feet feel intuitive because they have been sedimented in my body schema 
and become habitual ways of taking up my body and dancing in and toward the world. 
The habits held by my body have accustomed me to a certain ease of movement. The 
positions and movements that belong to these feet of mine spring up automatically. 
Taking up my feet in this way seemed to violate something fundamental to the way I 
extend my body in space. Unlike my pointed feet, which recede to the background of my 
experience and afford a smooth flow of movement when I am Highland dancing, 
Bharatanatyam brought my feet into sharp focus. Stomping, my foot flat against the floor 
                                                   
56 “Point yer toes lassies” was one of the most frequent corrections/directions called out 
from the front of the classroom, second only to “knees back”, which was sometimes 
accompanied by a smack to the thigh. 
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felt wrong.57  I had to consciously pay attention to my heels, balls, and soles of my feet to 
coordinate them properly. My flat foot presents a floor that feels different, my foot is not 
geared into the floor, I do not inhabit the dance through the floor. 
 
When Highland dancing, various rhythms arise as the strong beats generated from the 
ball of my foot mingle with the softer quicker beats from my pointed toes. Although the 
instep is not used to coax sound from one’s feet directly, it is essential for differentiating 
one’s foot from the floor. Like an elastic spring board, one’s arch absorbs the weight and 
energy of the body and sends it back up. Consequently, in Highland dance, the beat is 
articulated vertically. The feet rebound off the floor, giving Highland dance its 
characteristic springiness and explaining why an esteemed Highland dancer seeks rhythm 
through elevation. In contrast with the bouncy steps that send the Highland dancer up, 
Bharatanatyam steps pushes down into the floor. Unlike Highland dance where the 
dancing body appears as free from the influence of gravity, Bharatanatyam explores the 
movement of the body in its direct relation to the pull of gravity. The dancer’s work to 
sustain a vertical median, which represents “the unchanging pull of gravity”, exemplifies 
this (Vatsyayan, 1977, 28).58 Of course, one’s feet leave the floor to create rhythm, but 
this way of relating to the ground does not deliberately solicit elevation. Generally, a 
dancer’s movements flow with clarity along a level horizontal plane, sustaining a central 
vertical line as they unfold (Vatsyayan, 1977, 29). The thrust the Bharatanatyam dancer’s 
feet down into the floor imparts a grounded quality to the movement overall.   
 
As I learned, stomping the floor was strange, unfamiliar and difficult to move into. I felt 
the anticipatory force of my habitual dancing body in the moment I reshape my foot 
towards the floor. In the act of stomping, I registered the limitations of the habitual 
dancing structures of my body schema. I found myself confronted by a sense of my 
                                                   
57 Please recall the direction to “point ye toes lassie”!  
58 While Bharatanatyam might not be particularly “bouncy,” vertical movements do 
feature in its technique. Choreography incorporates beautiful leaps and jumps, however, 
they tend to be less expansive. What Bharatanatyam shares with Western dance styles is 
the desire to hide the labor of the dancing body in performance, creating the illusion that 
the dance is effortless (Srinivasan, 2012, xi). 
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movement as being stunted; my foot was tentative, hesitant, hovering. To dance 
Bharatanatyam, I had to change the way I relate to the floor through my feet. It took a 
year to become fully comfortable stomping my foot fully flat. The ball of my foot seemed 
strangely insistent on connecting with the floor first, ever-so-slightly before the rest of 
my foot. The profound sensation of hesitating in my feet was disorienting. Instead of 
carrying me towards the world, I felt my feet permeated by contradiction. This 
disorienting contradiction illustrates my dependence on the balls of my feet and my 
pointed toes for articulating the beat and creating rhythmic patterns. Not only does the 
hesitancy of my feet show up how accustomed I was to articulating rhythms vertically, 
but it also opened for me the possibilities of my feet, demonstrating that there are many 
ways of creating rhythm by responding differently to the floor.  
 
2.6.4 Hesitation 
 
Learning to dance Bharatanatyam not only involved adjusting to a new bodily spatiality, 
but also adapting to new temporal structures. Bharatanatyam is sonorous; a dancer’s 
movements articulate an audible rhythm. Given this, a dancer must execute movements 
with precision. It is very important to be dancing in time with the beat. I have been told 
that audiences are listening to the dance just as much as they are watching it. An incorrect 
stomp stands out like a sore thumb (even more when wearing bells). Learning to dance 
Bharatanatyam not only involved adjusting to a new bodily spatiality, but also adapting to 
new temporal structures. The complex rhythmic patterns created in Bharatanatyam are 
bound to a cyclical temporal structure called tala. Within the context of Indian thought on 
performance, dance and music are inextricably linked and tala is one of many points 
where we see this overlap (C.f. Rosewell, 2015). While a detailed introduction to this 
concept is not needed here, a brief one is necessary for articulating the shifts in my 
habitual sense of temporality occurring in the process of learning Bharatanatyam. Tala is 
a cyclical temporal structure, one that defines the timing of a composition of a 
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performance.59 It is understood as being responsible for “coordinating, integrating, and 
maintaining control over all aspects of performance” (Rosewell, 2015, 188). A tala 
unfolds as a temporal duration made up of a certain number of counts ranging from 3 -9. 
The temporal structure of tala resembles the Western musical concept of ‘meter’. In this 
context, meter refers to a specific number of beats that are grouped together as a coherent 
unit. As is the case for meter, a tala provides the wider structure for the repetition of 
musical phrases, motifs and improvisations. Rosewell (2015) explains that Indian 
experiences of meter are “based on a different way of thinking” (202).  
 
Dancing Bharatanatyam required learning to inhabit tala cycles governed by time 
signatures unfamiliar to my body, such as 5/4 (5 beat cycle) or 7/4 (7 beat cycle). I 
struggled with this. The experience of struggling to inhabit new time signatures also 
stirred up a sense of disorientation. My temporal awareness became disjointed. I 
struggled to properly inhabit the temporal flow of the dance. I fell out of sync with the 
tala and failed to inhabit the intervals between beats in their fullness. I felt in my body 
the call to dance, yet at once I felt myself to be concretely incapably of moving. I was 
struck by the hesitancy that pervaded my body. 
 
Hesitancy, or a feeling of delay, arose as I sensed the discontinuity between my intentions 
and the capacity to realise them. Consequently, my movements became inhibited as the “I 
can” of the habitual dancing body was supplanted by an “I cannot” of a dancing body 
caught up in the task of re-sedimenting habits.  Hesitation is a temporal concept. To 
hesitate is first and foremost to slow down. This opens a temporal interval which is felt as 
delay. This sense of delay is felt when the body waveres during habitual action. When 
one hesitates, one experiences the momentum established by the force of habit decelerate. 
The immediacy of habit is stunted. Moments of hesitation, undermine the “I can” of one’s 
body: and the flow of immediate intentional action is deferred, impeding the seamless 
way that one’s movement in and towards the world typically unfolds.  
 
                                                   
59 Cyclical insofar as the beginning of each cycle is regarded as the culmination of the 
previous one.  
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Alia Al-Saji (2014) distinguishes two forms of hesitation: a paralyzing hesitation arising 
from interiorized objectification, and a productive hesitation that makes habits visible, 
and enables them to become responsive to transformation. With regards to the former, 
she gestures to the way that “hesitancy in bodily movement and action tends to 
characterize the lived experience of systematic oppression” (151).60 As Iris Marion 
Young (2005) has shown, hesitation is a common learned dynamic of “feminine” bodily 
comportment in Western culture. Building off Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of 
intentionality as an “I can”, Young describes “feminine bodily existence” as being 
underlined by an inhibited intentionality. She shows that women sense contradiction 
throughout the course of intentional action. This springs from the imposition of a socially 
constituted and self-referred “I cannot” on the seemingly value-neutral “I can”(C.f. 
Young, 2005; Weiss, 1999; Al-Saji, 2014). Young describes the imposed “I cannot” as an 
inhibited intentionality.  Inhibited intentionality creates a lived tension where one is 
called to act but also feels themselves incapable of such action. Rather than being 
characterized by indeterminacy, this kind of hesitation is linked to the over-determination 
of “feminine” body schemas and habits, and expresses an inherent ambivalence that is 
key to this kind of hesitancy.   In contrast, the second responsive form of hesitation that 
Al-Saji identifies inserts indeterminacy into habit. This indeterminacy manifests the 
generativity of habit, its unpredictability, and its openness to change. As she explains, 
hesitation makes the body wait before acting, holding open a temporal interval that 
interrupts the immediacy of habitual action.  
 
Hesitation allows for the temporal gap necessary for what is normally perceived 
immediately and unreflectively to be called into question. Through the delay that 
hesitation initiates, one becomes aware of a sense of anticipation in the body. In other 
words, hesitation not only delays habitual action, but “it also prefigures the delayed habit, 
making it visible as an anticipated future among others” (Al-Saji, 143). To hesitate is to 
“feel one’s way tentatively and receptively” (Al-Saji, 143). Hesitation implies a kind of 
movement where one does not know what kind of future they will find.  In this way, 
                                                   
60 I return to this point in the following chapter when discussing racialized embodiment. 
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hesitation staves off habitual bodily responses. By disrupting the seamlessness of the 
habitual, hesitation can “make felt the historicity, contingency and sedimentation of 
habitual actions and perceptions” (Al-Saji, 143). In hesitation, in other words, not only is 
intentional movement delayed, but it also becomes more open to difference.  
 
2.6.5 Being Behind 
 
One perceives rhythm, music, and dance in culturally specific ways (C.f. Downey, 2002; 
Roholt, 2014). How one is situated socially and culturally plays an important role, not 
merely in the linguistic or symbolic “interpretation” of music, “but in its very sensual 
apprehension” (Downey, 2002, 490). One’s capacity to apprehend and engage with 
musical rhythm is acquired by being assimilated into a given musical culture. As Roholt 
(2014) explains, “one acquires it by being assimilated into a given musical culture. If you 
grew up listening to rock grooves, listening to rock records, going to rock shows, you 
develop a skill, a facility, for hearing the grooves, for grasping them” (71). If you grow 
up listening to jazz or hip hop, you are similarly able to easily hear and experience the 
rhythms characteristic of these genres. When I am dancing, my movement is situated 
according to this temporal structure set by the culturally specific music, and is 
synchronized with it. I perceive rhythm through a dancing body with trained habits of 
perceiving and responding to rhythm as it is constructed with a specific dancing/musical 
culture. Importantly, it has been found “the grooves a person within a musical culture 
clearly perceives may be lost in theory on the outside of that culture” (Roholt, 2014, 74). 
This is relevant given that Bharatanatyam is accompanied by Indian Classical music, 
which is organized according to a different temporal structure than Western Classical 
music.  
 
There are, indeed, some important differences between tala and meter. For instance, a 
tala can be made up of as many as 29 beats. Tala is counted differently than meter, and 
thus “does not correspond to the internal accent structure” that characterizes Western 
music (Nelson, 2008, 2). To explain, let’s turn to an example. When one counts a ¾ 
meter by clapping, it carries the following accent structure: Strong weak weak strong 
 88 
weak weak. In a corresponding three beat tala cycle (thisra), one does not find the 
implied accent of clapped first beat (C.f. Nelson, 2008). The phrase is counted with the 
palm and fingers of one hand against another: Clap, pinky finger, ring finger, clap, pinky 
finger, ring finger. This demonstrates a difference in how rhythmic accents are generated; 
rhythm is “generated by musical phrases and the processes applied to them” (Nelson, 
2008, 2). A given tala also corresponds with spoken syllables. Consequently, “counting” 
generally occurs through phrases rather than numbers. To illustrate, let’s return to the 3/4 
meter described above which (roughly) corresponds to the three-beat tala cycle called 
“thisra”. As opposed to being counted as “1 2 3”, it is spoken as “Ta Ki Ta”.  To give 
another example, a four-beat tala cycle (“chatusra”), is spoken as “Ta Ka Dhi Mi”. The 
tala provides an internal structure, a sort of frame within which both music and dance 
unfold. As mentioned, adavus are structured in relation to a tala, and, of course, any 
choreographed piece is also bound to a given tala structure as well.  
 
Although learning to speak in rhythmic syllables, as is done by Bharatanatyam dancers, 
was difficult, it only skims the surface of the temporal disorientation produced as I tried 
to fit my dancing body into unfamiliar temporal structures. As a Highland dancer, 4/4 
time easily extends the “I can” of my body. My body gears into this temporal structure; 
one might say 4/4 time institutes a familiar dynamic of movement. With the two talas I 
illustrated above, thisra (3) and chatusra (4), I had an easier time taking up and 
responding to because my habitual dancing body is already familiar with these time 
signatures. I find that 4/4 time fits me like a comfy sweater; my body snuggles into it, we 
conform to each other, I do not notice I am wearing it, I just feel warm and cozy. This is 
because I have sedimented a habitual perception that corresponds to the temporal 
regularity captured by this time signature. In Highland dance the tempo always occurs in 
4/4 time. I take up and move into this time signature with ease. As we know, the temporal 
structure of habit is such that it anticipates movement towards the world. My habitual 
dancing body anticipates the next beat. I take up the depth of the intervals between these 
beats in their fullness, sensing their duration and the expressive contours enabled by these 
silences. My habitual dancing body already understands 4/4. 
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Learning to inhabit tala cycles governed by time signatures unfamiliar to my body, such 
as 5/4 (5 beat cycle) or 7/4 (7 beat cycle) was very difficult. By comparison, 7/4 time felt 
like wearing a pair of boots too small for my feet. Fitting myself into a 5, 7, or 9 beat 
was, and sometimes still is, disorienting. Initially it was hard for me to even perceive this 
structure, let alone to move with or gear into it. Dancing in this context felt 
uncomfortable. Here my habitual dancing body poses a problem, for its residual 
structures continue to anticipate the next beat. Rather than feeling a sense of inhabiting a 
temporal flow while dancing, as I would if I were Highland dancing, for instance, while 
dancing Bharatanatyam my temporal awareness became disjointed. My dancing body 
could not feel the temporal regularity of the intervals between beats. When a beat is 
perceived, the body makes predictions about the upcoming beat. I became acutely aware 
that the residual habitual structures that have accustomed me to 4/4 time would lead me 
to incorrectly anticipate the coming beat. Not perceiving the beat properly, meant I could 
not synchronize my own movements with it. Sensing this anticipation, my dancing body 
would hesitate as I felt the next beat approach. Somehow the next beat seemed to obstruct 
my movement, stunting it in the moment of its initiation so I could not properly sense the 
duration of the interval between beats.  
 
In time, my body became responsive to these more complex time structures. I learned to 
respond to the call of the next beat, how to move towards it, how to anticipate its 
presence. My initial inability to comfortably inhabit these new time structures is also 
connected to a different problem that emerged: while dancing I was struck by the 
persistent sensation of “being behind”. Specifically, I observed a disjunction between the 
timing of my body and the timing of the choreography. My movements were out-of-sync 
with the tempo set by the tala. I was going slightly too slow, as if my movements were 
somehow delayed.61 The temporal intervals between beats/movements seemed 
impossibly short.62 I felt a sense of urgency in my body; I felt the need to hurry between 
                                                   
61 No wonder I felt “behind”! 
62 How could I possibly make it to the next step in time? Everything is too fast! It feels 
like there is not enough time within the intervals that separate beat to actually reach the 
next beat “on time”. 
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beats. To give an example, I return to the sequence of movement I described in section 
2.5 (di, da, da di da, da-di! (tai, tai-tai-tai)). These rhythmic syllables correspond to a 
short sequence of movements within a piece of choreography (jati63). This sequence was 
particularly difficult for me to grasp. I seemed to stumble on the space between “da,” and 
“da-di” and ended up arriving at the next beat “tai” too late. As a result, I would find 
myself scrambling to hit to “tai-tai-tai”, which I would sometimes end up missing all 
together. In this case, I was executing the rhythmic pattern of the dance sequence 
correctly, but I was still not keeping time.  As my skill level changed, I was able to feel 
these intervals between beats differently. They seemed to elongate. I no longer felt as 
though I was “behind” or trying to “catch up” to the tempo. Instead I learned how to take 
full advantage of these intervals.  
 
Having the privilege of learning Bharatanatyam has had a significant effect on the way I 
see, think, feel, and move in general. Much of this influence overflows critical analysis, 
and spills into my life away from the dance studio, and my desk. I have noticed, for 
instance, that my hand gestures are now often punctuated with mudras within the context 
of my own expressive speech. Outside of a specific dancing content, my hands form the 
now familiar shapes of mudras. Alapadma pops-up in my hand when I am speaking, 
frequently when I am trying to make a point it seems. This presence of Bharatanatyam 
within my body is likely not distinctly visible to others, but I can see it. Imagine my 
surprise when alapadma showed up in the pictures from my friend’s wedding! This is a 
subtle way that Bharatanatyam has inflected my perception. However, learning 
Bharatanatyam demonstrated to me in concrete bodily ways the powerful force of habit. 
Experiences of disorientation hesitation made me deeply aware of the anticipatory force 
behind my habitual movement. This helped me to experience what it means to not to 
easily move into and take up space. And yet, these experiences have helped me imagine 
                                                   
63 There are many different names for the various aspects of a Bharatanatyam 
performance, the sequence I describe here was part of a jati. Jati refers to a sequence of 
choreography that exists within a larger piece of choreography in a Bharatanatyam 
performance known as a varnum. For the sake of brevity and clarity I will not detail all 
parts that make up a Bharatanatyam performance here.  
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other ways of moving. Bharatanatyam has shown me that change requires one to be open 
and receptive, but also that time makes a difference in experience.  
 
2.7  Sensing Contradictions, Dancing Double Consciousness 
 
Double consciousness is first described by Du Bois in The Souls of Black Folk. For Du 
Bois, this concept captures a central contradiction in self-perception at the heart of the 
experiences of African Americans living in a fundamentally racist society. This 
contradiction results from seeing oneself through two sets of eyes: one’s own and that of 
one’s oppressors. Recently, Alcoff (2015) has explored how this concept might be 
applied to whiteness. Double consciousness invokes the idea of seeing one’s self through 
conflicting systems of meaning, both from inside and from outside of one’s communities. 
It also has the potential to open up both structural and self-critique. Turning to the mirror, 
which is an important pedagogical tool for dancers, I conclude by reflecting on the 
contradictions between how my movements felt from inside and how they were seen 
from the outside, and highlight how experiencing this contradiction can ground new ways 
of thinking about whiteness.  
 
Mirrors are intriguing because they make possible a certain kind of contemplation of the 
self (PrP, 136). Mirrors make visible the visibility of one’s dancing body. As an 
embodied subject, I am always on “this side” of my body. As Merleau-Ponty asserts, “I 
observe external objects with my body… But when it comes to my body, I never observe 
it in itself. I would need a second body to do so” (PhP, 93). I can look down and see my 
feet, or my hands, but not my body as a whole. Although one can never completely stand 
outside of one’s self, through the mirror the self can be taken as an object of reflection.64 
In this way, the mirror presents me with, in its own way, “what I will never be present to, 
what will always be invisible to me, what I will never directly witness”, i.e. my body as it 
is seen from the outside (VI, 82). The experience of seeing oneself reflected in the mirror 
                                                   
64 Merleau-Ponty points out, “the mirror furnishes the child with a perception of [her] 
own body that [s]he” could never have gotten by [herself]” (PrP, 126). 
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establishes that one’s own actions are visible from elsewhere, even though normally one 
cannot see themselves seeing. Reflected in the mirror I am able to see my body as a 
sensible object among objects that I am still able to recognise as ME! The image over 
there in the mirror is also importantly not me, since I am not in the mirror—I am here 
where I feel myself. In this way the mirror makes it known for the subject that they can 
be seen from the “outside”. By offering the opportunity to observe oneself “from the 
outside”, the experience of seeing oneself in mirrors opens the possibility that one’s 
body/movement/behavior might be considered from a different perspective.  
 
In my Bharatanatyam class the mirror made my whiteness visible. This image of myself 
reflected in the mirror provided visual reminder of my difference and position as a 
cultural outsider. Indeed, my white body stood out in a class of individuals of South East 
Asian descent. Before the mirror I was literally faced with my whiteness. After class I 
found my thoughts returning to this reflection, my double. I was intrigued by how my 
double (in the mirror) showed up contradictions65 between how my own movements felt 
and how they are seen.66 There were many instances when I was learning where my 
movements perhaps felt correct, but did not look correct. In other words, I might feel like 
I am executing a movement sequence correctly when I am not. For instance, I cannot see 
my poor turnout, shallow arimundi, uneven flexibility, crooked arms or head bopping up 
and down. I am executing movements that I do not necessarily feel as mistakes. I might 
think I’m doing a great job. Through the mirror one can see that they are in fact doing a 
movement incorrectly. There were many times, for instance, when I felt/thought I was 
                                                   
65 For Merleau-Ponty, however, the mirror is not just a representation or a symbol, rather 
it reveals the “possibility of ambiguity”, or potential for the presence of difference, 
contradiction, and multiplicity (PrP, 129).  
66 The image of one’s dancing body in the mirror offers a dancer a sense of how their 
dancing body looks from “the outside”. For dancers, the “look” of a certain movement 
(i.e. how it is perceived kinetically from the “outside”) is intertwined with how a 
movement feels (i.e. how it is perceived kinaesthetically, from the “inside”) (C.f. Ravn, 
2017). To execute an adavu correctly it must look a certain way from the outside. This 
“look” corresponds to a felt sense of certain postures and positions of one’s dancing body 
in space. As explained, I cannot stand outside myself to appraise my movements. The 
mirror, then, reflects back to me a perspective on my dancing body I cannot otherwise 
have.  
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making a nice straight diagonal line with my arms, when both my teacher and the mirror 
revealed it to be otherwise. I kept returning to this moment, for I found in it an echo of a 
different disjunction: white cognitive dissonance. Although a white individual might 
maintain a belief in racial equality, support antiracist work, and feel that they are not 
racist, they nevertheless continue to benefit from white domination (C.f. Sullivan, 2006, 
2014; Ahmed, 2007; Alcoff, 2015). As I will show in chapter three, white privilege 
operates covertly through habit. Although white individuals might be unconscious of 
these habits, it does not mean they cannot be seen from the outside. As Ahmed rightly 
observes, “whiteness is only invisible for those who inhabit it” (Ahmed, 2007, 157).  
 
A mirror offers a dancer a sense “of how a how a different movement pattern look[s] 
externally and of the correlating internal sensation of the movement” (Purser, 2017, 42).67 
As a tool, then, what the mirror does is “allow for the back and forth pattern between 
dancers’ kinaesthetic sensations and visual perceptions” (Ehrenberg, 2010, 175). 
Although the double that appears in the mirror can have a disorienting effect, it can also 
be actively engaged with as a tool for self-awareness and self-correction. Accordingly, 
Ravn (2017) suggests that a dancer’s interaction with a mirror exemplifies how “the 
sense of seeing can be unfixed from being directly linked to reflexive evaluations of the 
body” and instead can be related to expanding the potentials of one’s body (Ravn, 2017, 
74). In the dance classroom, the mirror image of my dancing body helped to make it 
possible to contemplate and correct my own movement both in the classroom and outside 
of it.68 I argue in the next chapter that this experience of double consciousness can 
                                                   
67 As Legrand and Ravn (2009) report in their ethnographic study exploring embodied 
perception of dancers, dancers most commonly use the mirror “to supplant their 
experience of how a quality of movement senses from within the body is visible on the 
surface, in the changing shape of the body” (404). 
68 In this context, mirrors are considered useful as a pedagogical tool for self-correction. 
For instance, one dancer explains that “when a teacher corrects me and she says I am 
doing something incorrectly and I don’t feel it, and then I look in the mirror and am 
surprised by what I see… sometimes I need to look in the mirror to feel it” (Ehrenburg, 
2010, 174). When learning, the mirror is particularly useful for sustaining basic body 
alignment. One dancer explains, “With the mirror it is good to see my placement… 
sometimes I look at the mirror and see I am doing a movement wrong, I need to fix my 
sway back, or whether my flat back was as it should be” (Ehrenberg, 2010, 174). In these 
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provide insight into whiteness as a habit of perception, and a means to explore ways of 
living whiteness differently.  
 
2.8 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I have explored the generativity of habit. Taking up dance as a method of 
inquiry, and my own dancing body as a site of discovery, I have demonstrated that latent 
habitual structures within our bodies can be resedimented through movement. I began 
with a brief introduction sketching the dance history sedimented within my own dancing 
body. Then, to familiarize readers with the dance vocabulary I would be drawing on 
throughout the chapter, I outlined some distinct features of Bharatanatyam: natya, nrtta, 
nritya, rasa, abhinaya, mudras, and adavus. This was followed by a section explaining 
my methodological approach for bringing dance together with phenomenology, and 
highlighting the strategies I developed for listening-to my body, attuning to sensation, 
and dancing with writing. In what followed I traced a number of changes in my own 
sensory-motor experiences as I became a novice Bharatanatyam dancer and identified 
two experiential phenomena essential for shifting habitual movement: disorientation and 
hesitation. I argued that disorientation throws the ease, immediacy, and flow of pre-
reflective movement into disarray by disrupting one’s sense of bodily spatiality. Next I 
demonstrated that hesitation, which is felt as a delay, disturbs one’s habitual sense of 
temporality and allows one to register the residual habitual structures in the body as over-
determining intentional action. This enables bodily receptivity and makes felt the 
contingency of habit (the possibility of becoming otherwise). Experiences of 
disorientation and hesitation are important because they open the possibility for double 
consciousness, which can ground critical reflection. The phenomenological analysis I 
developed in this chapter provides the foundation for my investigation of the habitual 
movement in the context of white privilege in the next chapter.  
 
                                                   
examples, we see how dancers combine the sense of sight with the sense of movement in 
order adjust their own movements so they match up with what they are supposed to look 
and feel like.  
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Chapter 3 
 
3 Slowing the Momentum of Habitual Whiteness 
 
“The true force of revolutionary change is never merely the oppressive situations which 
we seek to escape, but that piece of the oppressor which is planted deep within each of 
us.” 
 – Audre Lorde (1984, 123) 
 
Under such circumstances there is an urgent need for white individuals, especially those 
who are interested in supporting anti-racist projects, to contend with the fact that in this 
racialized culture their experiences, perceptions, and economic positions are constituted 
through being white. Dwelling on the muck and mire of my own whiteness has revealed 
to me that whiteness is subtended by a corporeal hold; whiteness is not just an idea that 
only exists “out there” in social structures and institutions, but is “right here” in the folds 
and flesh of my body guiding my perception and binding my intentions through action.69 
Although white individuals might be unaware of the racialized dimensions of their 
experiences, Sara Ahmed (2007) makes the important observation that “whiteness is only 
invisible for those who inhabit it” (157). As “an ongoing and unfinished, history, which 
orients bodies in specific directions, affecting how they take up space,” Ahmed views 
whiteness as a “bad habit” (Ahmed, 2007, 150). This chapter explores how this 
understanding of whiteness (as a bad habit) can breathe new life into the question of what 
white people can and should do to help support anti-racist projects.  
 
In this chapter I argue that within a context of racial inequality white privilege70 becomes 
embedded within the corporeal structures of the body. I will demonstrate that the 
                                                   
69 Of course this is also complicated by other intersectional factors, such as gender, 
sexual orientation, ability, class. 
70 I use “privilege” to refer to the unearned benefits that individuals who are perceived as 
belonging to dominant social groups are afforded within social systems of oppression. 
Within feminist and social justice literature this term is taken up to highlight the 
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movement of white bodies in and towards the world is underlined by an expansiveness 
that is expressed through a pre-reflective style of bodily comportment and motility 
characterized by momentum. I use momentum to describe the ease of movement that 
white privilege affords to white bodies as they move into traditionally white spaces. 
Momentum is felt as a style of comportment and motility that is unencumbered and 
uninhibited. This feeling of momentum captures the sense in which white bodies tend not 
to hesitate as they engage in intentional action. My goal in investigating the ways this 
momentum takes hold in white bodies as a habit of perception is to explore how we might 
replace this bad habit with a better one. Framing whiteness in terms of habitual 
perception positions whiteness as a kind of doing, rather than a kind of being. This means 
that there is potential for whiteness to be taken up differently and produce different 
effects. If white individuals are to do this successfully, however, it requires a disruption 
of the habitual ways in which they live whiteness. As I have shown in chapter one, 
however, for Merleau-Ponty the capacity for habit expresses a tension between 
sedimentation and spontaneity. Habits are flexible and always evolving and incorporating 
new elements. For this reason, there is always the possibility for habitual actions to shift 
and change. In chapter two I explored how habitual patterns of movement can be re-
sedimented, highlighting three experiential phenomena: disorientation, hesitation, and 
double consciousness. This chapter builds on and extends these chapters. I argue that 
experiences of disorientation and hesitation explicitly disrupt the sense of ease that 
normally animates white bodies as they move in and towards the world, and in so doing 
bring the pre-reflective dynamics of white privilege into appearance. Such an experience 
has potential for grounding white double consciousness, defined as a disjunction between 
how white individuals perceive themselves and the way they are perceived from the 
outside. 
 
My interest in the ordinary and everyday ways that whiteness is embodied leads me to the 
phenomena of habit and the realm of habitual action. As I have shown, habits are part of 
what allows for manners of taking up, moving into and engaging with the world to 
                                                   
dimensions of inequality that arise in everyday and ordinary experience (Case, 2013; 
Leavy, 2017). 
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become ordinary and taken for granted: “habits enable one to inhabit a world” (Weiss, 
2008, 76). By bringing the phenomena of habit to bear on whiteness I will clarify how 
whiteness becomes embedded corporeally, and consequently underlies perceptual 
experience and grounds styles of comportment and intentional action. Although the 
connection between whiteness and habit has been recently examined by Shannon 
Sullivan (2006) and Terence Macmillian (2009), these studies draw primarily on the 
pragmatic account of habit developed by John Dewey. The relationship between habit 
and whiteness has only just begun to be given attention phenomenologically. Sara Ahmed 
(2007) has addressed this whiteness as lived, but does so primarily through the concept of 
orientation. In her recent publication, Ngo (2017) also develops a detailed 
phenomenology of racism and racialized embodiment that is grounded in a very detailed 
phenomenological account of habit. In this text she addresses whiteness briefly. Although 
there are other scholars who discuss habit, I draw on Merleau-Ponty’s account because it 
allows me to address specifically how it is taken up in the body’s movements. While I see 
Pierre Bourdieu’s notion of habitus, which refers to an acquired set of dispositions that 
are internalized during childhood and conditioned by one’s position within a given social 
context, as being closely aligned with Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology, I find habitus 
too deterministic. Certainly, Bourdieu’s work on the social dimensions of habit helps to 
make sense of the connections between a one’s individual habits and the habits of others 
in one’s community, but his account has little to say about movement and is less focused 
on articulating the bodily experience of habit. By contrast, Merleau-Ponty’s account not 
only speaks to the process of habit formation itself as a dynamic and creative bodily 
process, but also foregrounds the specific role that movement plays in this process.  
 
3.1 Cultivating White Double Consciousness 
 
Within our current context of racial inequality there is an urgent need for white 
individuals, especially those who are interested in supporting anti-racist projects, to 
contend with the fact that within this racialized culture, their experiences, perceptions and 
economic positions are constituted through being white. I have demonstrated that 
experiences of disorientation and hesitation explicitly disrupt the sense of ease that 
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normally animates white bodies as they move in and towards the world and this allows 
for the pre-reflective dynamics of white privilege to be brought into appearance. Linda 
Alcoff has recently explored how this experience can generate what she describes as 
“white double consciousness” (C.f. Alcoff, 2015). She argues that white individuals 
experience a kind of double consciousness as they begin to understand themselves 
“through both the dominant and non-dominant lens and recognising the latter as a critical 
corrective truth” (Alcoff, 2015, 140). She likens this to the split in consciousness 
described by W.E.B. Du Bois.  
 
Double consciousness is first described by Du Bois in The Souls of Black Folk. Although 
it was published in 1903, The Souls of Black Folk remains a foundational text for the 
critical analysis of race because of the significant insights it offers into the lived realities 
of black folk in the United States. For Du Bois, double consciousness captures a central 
contradiction in self-perception at the heart of the experiences of African Americans 
living in a fundamentally racist society. This contradiction arises because oppressed 
groups come to view themselves through their oppressor eyes as well as their own. This 
results in a feeling of “two-ness.” He explains: “one ever feels his two-ness, - an 
American, a Negro; two souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings” (Du Bois, 1994 
9). From this perspective, double consciousness is particularly pernicious because it 
creates the “sense of always looking at one’s self through the eyes of others, of measuring 
one’s soul by the tape of a world that looks on it in amused contempt and pity” (Du Bois, 
1994, 9). Within this context, Du Bois argues, it is impossible to integrate these two 
conflicting perspectives in to a coherent view of oneself. One’s sense self is fragmented 
by “two warring ideals in one dark body, whose dogged strength alone keeps it from 
being torn asunder” (Du Bois, 1994, 9). For racialized subjects, the vacillation between 
contradictory senses of oneself results in a painful experience of self-alienation.71  
                                                   
71 One must be cognisant of presenting double consciousness as “a universally and trans-
historically true analysis of a tragic aspect of African-American self-consciousness” 
(Zamir, 1995116). Applying this concept so readily and broadly risks reifying a 
metanarrative of blackness, obscuring the significance of local conditions and historical 
specificity. Du Bois’ notion of double consciousness is a historically specific and class-
specific psychology, which reflects “the black middle-class elite facing the failure of its 
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Double consciousness invokes the idea of seeing one’s self through conflicting meaning 
systems. Because double consciousness disrupts one’s self-perception, it also has the 
potential to open up both self and structural critique. Given this, Alcoff (2015) has argued 
that a dedicated commitment to end racism among white individuals might involve 
establishing a form of white double consciousness . Alcoff (2015) extends Du Bois’ 
articulation of double consciousness to address a new-found incoherence within white 
subjective experience. She argues that the current subjectivity of many white individuals 
“does not correspond to the dominant narrative of whiteness that holds itself ahead of and 
better than every other culture” (Alcoff, 2015, 171). In many cases, their own lived 
contexts and experiences hold little in common with the interests and claims of 
supremacy. Whiteness, she maintains, “is neither as normative nor as positive an identity 
as it used to be” Alcoff 2015, 172). Subject to a unsympathetic gaze, white individuals 
are exposed to the reprehensible and unpleasant aspects of their own whiteness (C.f. 
Alcoff, 2015, 171-172). White double consciousness emerges from within this context.  
 
While Alcoff’s understanding of white double consciousness resembles the split in 
consciousness described by Du Bois, there are some crucial differences. Although white 
individuals may experience a split consciousness, she observes that they “are not thereby 
oppressed by the racist gaze from racial others” (170). Alternatively, she continues, they 
are living the consequences of “white vanguards ideologies” (170). In rearticulating 
                                                   
own progressive ideals in the late nineteenth century, in the aftermath of failed 
Reconstruction and under the gaze of a white America” (Zamir, 1995, 116). In other 
worlds, one must be aware of the way that this concept speaks specifically to the 
“fundamental antimony of diaspora blacks” (Gilroy, 1993, 30). And yet the sense of two-
ness at the heart of this concept, and the ambivalence it evokes, continues to resonate 
across many disciplines. As Gilroy (1993) points out, Du Bois’ notion of double 
consciousness is considered by many “the core dynamic of racial oppression” (30). 
Because Du Bois does not provide an exacting definition of double consciousness, we are 
left to gather the vestiges of this concept ourselves. As Mariana Ortega (2017) points out, 
on Du Bois’ account, the “meaning of double–consciousness and the status of the 
experience of having double-consciousness are not as clear” (122). Double consciousness 
is viewed by some as a “mythic blessing and social burden” (Bell, 1996, 95), while others 
have a more cynical outlook and view it as “a lack of racial identity” (Lott, 1995, 100) or 
“false consciousness” (Gooding-Williams, 2009, 21).  
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double consciousness Alcoff demonstrates how this concept might be extended to 
whiteness in order to address the ways in which splits in consciousness can ground 
critical reflexivity and establish richer understandings of others, as well as what it means 
to be oneself in others’ eyes. In the following section I dig deeper into the way that race 
operates at the level of perception.   
 
3.2 Race as Lived: Racialization and Habitual Perception 
 
Given the persistence of white privilege despite various legal interventions intended to 
prohibit deliberate privileging of white individuals, much of the academic literature on 
whiteness has focused on the ways that the privileging of whiteness is subtly embedded 
within social/institutional structures and individual unconscious projections.72 These 
approaches to whiteness have meaningfully contributed to our understanding of the ways 
that whiteness operates discursively, and how it is ideologically represented or 
manipulated, but tend to obscure the embodied dimensions of white privilege, how 
whiteness is lived in and through the body. Reframing questions about whiteness around 
embodiment helps demonstrate the more insidious workings of race and racism by 
demonstrating the ways that they take root in the habitual body. This begins with a 
discussion of how race works at the level of perception.  
 
Phenomenological accounts of racialized existence address race and racism as modes of 
inhabiting, wherein racial meanings are embedded within the structures of the body and 
mediate perception and intentional action in the world. Such analyses focus specifically 
on the lived, experiential, and embodied dimensions of racism and racialization. 
Racialization “describes the ways in which colonialism and White supremacy divide 
                                                   
72 I do not want to sound overly idealistic here. While progressive law has made 
important advancements and state/local laws and policy are not explicitly designed to 
impose segregation, there are plenty of formal policy and legal strategies which do not fit 
into a narrative of “progress” or “advancement”.  Certainly, America’s current crap-
handler-in-chief Donald Trump’s recent immigration politics which “curb illegal 
immigration” are also mired by anxieties surrounding securing a white majority 
population.  
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bodies politically, economically, spatially, and socially in order to exploit and dominate 
them” (Al-Saji, 2014, 137). This understanding of racialization encompasses various 
social, cultural, and historical processes through which races are constructed and lived. 
 
Racialization operates through perception, and largely through the domain of the 
visible.73 Critical race scholars have shown that framing race as a property of the visible 
material body is central to the perception of race/racial difference. Race is thus perceived 
as being based in bodily characteristics, such as skin colour, facial attributes, and bodily 
styles. In this way, race becomes perceived as “a natural category”, rather than a “social, 
cultural, and historical construct” (Al-Saji, 2014, 137). This is an important point 
because, as Alcoff (2005) has argued, “visible difference naturalizes racial meanings” 
(191). The perception of race as “innate” or “inherent” justifies and reinforces the racist 
logic that structures this perception in the first place. The naturalization of visible 
differences of raced attributes over-determines racialized bodies; subsequently they are 
perceived as “always ‘too much’ or ‘too little’ – an overdetermination, or a lack, but 
never a proper fit” (Hall, 1996, 3). In a world where racism exists, racialized bodies are 
overdetermined, laden with coded meanings. Yancy elaborates:  
My darkness is a signifier of negative values grounded within 
a racist social and historical matrix that predates my existential 
emergence. The meaning of my blackness is not intrinsic to 
my natural pigment, but has become a value laden “given,” an 
object presumed untouched and unmediated by various 
contingent discursive practices, history, time and context. My 
Blackness functions as a stipulatory axiom from which 
                                                   
73 Of course, racialization/race does not just operate through the vision/the domain of the 
visible, there are other significant social-economic, historical, and structural factors that 
contribute as well. However, in this context I am emphasize the specific role of visual 
perception in sustaining the unconscious and invisible operations of racialization. As Al-
Saji (2014) explains, “within a Merleau-Pontian frame, the visual naturalization of ‘race’ 
can be understood to be made possible by the intentional structure of vision and its 
reliance on habit, but not to be necessitation by them” (138) [C.f. Al-Saji, 2010, 884].  
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conclusions can be drawn: “Blackness is evil, not to be trusted, 
and guilty as such (Yancy, 2017, 19).  
Here Yancy articulates the generalized racist projection of Blackness on to his own body. 
This projection determines in advance how he will appear to others. Over-determining 
racialized bodies in this way works to perpetuate systemic inequality by justifying and 
reifying social ideologies about race. This in turn makes difference into “opposition and 
hierarchy, so that identities appear to be mutually exclusive” (Al-Saji, 2014, 136).74 
 
While race certainly operates through visible markers on the body, race itself is not a 
natural phenomena or biological category. Although visible differences in bodily being 
have material presence and effects, the meanings that are associated with these 
differences are in no way “natural.” Indeed, visible markers of race have been shown to 
have no biological correlates (C.f. Harding, 1993; Alcoff, 2005, 198). Furthermore, 
conventional racial categories have no correspondence to genotype, genetic variability, 
and the phenotypical features used to differentiate races are undetermined by genetic 
inheritance (Alcoff, 2006; Alcoff, 2015). Given this, the idea that “race” is a natural 
phenomena or biological category is dubious. Instead, race is better understood as a 
historically evolving and culturally contextual social construct: an emergent lived 
experience. To perceive race as a property of certain bodies is precisely not to see the 
historical, social, political cultural and economic dimensions that contextualize race.  
 
Evidently, seeing is not an indifferent engagement with the visible world. The world, and 
Others within it, come to be seen in accordance with sedimented habits of seeing. As 
Merleau-Ponty has shown, one learns how to see. For instance, I never really noticed, or 
gave a second thought to, random bits of food littering the sidewalk. This changed when I 
got a dog because he will dart to and devour discarded pizza crusts no matter how long 
they have been out in the rain. I learned to detect them faster than my dog, so as to 
prevent him eating them and getting sick. Because early detection of pizza crust is 
important to my dog’s continued well-being, I now see pizza crust everywhere. 
                                                   
74 The visibility of the racialized body extends beyond being seen, to also seeing oneself 
being seen.   
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Racializing perception, on the other hand, shows that habits of seeing are embedded in a 
given social, cultural, and historical context, which subsequently “structures in such ways 
as to motivate, without fully determining, certain forms of perception, certain meaning 
making schemas” (Al-Saji, 2014: 138). Perception of race is learned and acquired 
through bodily habit (Alcoff, 2006; Sullivan, 2006; Ngo, 2017). These habits then release 
us from the need of conscious interpretation. We do not see them but see through them. 
For instance, in chapter two I demonstrated that one perceives rhythms and music in 
culturally specific ways. As one who ha s grown up listening to Classical music, it might 
initially be harder for you to perceive the groove of Rhythm and Blues. As Ngo (2017) 
points out, this also lends insight into the impact of implicit racial bias within workplace 
hiring practices. She notes that, human resource managers are often caught off guard 
when faced with the data that demonstrates that they have a bias towards “white sounding 
names (Emily, Greg) over African American sounding names (Lakisha, Jamal)” when  
evaluating who to hire (Ngo, 2017, 33; Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2004, 1009). When 
conducting a study on racial bias and hiring behaviors Bertrand & Mullainathan, (2004) 
found that those with “white sounding names” received 50% greater call-backs as 
compared to those with CVs bearing “African American sounding” names (992). These 
finding are mirrored in Devah Pager’s (2003) study of hiring behavior, where she found 
that white applicants that were twice as likely to receive an interview than black 
applicants (957-958). Al-Saji argues that racializing perception circumscribes the 
receptivity and affectivity of the perceiver; “the openness of vision to other ways of 
being, which may destabilize or shatter its perceptual schemata, delimited” (2014, 138). 
Under these conditions, “the dynamic ability of vision to change is partially closed-
down” (Al-Saji, 2014, 138). Consequently, “racialized bodies are not only seen as 
naturally inferior, they cannot be seen otherwise” (Al-Saji, 2010, 885). This reflects the 
perceptual closure that characterizes racializing perception. Racializing perception is thus 
defined by rigidity and affective closure, i.e. the ability to be affected by that which is 
outside the objectifying structures that underlie habitual perception.  
 
Affect plays a significant role in linking what is perceived as a racialized other to its 
immediately felt effects on the racializing body. This immediacy is connected to 
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phenomena of habit (see chapter one), and is central for the naturalization that sustains 
racializing habits of perception. The dominant subject’s response to the racialized other 
appears immediate, and this immediacy is part of what justifies the response. In this 
process of visible racialization, what is seen and felt by the dominant subject in the 
presence of the racialized individual is naturalized. Importantly, this means that in 
racializing vision it is not just that racialized bodies are perceived as “naturally inferior”, 
but that they “cannot be seen otherwise” (138). Projecting race onto the body is not 
accidental: “locating race in the visible thus produces the experience that racial identity is 
immutable” (Alcoff, 2006, 192).75  
 
3.2.1 Whiteness and Invisibility 
  
Whiteness is an effect of racialization, meaning that individuals are conferred the status 
of whiteness through the same processes by which racial meaning and social significance 
adheres to other racialized bodies. Because of the unique76 relationship that whiteness has 
to most histories of domination, the relation between whiteness and the visible body takes 
                                                   
75 This would seem to also relieve the dominant subject, and the larger social sphere, 
from responsibility for their response.  
76 Whiteness, has a distinct connection to horrific historical atrocities including  
colonialism, slavery, and genocide. As Alcoff (2015) points out, this greatly impacts the 
kind of affective orientation that white individuals have towards these events. Guilt, 
shame, or denial in response to the relationship that whiteness has to slavery and 
colonialism for example are affective responses that differentiate white individuals’ 
experience from that of other racialized individuals. Feelings such as shame, guilt, or 
denial are less common among those racialized groups whose families were and continue 
to be subjected to systems of oppression. Although domination and privilege certainly 
guide what it means to live as a white individual, whiteness should not be reduced to 
these dynamics alone. Just as we ought not to essentialize whiteness by homogenizing 
white identity, one cannot distill whiteness to domination and privilege definitively. The 
strong and longstanding connection between whiteness and supremacist ideologies 
notwithstanding, I echo Alcoff’s (2015) assertion that “we need an account of what 
whiteness can possibly mean apart from white supremacy” (20). This is especially the 
case if we wish to imagine a future where whiteness might be lived differently and have 
different effects. This being said, the privileges and social-structural benefits white 
individuals experience come from a particular history, a history of colonialism, slavery 
and segregation. Failure to acknowledge/recognize these histories only contributes to the 
covert fashion in which privilege operates. 
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shape differently. In this context, whiteness is often described in terms of its invisibility. 
Whiteness “disappears,” (Dyer, 1997), is “unmarked” (Frankenberg, 1993), and thus is 
“difficult to get a hold of” (Kobayashi and Johnson, 2007). As Richard Dyer (1997) 
observes, of course white people have a color; however, within a racialized context the 
color of whiteness has come to signify “the absence of color” (207). This assumption, he 
argues, grounds a “logic of whiteness” that produces white bodies as neutral, universal, 
against which all else is measured.77 Under this logic, whiteness disappears as a category 
of racial experience: despite the fact that the visible bodies of white individuals have a 
color. Under these circumstances, George Lipsitz notes that “whiteness never has to 
speak its name, never has to acknowledge its role as an organizing principal in social and 
cultural relations” (Lipsitz, 1995, 369). This “silence about itself” is, for Ann Ducille “the 
primary prerogative of whiteness, at once its grand scheme and deep cover” (Ducille, 
1997, 13). Of course, the illusive invisibility of whiteness is directly related to the social 
privileging of whiteness as a normative standard. As Sara Ahmed observes, “whiteness is 
only invisible for those who inhabit it” (2007, 157). In fact, what is rendered invisible 
about whiteness is the historically, socially and culturally specific structures of 
oppression that are instituted in and through the process of racialization.78 The tendency 
                                                   
77 “More often than not universal categories have been clandestinely racialized. Any 
critical engagement with racism requires us to understand the tyranny of the universal” 
(Davis, 2016, 87). For most of our history the very category ‘human’ has been 
constructed through binary relations that position people of colour as not belonging to it. 
Universal categories are “coloured white and gendered male” (Davis, 2016, 87).  
78 The ideology of colour-blindness is another distancing strategy within white liberalism 
that exploits the connection between race and the visual. The liberal myth of colour-
blindness revolves around a the disavow of difference and the denial of embodiment. The 
so-called ‘colour-blind’ claim not to see race and instead ‘just people’. As Puwar (2004) 
explains this perpetuates the thinking that race does not matter and colour does not make 
a difference, “that we are all the same – one happy human race” (136). On this account, 
racism becomes a ‘public secret,’ to be discussed in low voices and hushed tones. This 
makes discussions of race, racism or racial tensions extremely taboo. Subsequently, 
racism becomes a “matter that should not be mentioned for fear of opening up the ever-
present but often repressed racial fissures that society is infected with” (Puwar, 2004, 
137-138). Within this context, differences should not be mentioned and we should 
consider that we are all the same. One’s supposed colour-blindness is meant to be a 
marker of a white person’s growth beyond racism, demonstrating that she is so 
progressive that she is (supposedly) unaware of the racial categories on which racism 
depends. Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that white liberals avoid the 
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for whiteness to disappear from the experiences of white individuals is not only a mark of 
privilege, but also works to obscure the systemic nature of racism and thus prevents an 
interrogation of its presence as part and parcel of a system of oppression that normalizes 
dominance of one group over another regardless of their intention or desire.79  
 
To say that in racialized contexts whiteness operates through invisibility is not to say that 
white individuals are unaware of their skin color, as was argued by early sociological 
analyses of whiteness (Cf. Frankenberg, 1993). To the contrary, Alcoff (2015) argues that 
whiteness is not experienced by white individuals “as a peripheral or contingent 
characteristic,” but instead is a “cornerstone of their sense of who they are” (86). The 
idea that whiteness is invisible instead speaks to the tendency for white individuals to 
greatly underestimate the ways that their experiences, perceptions, and economic position 
are affected by being constituted as white. Situating whiteness in relation to habit helps to 
explain this. As I have shown in chapter one, for Merleau-Ponty, once habits have been 
sedimented into one’s corporeal schema they mitigate one’s need to interpret their 
perceptual experience; situating whiteness as a habit thus demonstrates how it is that 
white individuals do not perceive the ways that their whiteness bears upon how they 
move into and take up space. By providing a system of transposable equivalences, the 
ways of habitually taking up the world that are associated with one’s whiteness become 
the background that illuminates my field of action. Accordingly, for a white individual, 
their actions appear neutral, as if they have nothing to do with my whiteness at all. Here, 
whiteness remains in the background of experience for white individuals. Understanding 
whiteness as habitual helps make sense of why “people who benefit from social 
privileges are generally oblivious to them” (Leavy, 2017, 2). 
 
                                                   
implications of their whiteness. Avoidance in the face of  substantive discussions of their 
own vested interest in whiteness, as George Yancy explains, “is a key feature of the 
social ontology of whiteness” (2004, 4).  
79 Accordingly, analyses of whiteness within phenomenological studies of race and 
racism are not only part of a larger interest in forwarding anti-racist critiques of existing 
power relations, but also contend with the tendency for whiteness to disappear.  
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3.3 Whiteness as a Style of Being in the World 
  
In her work, The Future of Whiteness, Linda Alcoff (2015) describes whiteness as “a 
historically emergent lived experience” (8). This interpretation captures the dynamic 
nexus of historical, social, and political horizons through which contemporary white 
identities have emerged and emphasizes the ways that whiteness imparts a particular 
perspective on the world. Alcoff demonstrates that one’s whiteness significantly impacts 
one’s being in the world by influencing “how one navigates that world”, as well as “how 
they are navigated around by others” (9). Framed in this way, whiteness is understood to 
be constantly becoming and becoming undone. Of course, one’s experience of their world 
is impacted by different aspects of their social positioning simultaneously. Everyone 
experiences privilege and oppression in varying degrees (Hill Collins, 2000; Case, 2013). 
Indeed, one’s own experiences of privilege and oppression shift according to how one is 
situated at any given time and in any given social, political or historical context. Given 
that privilege and oppression overlap and mutually influence each other, individuals are 
not simply oppressed or privileged. One’s experience of white identity is mediated by 
other factors such as gender, ability, class, and sexuality. For example, one can 
experience certain social privileges by being white, thin, and cisgender, while also 
experiencing oppression based on gender, and sexuality. The privileges one experiences 
as a result of one’s whiteness are not negated by one’s own experiences of oppression. 
Rather, it demonstrates that one’s experience of white privilege is fundamentally shaped 
by the dynamics of its intertwining with other factors.  
 
It is clear that one’s whiteness is experienced in ways that are complex, contradictory, 
and constantly shifting, so we cannot think of white identities as homogenous. One’s 
whiteness is multidimensional and multiply constituted. Nevertheless, there are ways of 
being in the world that are particular to white individuals. Indeed, the works of W.E.B. 
Du Bois (1986) and Franz Fanon (1967), as well contemporary scholars such as Sara 
Ahmed (2007), Shannon Sullivan (2006; 2014), and George Yancy (2014), show that 
there are particular inclinations, affects, practices, modes of perceptions, manners of 
comportment which congeal in and through white bodies as they inhabit the world. There 
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is something recognisable about whiteness, but not generalizable. Indeed, who is, or is 
not, considered white has changed significantly over time and whiteness is complicated 
further by intersectional questions surrounding gender, sexuality, ability, and so on. As 
with all social identities, whiteness is messy and contested. Who is, or is not, considered 
white, for example, has changed significantly over time.80 Thinking about whiteness as a 
style allows us to explore a common manner of relating to the world through the 
intertwining of intentionality and habit. This is not to posit an essentialist view of 
whiteness, but instead to lay bare the substantive specificity of white subjective 
experience. 
 
For Merleau-Ponty, intentionality and habitual patterns of movement coalesce in the 
living body. Their overlapping expresses a particular style of being in and towards the 
world that can be observed and kinesthetically experienced. Style is expressive. For 
Merleau-Ponty it captures “a general attitude towards the world” (SB, 157-158). Style 
thus constitutes a certain field of action I hold around me. This understanding of style 
goes beyond its traditional aesthetic context. Style is not about your cool shoes; rather it 
describes a persistent mode of being in the world that we can perceive others and the 
world around us, without having to grasp the entirety of their being or manner of 
inhabiting the world. He describes style as a certain manner of “managing the domain of 
space and time, over which it has competency, of pronouncing, of articulating that 
                                                   
80 Although in North America neither Italians nor the Irish were considered white prior to 
the 19th century, in both cases the public opinions about their racial identities have shifted 
over time, demonstrating that ethnic groups can become white (Garner, 2007). In an era 
of globalized capitalism and the expansion of neo-liberalism, one also cannot ignore the 
ways that the boundaries of “race” are impacted by economic status and “proper” 
consumption. For example, David Goldberg (2002) asserts, “non-whites can be 
‘whitened’ by the classed color of money” (222). Global capitalism thus enables some 
individuals, such as those belonging to the new middle classes in the Global South, who 
would otherwise be unable to enter into realm of whiteness, to breach the color line 
(Arat-Koc, 2010). On the other hand, being racialized as white does not always guarantee 
access to the privileges of whiteness. The white working class, for example, has long held 
an ambiguous in-between position in the North American social imaginary (Garner, 
2007; Sullivan, 2014). It is important to remember that regulating the boundaries of who 
is, or who is not, considered white is an important way in which the normative and 
ideological domain of white privilege is sustained.  
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domain, or radiating about a wholly virtual center” (VI, 115). Style appears as an 
inalienable internal horizon but is also allusive and elliptical. A style does not posit a 
finite end, rather we operate according to a style (VI, 152).  
 
In the preface to The Visible and The Invisible, Claude Lefort clarifies style as “that 
interior animation of colour,81 that interior rhythm that assembles the forms and shadows 
of the rose, that organized fluctuation that makes the thing arise as a relief upon a depth 
of being” (VI, xlix). According to Merleau-Ponty, “the style of each individual is visible 
in them just as a heart is felt even at the periphery of the body” (PhP, 87). In this way, 
style can be observed and kinesthetically experienced. For example, even if my friend is 
not wearing her glasses and so cannot make out the details of my figure, she still 
recognises me from afar by the way that I walk. There is something of my style of being 
in the world that is visible in the sway of my gait. We can also think of places as 
confirming a certain style. Merleau-Ponty describes for example, the latent sense diffused 
throughout Paris, which one can feel “in a specific evidentness without having to define 
it” (PhP, 294). Style manifests in and through the kinaesthetic awareness of our bodies, 
because kinaesthesia involves “the dynamics of our movement, its expansiveness, its 
sluggishness, explosiveness, jaggedness, its changes in direction, intensity and range” 
(Sheets-Johnstone, 2015, 31). What this notion of style captures then, is something 
effervescent and transient, that is nonetheless observable and kinaesthetically felt as our 
specific manner of relating to the world.  
 
Thinking about whiteness as a style of being in the world captures whiteness as a 
momentary crystallization, not an unchanging essence. A style is not any one thing alone, 
but unfolds in and through the reversible intertwining of a body-in-situation. Here 
                                                   
81 “…a naked colour, and in general a visible, is not a chunk of absolutely hard, 
indivisible being, offered all naked to a vision which would be only total or null, but is 
rather a sort of straits between exterior horizons and interior horizons ever gaping open, 
something that comes to touch lightly and make resound at the distances diverse regions 
of the coloured visible world, a certain differentiation, an ephemeral modulation of the 
world – less a colour or a things, therefore, than a difference between things and colour, a 
momentary crystallization of coloured being or of visibility” (VI, 132).  
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“situation” refers to the concrete ways in which the specific material facts of one’s 
embodiment, as well as the social, historical, and physical context in which one is 
positioned, appear in light of one’s goals, interests, and desires. Motor intentionality is 
called forth from one’s situation. Phenomenologically, situations implicate who we are in 
all of our depth, showing up the ways that we are intertwined with others. As a style of 
being in the world, whiteness is relationally lived. As George Yancy (2014) reminds us, 
this is an important point to dwell on, for if whiteness is relationally lived then it becomes 
necessary to consider the implications that the privileged status of whiteness has for both 
the lived experiences of white individuals as well as people of color.  
 
3.4 (Bad) Habits of White Relationality 
  
Ngo (2017) identifies the “ontological violence” of racism as “a violence against our 
intersubjectivity, it is a violence against our embodied being-with” (166). As outlined in 
chapter one, Merleau-Ponty’s (2012) account of embodied subjectivity is grounded in the 
notion of the lived body, and positions one’s body, not as “an object among objects”, but 
instead the very possibility for my active engagement with world (PhP, 92). This is 
important to mention because racism is primarily understood in terms of objectification, 
wherein racialized bodies are rendered objects rather than subjects. The experience of 
racialized embodiment, for people of colour, is often described as “a kind of being-
object” (Ngo, 2017, 166). From this perspective, the violence of racism is enacted at the 
level of the racialized individual’s subjectivity. Although I certainly do not dispute this, it 
does seem to reiterate a dualistic understand of subject and object. The lived body is 
relational and is both co-constituted by its world/others and in turn co-constitutes its 
world/others. Beginning from the lived body, which is relational, leads to new questions 
about how racialized embodiment and the violence of racism are articulated through 
intersubjectivity.  
 
Phenomenologically, we are intertwined with others. This points to the importance of 
understanding whiteness as relationally lived. As has been made clear in the previous 
sections, the social privileging of whiteness deeply affects how white individuals relate to 
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their world and others. As a white person, from an early age I have corporeally 
sedimented ways of being in and towards the world and relating with others that are 
inextricably linked to my white privilege. Yancy (2014) reminds us of the importance of 
dwelling on this point, for if whiteness is relationally lived then it becomes necessary to 
consider the implications that the privileged status of whiteness has on both the lived 
experiences of white individuals as well as people of color. In the following section I 
examine habits of white relationality, specifically focusing on responsive gesture and 
ontological expansiveness. I will show that white privilege is expressed through a pre-
reflective style of bodily comportment and motility characterized by momentum. I use 
momentum to refer to the ease of movement that white privilege affords to white bodies 
as they relate to the world and others. Momentum is felt as a style of comportment and 
motility that is unencumbered and uninhibited and captures the sense in which white 
bodies tend not to hesitate as they engage in intentional action.  
 
3.4.1 Responsive Gesture 
 
Racist habits often play out in bodily gesture.82 On one hand, there are explicitly racist 
gestures that are enacted with the specific intent of degrading racialized individuals. As 
Ngo (2017) notes, carrying out a Nazi salute, creating “slanted eyes”, or putting on 
“blackface” are examples of this kind of explicit gestural racism (14 -15). These gestures 
“carry clearly intended and precisely executed racist messages” (Ngo, 2017, 14). 
However, Merleau-Ponty’s work on habit and intentionality offers “a way to bring such 
unassuming body responses and movements – glances, flinches, and the like – into the 
purview of our discussion about racism and racist gestures” (Ngo, 2017, 14). This brings 
attention to instances of racism that are taken up in one’s comportment as a subtler 
responsive gesture. Ngo (2017) suggests that subtler forms of racist gesture are distinct 
from the more clearly manifest, and consciously executed, forms of explicit racist 
gestures mentioned above (i.e. Nazi salute). Recall that one’s habitual ways of engaging 
                                                   
82 Gestures are an important part of everyday communication and lend meaning and 
intention to what is being said. They help to disclose emotions and work at the level of 
the individual and social by conveying various social meanings pre-reflectively. 
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in the world are not conscious, but are held in the body and reflect an acquired orientation 
in the world. Habit, as we know, also anticipates action, guiding one’s movement in and 
toward the world. A palpable example can be found in the “click” of car doors locking. 
Perhaps on the surface, the act of white individuals locking their car doors in the presence 
of black bodies might seem unremarkable. However, as Yancy (2014) points out, it is in 
and through this seemingly unremarkable act that black bodies are marked as inherently 
dangerous (48). The same deafening clicks on family road trips, at gas stations, or in 
“sketchy neighborhoods,” have re-signified my white body as “being in need of 
protection” (Yancy, 2014, 48).83 A sonorous and sensuous example of white privilege 
residing “right here” in my everyday embodied actions and perceptions. This example 
draws attention to the ways in which white privilege is embedded in everyday actions, 
showing up in the way one responds to the world, and taken up as a style of bodily 
comportment.   
 
Audre Lorde (1984) captures a powerful example of gestural racism in Sister Outsider. 
Relying on her own lived experiences of living in the United States as a black woman, 
Lorde powerfully describes a tenuous moment she experienced as a girl while riding the 
subway in New York. She writes:  
My mother spots an almost seat, pushes my little sown suited 
body down. On one side of me a man reading a paper. On the 
other, a woman in a fur hat staring at me…He leather gloved 
hand plucks at the line where my new blue snow pants and her 
sleek fur coat meet. She jerks her coat close to her. I look. I do 
not see whatever terrible this she is seeing on the seat between 
us…But she has communicated her horror to me. It must be 
something very bad from the way she is looking, so I pull my 
snow suit closer to me away from it, too. When I look up the 
woman is still staring at me, her nose holes and eyes huge. And 
suddenly I realize there is nothing crawling up the seat 
                                                   
83 This example speaks to class privilege as well as racial privilege.  
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between us; it is me she doesn’t want her coat to touch… she 
stands with a shudder and holds on to a strap in the speeding 
train (1984, 147).  
While Lorde does not specify in this example that the woman in the fur hat is white, she 
discusses this example in the context of experiences of racism. The small gestures she 
recounts, the swift jerk of the hand, eyes widening, nostrils flaring, express a history 
violence that that marked Lorde’s body as other. However brief, these responsive 
gestures are not inconsequential. In this example, racism is enacted in and through 
habitual bodily response. For white individuals, racializing perception grounds a habitual 
orientation towards the racialized other. When the woman in the fur hat withdraws her 
hand abruptly, stands, and shudders, she is taking up and enacting the racist social 
discourses. In fact, this woman never truly encounters Lorde on the subway. The visceral 
response elicited from the woman in the fur hat indicates that she is responding to a 
generalized racist trope, rather than a little girl on the subway. In Habits of Racism: A 
Phenomenology of Racism and Racialized Embodiment, Ngo (2017) draws attention to 
another palpable example of this gestural mode of racism given by Yancy (2008). She 
specifically cites Yancy (2008) description of what he calls, “the Elevator Effect.” Yancy 
(2008) writes: 
Well-dressed, I enter an elevator where a white woman waits 
to reach her floor. She ‘sees’ my Black body, though not the 
same one I have seen reflected back to me from the mirror on 
any number of occasions. Buying into the myth that one’s 
dress says something about the person, one might think that 
the markers of my dress (suit and tie) should ease her tension 
(2008, 4).  
He continues: 
I walk into the elevator and she feels apprehension. Her body 
shifts nervously and her heart beats more quickly as she clutches 
her purse more closely to her. She feels anxiety in the pit of her 
stomach. Her perception of time in the elevator may feel like 
eternity. The space within the elevator is surrounded from all 
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sides with my Black presence. It is as if I have become 
omnipresent within that space, ready to attack from all sides. 
Like choking black smoke, my Blackness permeates the 
enclosed space of the elevator. Her palms become clammy. She 
feels herself on the precipice of taking flight, the desperation to 
flee. There is panic, there is difficulty swallowing, and there is a 
slight trembling of her white torso, dry mouth, nausea (Yancy, 
2008, 5). 
Ngo (2017) asserts that this example is quite unlike the explicit racist gestures described 
above (i.e. Nazi salute, “black face”, “slanting eyes”). As with the example from Lorde, 
rather than perform explicit racist messages, in “the Elevator Effect” racism is enacted in 
and through her habitual bodily responses. The white woman’s bodily response to Yancy 
on the elevator – shifting, tensing, swallowing, sweating – is not connected to the actual 
the person in front of her (Yancy, 2008). In reference to this example, Ngo (2017) 
observes that “it is not Yancy’s body in its particularity that solicits the response. Rather 
what she responds to is a generalized racist projection of Blackness” (16). As Ngo 
indicates, it is important to question whether it is right to call such gestures themselves 
racist. Are these gestures mere expression of racist ideas or modes of thinking? This 
returns us to the question of the relationship between an idea and its expression.  
 
For Merleau-Ponty (2012) gestures are expressive. As with the dancer and the dance in 
chapter one, and thinking and dancing in chapter two, there is not a sharp distinction 
made between the idea and its enactment. The meaning of a gesture can be “read” in the 
gesture itself. I do not pause to recall my past experiences to understand a threatening 
gesture, for instance. As Merleau-Ponty notes, “the gesture does not make me think of 
anger, it is the anger itself” (190). As Ngo (2017) has also observed, this has significant 
implications for how one interprets the white women’s tensing body. Although the 
gesture of tensing itself does not appeal to racist tropes around Blackness explicitly, it 
nevertheless arises because of racists discourses which render black male bodies as 
inherently dangerous. As Ngo (2017) reiterates, “it is not that the discursive 
representation tells women (and in particular white women) that Black men ought to be 
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feared; bodily responses such as these enact the fear, and the Back man is feared” (17). In 
this way, the white woman’s bodily responsive gestures (tensing) take up and act out 
racist discourses in and through her body. With the tensing of her body, she lives these 
racist tropes, enacting them as she takes them up corporeally. As Ngo (2017) notes, 
enacting this responsive gesture re-sediments it within one’s body schema, thereby 
sustaining its habitual force. The same is true in the case of the woman in the fur hat. As 
Lorde (1984) indicates, when this woman jerks her hand away, or shudders, her 
responsive bodily gesture “communicate[s] her horror” (147). This horror is conveyed so 
palpably that Lorde herself searches out its source herself. In the act of “shuddering”, the 
woman in the fur hat brings racist tropes into being and Lorde’s becomes an 
overdetermined object of contempt.  
 
3.4.2 Ontological Expansiveness 
  
The social privileging of whiteness affects how the world opens for me. I am afforded 
ways of extending into the world that cannot be disentangled from my whiteness. 
Shannon Sullivan (2006) has recently taken up habit in order to discuss whiteness. 
Specifically, Sullivan connects white privilege to what she calls a habit of ontological 
expansiveness. She defines this as the tendency “of assuming and acting as if any and all 
spaces – geographical, psychological, cultural, linguistic or whatever – are rightfully 
available to and open for white people to enter into whenever they like” (Sullivan, 2014, 
20). This expresses a distinct “relationship between self and environment, in which the 
self assumes that it can and should have totally mastery over its environment” (Sullivan, 
2006, 10). This sense of mastery is made manifest in and through an uninhibited 
movement in and out of space. Recall that Merleau-Ponty positions intentionality in 
motility, or the bodily sense of “I can.” The “I can” of the body is precisely the 
experience of harmony between intention and action, projecting “the aim to be 
accomplished and connects the body’s motion towards that end in an unbroken 
directedness” (Young, 2005, 146). Of course, because the “I can” expresses a rationality 
between self and world, it reflects the conditions of the world as imposed limits on one’s 
sense of intentional action. This point is significant because of the way that social norms 
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govern how one perceives their own possibilities of engagement in the world. Iris Marion 
Young, for example, famously identifies feminine bodily existence as being overlaid by 
an “I cannot,” which occurs as a result of gendered inequality. This “I cannot” severs the 
otherwise “mutually conditioning relation between aim and enactment”, because it 
“simultaneously reaches toward a projected end with an ‘I can’ and withholds its full 
bodily commitment to that end” (Young, 2005, 146). The expansiveness that animates 
white bodies is expressly contrary to the sense of hesitancy described here, and rather 
encapsulates a style of being in and towards the world that is unencumbered and reflects 
a sense of ease.  
 
By way of example we can consider how, within traditionally “white spaces,” my 
intentional action is less restricted and as a result my steps do not bear the weight of 
hesitation, or uncertainty. One could think of the ways that, for example, as a white 
woman I might feel more “at home” moving within different institutional spaces such as 
the university, than a person of color might in the same context. Although the academy 
arguably still remains a space that most effectively extends the bodies and interests of 
white, heterosexual, cis-gendered, able-bodied men, as Malinda Smith points out, white 
women are the biggest beneficiaries of institutional advancements towards equity (Smith, 
2010).  Given this observation, the prevalence of white women contributes in extending 
the space of the academy as white. I might not encounter and move within this space in 
the same way as a person of color because my body is not made to stand out in this 
situation. My actions are, for the most part, seamless and immediate. Ahmed (2007), on 
the other hand, describes the experience of encountering the space of the academy as 
“walking into a sea of whiteness” (157). She returns to this image in her most recent 
work, Living a Feminist Life (2017), where she describes how exhausting it can be 
inhabiting white spaces. She declares “it is like how you can feel the weight of tiredness” 
([my emphasis]146). Although I might be conscious of the “sea of whiteness” before me 
at the university, it does not impress upon my field of action in the same ways that it does 
for Ahmed. I am not exhausted by the weight of whiteness. This sea of whiteness does 
not wear me down or deplete my energy. I am able not to be explicitly conscious of my 
movement in this context in the same way Ahmed is, because the space itself extends the 
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reach of my intentional actions. Here, I am “at home,” and I am more free to enact my 
intentions directly with a resounding “I can.”84  
 
The ease of movement that characterizes whiteness as a style of being in the world can be 
clarified further when compared with the regulation of the movement of racialized 
bodies. In a time of global fear, freedom of movement is not granted to all. Some bodies 
can move into spaces with ease, but others cannot. This disproportionality affects people 
of colour, who are too often deemed “suspect,” are “randomly selected” and “stopped.” 
White bodies on the other hand, “move easily across the lines that divide spaces” 
(Ahmed, 2007, 162). White bodies are less likely to be delayed or surveilled. White 
individuals are, for instance, less likely to be “stopped” by police, or “randomly selected” 
for an airport check. Anecdotally, I have never, for example, had a problem at the border. 
I once (accidentally) packed a knife in my carry-on luggage and was waved right on 
through the security gate, without incident. As Trinh T Minh-ha (2011) reminds us, 
security checks are administered not only to those “whose political background poses a 
threat to the ruling authorities, but most often those in possession of a ‘Muslim’ name and 
to those who simply ‘look’ other, queer, or shady to the ‘normal’ eye” (5). Indeed, there 
is significant evidence that demonstrates that racial profiling in border control and 
policing disproportionately restrains the mobility of people of color, while facilitating the 
mobility of white individuals (Helleiner, 2012; Dua et. Al, 2005; Ahmed, 2007). These 
examples demonstrate the ways that the motility of some racialized bodies is regulated 
more heavily than others (i.e. white bodies).  
 
The expansive and uninhibited style of being in the world that I have described is 
habitual for white people. As a result, this way of taking up and moving into the world 
plays an important role in mediating perception, becoming the background that 
illuminates one’s field of action and institutes its own momentum. Once habits of white 
                                                   
84 The gendered dynamics operating in academic spaces impose very real and frustrating 
barriers on women, and it is important not to underestimate this. I am purposely 
overstating the strength of my own sense of agency in these spaces in order to capture the 
ways that a given situation impresses differently on differently marked bodies.  
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privilege have been sedimented into one’s corporeal schema they mitigate one’s need to 
interpret their perceptual experience. This allows intentional action to flow 
instantaneously and unconsciously through the body and engenders white bodies with a 
certain momentum. White privilege thus operates covertly in and through the ordinary 
and everyday manners of behavior. As Sullivan (2006) points out, “as unconscious, 
habits of white privilege do not merely go unnoticed. They actively thwart the process of 
conscious reflection, which allows them to seem nonexistent even as they continue to 
function” (6). This is precisely why the habits of white privilege have been proven so 
difficult to change, and is why white individuals seem to have such a hard time grasping 
their own complicity in perpetuating racial inequality. As Linda Alcoff (1998) reminds 
us, “one’s appearance of being white still operate to confer privilege in numerous and 
significant ways, and to avow treason does not render whites ineligible for these 
privileges even if they work hard to avoid them” (17). From here the question for white 
individuals who wish to support anti-racism becomes: how do we slow the momentum 
that white privilege affords us?85  
 
3.5 Breaking Bad Habits 
 
In the remainder of this chapter I explore the potential for habits to shift and change. The 
previous chapter highlighted three experiential phenomena that arise as part of the 
experience of the transformation of habit: disorientation, hesitation, and double 
consciousness. I argue that experiences of disorientation and hesitation explicitly disrupt 
the sense of ease that normally animates white bodies as they move in and towards the 
world, and in so doing bring the pre-reflective dynamics of white privilege into 
appearance. Such an experience has potential for grounding white double consciousness, 
defined as the disjunction between how a “white individual sees themselves and the way 
they are seen by non-white others” (Alcoff, 2014, 273).86 In other words, experiences of 
                                                   
85 With the goal of increasing momentum for people of colour.   
86 Although I am separating these concepts, in the context in which these phenomena are 
lived they tend to arise in concert. For instance, living with a sense of double 
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disorientation, hesitation and double consciousness have the potential to slow the 
momentum of habitual whiteness. To be clear, I am not arguing that hesitation, 
disorientation and double consciousness are sufficient on their own to overcome 
racializing habits, but rather that the necessary role of these phenomena should be 
considered when forming antiracist strategies for overcoming the habitual dynamics that 
sustain white privilege. However, the promises of disorientation, hesitation, and double 
consciousness are contingent. The potential for disorientation, hesitation, and double 
consciousness to disrupt the momentum of habitual whiteness depends on what initiates 
them, and how they are experienced, made sense of, and responded to by the larger 
community.  
 
In his discussion of habit, Merleau-Ponty reminds us that the knowledge that has been 
contracted through the process of sedimentation “is not an inert mass at the foundation of 
our consciousness,” as the word might imply (PhP, 131). Habitual movements are not 
simply a repetition of that which has come before. On Merleau-Ponty’s account of habit, 
sedimentation is always accompanied by spontaneity and the structures held by the body 
schema are flexible and contingent. Consequently, acquisitions made through habit are 
never fixed, permanent, or absolute because “they feed off my present” (PhP, 132). This 
gestures to the temporal dimensions of habit. As mentioned in chapter one, habits are 
enacted in a field of presence that envelopes the horizons of the past and future. Habitual 
movement is not a simple performative repetition. In habitual movement a motor task is 
acted out anew. Habitual movement is situated within the present moment, which is 
understood as temporally open and enveloping both the past and the future (PhP, 141). 
For Merleau-Ponty, habit discloses our capacity for “dilating our being in the world” or 
“altering our existence” (PhP, 145). It follows that I am not determined by my habits. 
This is important because it means that there is always potential for habits to be taken up 
differently, and allow for introducing new habits. As Merleau-Ponty puts it, “the 
resumption of the past in the present leaves it in its originality, does not truly surpass it, 
does not flatter itself to contain it all [in its entirety], plus something else” (IP, 59). The 
                                                   
consciousness can be disorientating “because it is a constant reminder of the ways one 
does not belong” (Harbin, 2016, 70). 
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past “creates a question, puts it in reserve, makes a situation that is indefinitely open” (IP, 
22). Although they are anchored in the past, habits are never permanently fixed because 
they are held in our bodily horizons. Because habits are a kind of doing rather than a kind 
of being there is potential for them to be taken up differently. I am not condemned by the 
ways that whiteness has been sedimented into my corporeal schema. To successfully take 
whiteness up differently, however, requires that we interrupt the momentum of habitual 
whiteness. It requires us to actively resist our first response, such that we might respond 
differently. 
 
 What should white people do if they are committed to anti-racism? How do we break our 
bad habits? In asking this very question I risk folding back into my familiar domain of 
whiteness. Remember, conceived as a habit of perception, my whiteness remains around 
me as a domain to which I am the most accustomed: “I still hold in my hand and in my 
legs its principal distances and directions,” because they are embedded within my 
corporeal schema (PhP, 131). I am keenly aware of how posing the question ‘what should 
white people do’ could easily dissolve into a kind of white solipsism wherein the white 
subject is positioned at the center of a discussion of racism. It could also “re-position the 
white subject as somewhere other than implicated in the critique” (Srivastava, 164-165). 
This being said, my goal in reframing this question is to generate productive ways of 
thinking about how whiteness can be inhabited differently and to different effects.  
 
3.6 Slowing the Momentum of Habitual Whiteness 
 
Merleau-Ponty shows us that one feels most orientated when there is a sense of cohesion 
between oneself and the world. This cohesion is established through the coalescence of 
habit and intentionality and gives rise to bodily motility that flows with ease. In everyday 
experience, being white in a racist society is orienting. With the social privilege of 
whiteness comes a feeling of being “at home” in the world accompanied by and seamless 
intentional action.87 Linda Alcoff (1998) has suggested that the fundamental first step for 
                                                   
87 Specifically, in white spaces.   
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white individuals is to “recognize that they are white” (8). For white individuals, this 
means that we must bring our whiteness and its implications to the forefront of our 
experience.  
 
On the surface, the task of recognizing one’s own whiteness seems as though it should be 
easy. However, the emotional and resistant responses that often follow even the most 
basic and provisional discussions of racism within feminist organizations or classrooms 
indicates otherwise. I have found that undergraduate students, for example, can be very 
resistant to learning about white privilege. Sarita Srivastava (2005) asserts “if one’s 
identity as feminist, as woman, as Canadian, as liberal rests on being tolerant and just, 
then antiracist challenges profoundly unsettle that foundation” (43). If one’s habitually 
living whiteness is what anchors white individuals in their world then to disrupt this habit 
through the recognition of whiteness is to dislodge these individuals from their world. For 
a white feminist, whose sense of their world is grounded in a moral sense of identity that 
is bound up in being tolerant and just, facing the realization that they are an agent of 
oppression complicit in the perpetuation of racial discrimination is disorientating to say 
the least. I have shown that white privilege has a significant impact on the habitual ways 
that one relates to the world. As an unconscious habit, white privilege operates covertly 
in pre-reflective bodily movement, and actively conceals itself.  
 
White individuals are not encouraged to recognise race as a distinct part of their 
identities. As reviewed in chapter two, disorientation occurs when one’s habitual modes 
of relating to the world (and others) are disrupted. One’s established habits of moving 
into the world begin to unravel; the world itself becomes unfamiliar. With one’s habitual 
grasp on their world unmoored, the seamlessness that animates one’s intentional action is 
undone. Feelings of comfort and ease are subsequently replaced with discomfort and 
uncertainty. Recognising one’s white privilege can be disorienting because it challenges 
one’s perception of the world and one’s place within it. Experiencing oneself as 
privileged can produce discomfort. However, experiencing the discomfort that 
disorientation produces is very important for generating awareness of habit. Ideally, this 
new awareness disrupts “everyday sensuous and affective habits of being embodied, 
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moving in space, and relating to others. In such cases, how individuals should act, how 
others will respond, what is appropriate, healthy, or normal becomes uncertain” (Harbin, 
2016, xviii). One’s felt certainty about how to act dissolves. The perceiving white subject 
suddenly finds that their intentions no longer seem to line up with the realization of those 
intentions. This brings attention to a moment that would likely have otherwise passed 
without one’s awareness. When such awareness is gained, individuals tread more 
cautiously, slowing down to wait before acting/speaking. 
 
While I certainly agree that through the experience of disorientation, the movement of 
white individuals recognition of whiteness is fundamental for beginning to live whiteness 
differently, when coupled with the inability to disavow one’s whiteness, the feelings of 
guilt and remorse that tend to accompany the recognition of one’s whiteness can easily 
lead to a sense of paralysis. This feeling of paralysis has stood out for me in my own 
experience of contending with my whiteness and the privileges it confers: an odd 
sensation of desperately wanting to move, but not knowing how, or in which direction to 
turn. This sense of paralysis is linked to hesitation. As explained in chapter two, 
hesitation involves slowing down. The anticipatory dynamic of habitual action is 
interrupted as the “I can” of one’s lived body collapses. Hesitation is felt as a delay and 
the seamless flow of intentional action is stunted. Alia Al-Saji (2014) identifies two 
forms of hesitation, one that is paralyzing and another that is generative. The white 
paralysis described above captures the paralyzing sense of hesitation. Evidently, white 
paralysis is not very useful. How can we help to bring about the necessary structural and 
political changes if we are afraid to move for fear of making the situation worse? Luckily 
the promise of hesitation lies in the way that it modulates the temporality of habit. The 
bodily awareness that hesitation allows can call the immediacy and automaticity of habit 
into question. By putting off habitual action, hesitating generates a temporal interval that 
opens the possibility of becoming otherwise. 
 
This moment of delay allows the body more time to perceive, but also to remember. 
Thus, hesitation “can make felt the historicity, contingency and sedimentation of habitual 
actions and perceptions as well as their plasticity” (Al-Saji, 2014, 143). By holding open 
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an interval of hesitation, disorientation allows for the temporal gap necessary for habit to 
“destabilize itself and transform, to become self-aware and respond” (Al-Saji, 2014, 145). 
Slowing the momentum of habitual whiteness through hesitation thus permits different 
possibilities for action to become visible that can create the possibility for one to learn to 
move differently. To hesitate is to “feel one’s way tentatively and receptively” (Al-Saji, 
2014, 143). This implies a kind of movement where one does not know what kind of 
future they will find. In hesitation, not only is intentional movement delayed, but it also 
becomes more open to the world in a way that can allow one to move in accordance with 
others. This parallels George Yancy’s (2015) call for white individuals to tarry with the 
weight of race. Yancy maintains that by “moving too quickly when confronted with the 
muck and mire of their own whiteness,” white individuals often distance themselves from 
their complicity in racial inequality (Yancy, 2015, 26). The call to tarry, like hesitation, 
slows the momentum of habitual whiteness by inviting white individuals “‘to wait,’ ‘to 
abide’ in the face of new insights” (Yancy, 2015, 31). Moving towards the goal of 
sedimenting habits of whiteness not only brings whiteness as a category of experience 
into question, but also allows for whiteness to be embodied in different ways. This is not 
to say however that we should be finding ways to alleviate feelings of white paralysis 
completely since the disorienting feeling associated with it is also necessary for self-
reflexivity. Rather than moving past white paralysis, we need to learn how to inhabit the 
ambiguity it creates. These moments of paralysis, by slowing the momentum of habitual 
practices of whiteness, allow time for one’s actions to be actively reflected upon.  
 
The interplay between disorientation and hesitation is not a straightforward remedy to the 
habitual, but rather shows what is needed phenomenologically in order to take advantage 
of the generativity at the heart of habit in order to move away from the bad habits of 
whiteness. The experiences of disorientation and hesitation are thus powerful tools for 
thinking about how to live whiteness differently. is interrupted, bringing a temporary 
cessation to the momentum that characterizes white privilege. This moment of hesitation 
itself is unnatural to white privilege because white privilege allows one to take up and 
move into one’s world in an uninhibited manner. This inhibiting that is caused by 
disorientation can bring the pre-reflectively experience of ease with which white 
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individuals move into the world up to the level of reflection. While disorientation and 
hesitation by themselves do not sediment new habits, it forces a question: why have I 
stopped moving? This forces a double consciousness upon the white individual as they 
are forced to reckon with the implications of their whiteness.  
 
3.7 Conclusion 
 
For white individuals, experiencing the disjunction between the way they perceive 
themselves and how they are perceived by non-white others, as a kind of white double 
consciousness, can be a “potential source for a new and more accurate understanding of 
social conditions” and their material impacts (Alcoff, 2015, 170). As part of this, white 
individuals must acknowledge the historical legacy of white privilege and the impact it 
has on the pervasive structures of inequality and exploitation that still exist today. Yancy 
(2012) writes:  
the unfinished present is where I want whites to tarry (though 
not permanently remain), to listen, to recognize the complexity 
and weight of the current existence of white racism, to attempt 
to understand the ways in which they perpetuate racism, and to 
begin to think about the incredible difficulty involved in 
undoing it (158). 
The impulse to hurry through discussions of the tragedy of racial violence and white 
privilege spares white individuals and those unaffected by the harms of racism, the 
discomfort and unease of confronting its reality and their entanglement in it. I frame my 
engagement with Bharatanatyam in the next chapter in light of this call to tarry, as an 
exercise in exploring this two-sided sense of its past and how this past continues to 
motivate relations of domination in the present in which I am implicated. As I will show, 
I am not the first white Western woman to engage with Bharatanatyam through the lens 
of transformation. I turn to the past of dance in order to understand the implication of its 
performance in the present and interrogate my own participation in this practice.  
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Chapter 4 
 
4 Dancing with History  
 
“Whether it is a question of things or of historical situations, philosophy has 
no other function than to teach us to see them anew” (PhP, 548). 
 
In this chapter I turn to the past of dance to understand the implication of its performance 
in the present. The contemporary practice of dancing Bharatanatyam reflects a long and 
complicated history of entanglements. It is a history marked by British colonialism, 
Indian nationalism, post-colonial migration, and is further mediated by questions of 
gender, sexuality, race, caste, and other dimensions of identity. How does the weight of 
these histories produces complex meanings when they coalesce in living bodies in the 
present? In this chapter, I critically situate my own participation in Bharatanatyam in 
light of critical race, and post-colonial feminist scholarship. This is framed as an exercise 
in double consciousness, one that takes stock of my own complicity in the perpetuation 
of systemic racial inequality. I come into a world where the figure of the female Indian 
dancer already exists, and continues to be consumed and appropriated by white Western 
subjects in ways that (re)enact the violence of colonialism, racialization, and orientalism 
through misrepresentation.  I am not the first white Western woman to take up Indian 
dance practices as a vehicle to explore questions of transformation and it is important to 
understand how histories of domination are implicated in my own engagement with 
Bharatanatyam. I turn towards these histories beset by questions concerning the ethics of 
intercultural encounters, and concerns with how to engage with cultural alterity without 
reproducing histories of violence.  
 
This chapter is made up  of three sections. In the first section, I offer an account of the 
social, historical cultural context in which Bharatanatyam emerged. This begins with an 
examination of the devadasi, whose dance practices form the foundation for 
Bharatanatyam, and trace the suppression of dance under colonial rule. I will show the 
ways that dance in India has been subject to contradictory forces of reform and revival, 
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each of which manifest the effects of colonial violence. This section provides the 
necessary historical ground from which to analyze the workings of orientalism and 
racialization in the proliferation of the figure of the female Indian dancer as a cultural 
stereotype. The second section of the chapter draw on the figure of the female Indian 
dancer to explore the role that habit plays in the perception and perpetuation of cultural 
stereotypes. I begin by outlining how “the Other” is constructed in the colonial 
imaginary, and examine the proliferation of the figure of the female Indian dancer within 
various site of colonial cultural production at the turn of the twentieth century. Drawing 
on this historical literature, I will show that habit plays an important role in grounding a 
habitual orientation towards the figure of the Indian dancer, and linking what is 
perceived as a racialized exotic other (here the figure of the female Indian dancer) by the 
dominant (white Western) subject to its immediately felt effects on the racializing body. 
In the final section I examine the connections between the appropriation of cultural 
difference, and ontological expansiveness. I specifically reframe cultural appropriation 
as a distinctive style of pre-reflective movement. As I will show, the sense of mastery 
that defines acts of cultural appropriation is made manifest in and through uninhibited 
movement in and towards the world. This is exemplified in the long and largely 
unquestioned role that the appropriation of Indian dance played within the American 
modern dance tradition. There is a long history of white Western women incorporating 
elements of Indian dance into their modern dance performance repertoire without 
citation in order to advance their own creative interests and positions. While modern 
dancers challenged gender hierarchies by claiming leadership positions as 
choreographers on the public stage, they did so while actively reinforcing racial 
hierarchies. 
 
4.1 Contesting Histories: Classical Indian Dance 
 
During my first year of dance training I found my enthusiasm tempered by a 
small but specific anxiety… am I pronouncing this correctly? Bhar-ta-
natyam? The name swells in my mouth. B-harta-nat-yam? It gets stuck on the 
tip of my tongue. I feel myself pausing, hesitating, speaking uncertainly, 
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mumbling. I became overly conscious about clarifying the pronunciation too 
many times. After all, there are only so many times you can ask the same 
question without feeling that “I’m embarrassing myself”. This anxiety, of 
course, gestures to my position as a cultural outsider. However, it also 
serves as an embodied reminder of the communicative impasses imposed by 
the colonizing nature of language and emphasizes the privilege of being a 
dominant speaker (C.f. Spivak, 1999; Mohanty, 1984; Lugones, 2006). To 
avoid my insecurity, I would refer to Bharatanatyam as “Classical Indian 
Dance”. At the time, this seemed like a good temporary solution. After all, 
along with Kathak and Odissi, Bharatanatyam is officially recognized as a 
form of Indian “classical” dance. However, “classical” is not simply a 
descriptive term, but a signifier that evokes and masks a range of 
associations. What project does adopting such a terminology serve?  
 
Although an account of the historical context in which Bharatanatyam emerged is 
necessary to lay the foundation for critically situating my participation in this practice, it 
is important to remember the ways in which such histories always fall short. Histories 
neither exhaust, not fully encapsulate the complexity of the events of the past. Historical 
narratives are products of historical beings, and so the perspectives they advance are 
themselves embedded in a time, place, and culture. Historical narratives rely on the 
relation between those who interpret and reproduce the telling of events, rather than just 
the events themselves. Consequently, questioning whose dance practices are 
remembered, or forgotten, which dances are preserved, and which are erased, and what 
project dance history serves, is central when approaching dance historically. Ideological 
frameworks – national, political, social, cultural, gendered or racial – produce certain 
histories, while ignoring and suppressing others. Social ideologies and power structures 
have, and continue to, instrumentalize events and practices of the past in the present to 
support certain interests, or to explain, validate or justify events in the present. Indeed, 
certain histories may be mobilized and manipulated to produce strategic and material 
effects. It is through such processes that certain dance practices and practitioners become 
privileged while others are silenced.   
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Use of the word “Classical” in reference to Bharatanatyam exemplifies this, since this 
term is taken up in order to imply a relationship with the past. In the context of Indian 
dance, the styles subsumed under the label “Classical”, are commonly associated with a 
specific historical narrative - one that posits them as timeless relics connected with an 
ancient past. Indian classical dance, so the story goes, can be traced to antiquity. 
However, writing on Indian dance styles has grown increasingly suspicious of these 
grand narratives. Recent post-colonial analyses of classical Indian dance have produced 
a significant body of scholarship that has demonstrated that within this context 
“Classical” is a fraught term, one that cannot be disentangled from the various colonial, 
Orientalist, post-colonial, and Indian nationalist discourses of the late Nineteenth and 
Twentieth centuries.88 In fact, Bharatanatyam is a twentieth-century invention, one that 
has been significantly shaped by relations of power (C.f. Janet O’Shea, 2007; Roy, 2010; 
Thobani, 2017; Ram, 2000). In this section I explore the emergence of Bharatanatyam, to 
gain an understanding of the historical and social politics that make its practices 
possible; that is, “to understand how the meaning attributed to the dance is derived and 
the relations of power such meaning sustains” (Thobani, 2017, 8). Bharatanatyam 
“comes to us already interpreted, not as a mere object, but as a tissue of interpretations” 
that forces one to rethink their current understanding of this dance practice, and “to 
rearticulate the tradition through which it arrives to us” (Seth, 2008, 222). 
 
History never ceases to confront contingency.89 Our hold of the past is always 
precarious, as its meanings are constantly reworked in the present. While the past 
informs the present, the present also retrospectively lends new meaning to the past. The 
meanings ascribed to dance practices, “as historically accumulated constructs of body, 
                                                   
88 The problematic and tokenistic use of categories and labels such as “classical”, “folk”, 
and “modern” in the context of Indian dance has been criticized by several scholars (C.f. 
Vatsyayan, 1974; Coolawala, 1994; Bose, 2001; Lopez and Royo, 2003; Purkayastha, 
2014).  
89 “[H]istory has meaning, but there is not pure development of ideas. Its meaning arises 
in contact with contingency, at the moment when human initiative founds a system of life 
by taking up anew scattered givens. And the historical understanding which reveals an 
interior to history still leaves us in the presence of empirical history, with its density and 
its haphazardness, and does not subordinate it to any hidden reason” (AD, 17). 
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and aesthetics,” for example, are invariably altered as they move across borders, intra-
cultural, and geo-cultural divides (Coorlawala, 2004, 59). In what follows I engage in a 
critical analysis of the socio-cultural, historical and political context in which 
Bharatanatyam arose, highlighting the gendered dynamics of this situation. I offer a 
depiction of Indian dance history, one in which questions of heritage, authenticity, and 
identity are intimately tied to nationalism, race, gender, caste90 power and 
disenfranchisement. In the first section of this chapter I explore the context from which 
Bharatanatyam emerged, beginning with the practice of sadir, a style of dance practiced 
by devadasi (ritual officiates dedicated to temple service). Devadasi became the site of 
significant regulation during British colonial and post-colonial rule in India, during 
which time sadir was subject to the contradictory forces of reform and revival.  
 
4.1.1 Defining the Devadasi as Objects of Knowledge 
 
Bharatanatyam finds its roots in sadir, the “solo female dance form” associated with the 
literary and musical traditions of Southern India (O’Shea, 2007, 29). Sadir was 
performed by devadasis, ritual officiates dedicated to temple and court service. Any 
history of Bharatanatyam ought to begin with the devadasis. However, this is easier said 
than done. There a significant gap in our understanding of the of devadasis and their 
communities because much of what is known about them is mediated by the perspectives 
of those outside their communities. Indeed, their voices are largely missing from most 
historical accounts of their ways of life. It is important to keep this in mind when 
approaching writing about them. As Hubel (2005) asserts, “the problem is that their 
individual lives and collective ways of living them are impossible to recover in any form 
that has not already been altered by our own concerns” (121). If, in turning to the 
                                                   
90 Caste is a system of social stratification that is hierarchically structured and organized 
around a polarized conception of purity and pollution (C.f. Flood, 1996). The ways that 
caste politics are entangled with dance in India are very complex. When sadir was 
“reformed” in the twentieth century (and renamed Bharatanatyam) it became associated 
with the upper-caste Brahmanic tradition. This not only served to homogenize a number 
of distinct regional dance traditions, but also de-legitimized and obscured the unique 
dance practices of non-Brahmin devadasis (C.f. Soneji, 2012; O’Shea, 2007).  
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devadasi, we are invariably integrating them into narratives that ultimately belong to us, 
and are about us, then one must concede that we can never really “know” the “real” 
devadasi (C.f. Hubel, 2005; Spivak 1996). Given this, rather that write “about” 
devadasis, I position myself alongside them; writing “nearby”.  
 
Unfortunately, I do not have enough space here for an extensive outline of the intricacies 
of the social institutions which supported devadasis. For the purposes of a sustained 
focus, in what follows I offer a brief overview of salient aspects of their community and 
lifestyle. Although other studies provide greater detail on the devadasi institution and its 
historical and cultural specificities (C.f. Purkayastha 2017; Soneji, 2012; Sreenivas 2011; 
Hubel 2005; Natarajan 1997), I touch upon the dance practices of the devadasi because 
they are the foundation for technique in Bharatanatyam. As will be shown, the devadasi 
became the locus of intense debate both within and outside India during the colonial and 
post-colonial period. Several scholars have approached devadasi communities from a 
feminist standpoint. Some locate in these communities precolonial models for female 
autonomy (C.f. Oldenberg, 1995; Srinivasan, 1987). Indeed, the devadasi institution 
afforded these women a number of freedoms. They were educated, they received an 
autonomous salary from the temple or court, could travel freely, owned land, and in 
some cases were able to amass considerable wealth - all things that were denied to many 
middle-class Indian women, or even English women in the Victorian era. While 
acknowledging these relative freedoms experienced by devadasi, they were still 
embedded in a patriarchal social system, and remained socially and economically 
dependent on men through systems of patronage (C.f. Coorlawala, 2004; O’Shea, 2007; 
Purkayastha, 2014). Although patriarchal controls operated differently among devadasi 
and non-devadasi women, both existed within the same socio-cultural framework for 
regulating women’s sexuality, economic activity, and social status. Adding to this, 
Spivak (1996) contends that there is a tendency to overlook the operations of class in the 
agency of the devadasi. She warns against blindly accepting that the devadasi represents 
a “free woman”, reminding us that “it is often class-jumping that gives women ‘freedom’ 
in patriarchy” (Spivak, 1996, 251).   
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4.1.2 Dance in India: Colonial Legacies of Reform 
 
Prior to the colonial period in India, dance had a prestigious role in Indian society. 
“Historically, Indian dance never occurs as an isolated, separate practice, but has been 
integrated into a much larger framework that encompasses… narrative and ritual” (Ram, 
2000, 6). Dance in India is rooted in religious and ritual traditions “as a metaphor for 
Lord Shiva’s perpetuation of the cosmos” (Mitra, 2006, 66). Dance was thus framed as 
an integral part the ritual devotion, with performances being framed as an active offering 
to the divine.91 Sadir was a regionally specific practice connected to the Madras State of 
Southern India. Following a ritual akin to an upper-caste Hindu wedding ceremony, 
devadasi would be dedicated to the governing deity of their temple. Within this context, 
they played an important role in temple life, lending ritual and artistic services. 
 
Not only was sadir performed as a part of temple worship in South India, but were also 
paid performers who participated in a secular performance economy (C.f. Soneji, 
2012).92 Devadasi also figured prominently in the royal courts. By the 17th and 18th 
centuries devadasis had become a crucial link between Hindu temples and south Indian 
ruling households. As Sreenivas (2011) explains, “through their patronage of temples, 
rulers demonstrated their political and moral role as protectors of the social order”, while 
the devadasis “helped to cement the association between the king and the temple deity” 
(66). However, as British colonial rule gained more power in southern India in the 
nineteenth century, the ritual and economic role that the devadasi institution had 
previously played became suspect. Because devadasis were a central link between the 
temple and the rulers, under the new colonial regime their position was called into 
question, as it buttressed the old regime. As a consequence of the process of stripping 
kings of their ruling authority, devadasis gradually lost opportunities for royal patronage. 
                                                   
91 Sadir is connected to the bhakti movement, which developed in southern India and 
reached the height of popularity between the 15th and 17th centuries.  Bhakti locates 
spiritual attainment in a personal allegiance to and affection for a god(dess). 
92 Scholarship has tended to focus on the temple-based religious lives of some devadasis. 
As Soneji (2012) argues however, this framework has limited how the devadasi are 
interpreted and fails to address one of the most common sites for their performances: 
salons in the homes of elite patrons, i.e. secular rather than religious contexts.  
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By the turn of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries, the British 
Empire’s reach and domination had pervaded much of Indian life, from infrastructure to 
governance, education and cultural practices. Within this context, the devadasi 
institution had become the subject of intense debate, much of which hinged on their 
sexuality. Devadasis were not expected to remain sexually abstinent and frequently 
entered sexual relationship with the men who became their patrons. These relationships 
were non-monogamous and nondomestic; devadasi did not live with their patrons, nor 
did they perform any household tasks for them. Rather, devadasis lived in robust female-
headed households with grandmothers, mothers and children residing together. This 
meant that devadasi communities did not follow the patterns of patrilineal decent and 
inheritance that were characteristic of upper-caste non-devadasi families. Amrit 
Srinivasan (1985) has argued that the economic relationship that these women had with 
Hindu temples encouraged a “matrifocal household” because their ritual and artistic 
services provided the primary source of income. Any children conceived through these 
relationships would live with the devadasis and be trained in dance and music.  
 
It should come as no surprise that sexuality and conjugal relations of the devadasi did 
not fly with the British. As Prarthana Purkayastha (2017) asserts, in the eyes of British 
colonial rulers, the devadasis subverted normative codes of gender and sexuality. 
Consequently, the sexuality of the devadasi became the focus of intense debate. As non-
marrying women who were sexually active, devadasis represented an ambiguous 
category of woman in the colonialist imagination. Victorian morality was constructed 
around the pure domestic woman and her antithesis was the promiscuous public women, 
and the devadasi rested in between these two dichotomies. This ambiguity is manifest in 
colonial literature that wavers between referring to them as “wives” (of a deity) and 
“prostitutes”.93 The connection between the devadasi and prostitution would come to be 
                                                   
93 Under colonial criminal law, “prostitution” is vaguely defined as “a vast residual 
category…of sexual activity ‘outside of marriage’” (Sreenivas, 2011, 68). This meant that 
the sexual activities and conjugal relationships of the devadasi were considered 
prostitution. However, as Sreenivas (2011) points out, colonial civil law simultaneously 
defined the devadasi as a “separate class [of women] having a legal status” that was 
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a central mechanism in the suppression of their culture and way of life. For example, the 
anti-nautch (anti-dance) reform movement, which began in 1892, specifically targeted 
the devadasi by denouncing their nondomestic ways of life as prostitution, and 
describing the practice of sadir as lustful and lascivious.  
 
Through a series campaigns, social reformists recast the devadasi as innocent, helpless, 
victims of “unhealthy pernicious customs” (Hubel, 129). Though the regulation of 
devadasi sexuality with an eye towards “reform”, devadasis were to be “made into good, 
pure, respectable women” (Soneji, 2012, 20). In this way, devadasi reform was framed 
as an altruistic act. As Srividya Natarajan (1997) has pointed out, this positions devadasi 
as mere “objects of their altruism”, an attitude as “invariably patronizing or censorious” 
(131). Determining how the devadasis saw themselves in this context is not straight 
forward. However, in her doctoral dissertation entitled “Another Stage in the Life of the 
Nation: Sadir, Bharatanatyam, Feminist Theory”, Srividya Natarajan (1997) quotes a 
series of memorials and testimonials submitted to the government of Madras by 
communities of devadasis in an attempt to retain control of their profession and the 
meanings that could be ascribed to it. One such example is found in a 1927 self-
description offered by the South Indian Devadasi Association, where it states that the 
name devadasi “is not unfortunately mingled up with and associated with an immoral 
life. It would, we submit, be easily conceded by everyone that the institution of 
dedicating one’s life to a temple has nothing to do with prostitution” (quoted in 
Natarajan, 1997, 124). Clearly, devadasis were aware that their culture and practices 
were coming under scrutiny by the new moral order. Although they continued to 
collectively oppose anti-dedication legislation, by the early twentieth century the efforts 
of the anti-nautch campaign had succeeded in eroding public support for the devadasi. 
By the time the Mudas Devadasi Prevention of Dedication Act, (which outlawed the 
practice of dedicating women as devadasi in temples) was passed in 1947, the practice of 
dancing sadir had been impelled into obscurity.  
 
                                                   
distinct from other Hindu women (Sreenivas, 2011, 68).  
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4.1.3 Reviving Dance: Bharatanatyam and Indian Nationalism 
 
Theorists of anti-colonial nationalism have observed that many newly independent 
nations actively sought to produce a cohesive and unified culture to rally the sentiments 
of national unity, often in (unintentional) ironic alignment with colonial discourse (c.f. 
Thobani, 2017; Fannon, 2004 [1961]; Chatterjee, 1999; Ludden, 1993). While many 
post-colonial studies have drawn from literary studies to trace the reproduction of 
colonial discourse within post-independence nationalist movements (c.f. Said, 1993; 
Spivak, 1999), recent scholarship has drawn attention to dance as a potent a medium 
through which these dynamics have been negotiated. Dance scholars have identified a 
common trend across many different dance traditions emerging within colonial contexts. 
In fact, similar patterns of suppression, and revival can be found in tango (c.f. 
Savigliano, 1995) and bellydance (C.f. Karayanni, 2004).   
 
Rather than simply dissolving, elements of devadasi dance traditions were preserved 
through the vehicle of what has been called a “revival” or “reconstruction” movement. 
Through this movement, sadir was reconfigured and renamed Bharatanatyam. Post-
colonial critique of classical Indian dance has produced a significant body of scholarship 
that has focused on the (re)construction of Bharatanatyam in the twentieth century (c.f. 
Royo, 2003; Ram, 2011; Sreenivas, 2011; Purkayatha, 2014). As Royo (2003) explains, 
the reworking of sadir into Bharatanatyam was part of a wider project aimed at 
reimagining Indian culture in the interest of establishing a pan-Indian sense of collective 
cultural and national identity post-independence (157). The binary logic of colonialism, 
which positioned itself as a “civilizing mission”, depended on perpetuating the view that 
the colonized were “culturally deficit” for its moral justification. Indian nationalists 
sought to undermine this premise by supplying evidence of indigenous accomplishment, 
which they argued resided in the traditions of arts (O’Shea, 2007, 32). In this context, 
dance became a site “for the expression of an unaltered Indian culture that predated 
colonisation” (Royo, 2003). Accordingly, dance revivalists such as Rukmini Devi, 
Krishna Iyer, Madame Menaka, went in search of cultural authenticity and cultural roots 
in the dance traditions of the past.   
 
 135 
Within this context, Bharatanatyam became material evidence, and heir to the notion of a 
longstanding and glorified Indian tradition. This had immense political significance 
because it bolstered nationalist claims to an enduring cultural heritage. The sweeping 
success of the anti-nautch movement, however, had devastated public opinion about 
dance. If only, the revivalists maintained, the dance form could be “purified”, its essence 
rescued and redeemed from its “degenerate” practitioners. To this end, revivalists sought 
out to distance dance from its association with devadasis and the devadasi institution. 
The name “Bharatanatyam” itself was central in this effort. Bharatanatyam alludes to a 
canonical Sanskrit text on aesthetic theory the Natyasastra, and its author Bharata. This 
etymological association is strategic. By invoking the Natyasastra, revivalists 
successfully shifted the dance form’s point of reference from the devadasis, towards 
“ancient”, “pan-Indian” traditions, which in turn helped to validate the form’s 
“authenticity” and affirm its respectability (O’Shea, 2007, 37).94 Within this context, 
Bharatanatyam became material evidence and heir to the notion of a longstanding and 
glorified Indian tradition. As “an emblem” of Indian-ness designed to display modern 
India’s ties to its ancient past, Bharatanatyam helped bolster nationalist claims to an 
enduring cultural heritage.  
 
However, the successes of the revival movement depended on more than establishing 
Bharatanatyam’s roots in antiquity. Before sadir could become “respectable”, it was 
necessary to bring it in line with the newly constructed ideals of Indian womanhood. 
Nationalist ideology placed enormous significance on motherhood, deemphasizing 
female erotic sexuality (C.f. Hubel, 2005; Sreenivas, 2011).95 Within this context, the 
erotic elements of sadir also posed a problem. Here I gesture to the notion of “sringara 
                                                   
94 Of course, this relied on emphasizing only particular aspects of the past in dance, and 
highlighted specific histories as the source of these legitimate dance traditions, which 
invariably homogenizes and essentializes cultural diversity. 
95 Hubel (2005) points out that although “the wife” and “the dancer” were often depicted 
in opposition to one another, “these two kinds of women were nonetheless both 
conspicuous figures within the various historical Hindu patriarchies of South India that 
preceded the nationalist era” (133). It was only in the late nineteenth century and early 
twentieth century that the one female group consumed the other.  
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bhakti”, or devotion through eroticism, which was an important feature of the practice 
and performance of sadir, rather than the social scrutiny of the sexuality of the devadasi. 
“Cleansing” sadir primarily involved removing the erotic dimensions of the dance form 
itself. Placing emphasis on technique, rather than devotion, helped temper the sensuality 
associated with the solo dancer and devotional repertoire. The development of group 
choreography also deflected attention away from the display of the individual dancer. 
Choreography also began to be more focused around action-oriented plots enacted by the 
dancer(s), “dramatic elements of performance thus rested less on the cultivation of 
emotional states, including romantic love and sexual desire, than on the progression of a 
story from exposition through conflict to resolution” (O’Shea, 2007, 46).  
 
Both the historical narrative tracing an unbroken line between Bharatanatyam and the 
traditions of Indian antiquity, and the accompanying associations with notions of ideal 
Indian womanhood, not only continue to accompany contemporary training in 
Bharatanatyam technique, but remain prevalent in the dominant social imaginary within 
India and beyond (Vena Ramphal, 2003; Royo, 2004; Thobani, 2017; O’Shea, 2007). As 
O’Shea (2007) observes, the dance form both “transcends national and cultural 
boundaries” while still remaining “resolutely tied to them” (4). Presently, Bharatanatyam 
is one of the most popular and widely known of the dance forms performed in India and 
the diaspora. Within South Asian communities in Europe and North America, 
Bharatanatyam provides a means through which individuals maintain their cultural 
identity in the diaspora. In this new context, Bharatanatyam helps to sustain a continued 
connection to a homeland, and is called upon to confirm an “authentic” Indian identity. 
Of course, such claims to authenticity arouse suspicion, since they reify the normative 
boundaries which define cultural insiders, and perpetuate a view of cultures as 
“homogenous, static, and monolithic” (Narayan, 2000, 88). As Narayan (2000) explains, 
essentialist generalizations such as these “depict as homogenous groups of 
heterogeneous people whose values, interests, ways of life, and moral and political 
commitments are internally plural and divergent” (Narayan, 2000, 88). The connection 
between Bhartanatyam and authenticity continues to conflate a myriad of regional 
variations of dance practices (and practitioners) in India together.  
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4.2 Dancing Otherness: Habit Orientation, and the Figure of the 
Female Dancer 
 
In 1881, a group of Indian dancers traveled from India to North American to perform in 
Augustin Daly’s production of Zanina in New York. Although the comedic opera 
included an “Indian dancing girl” as a central character, this part was played by a white 
actress. The actual Indian performers were to be featured between acts. Their arrival was 
highly anticipated and caused much excitement and anticipation in New York’s press. 
This curiosity is reflected in a New York Clipper article detailing these Indian women 
and their dance practices: 
It has been written of the “Nautch Maidens” that their dancers do 
not resemble what we are accustomed to calling dance, but 
consists of light graceful whirling, most marvelous quickness and 
sometimes frenzy, and also in mystic weaving, and of subtle, 
pantomimic contortions, explained by their songs, and in time and 
theme with the spirit of their music. They have warm olive skin, 
and many of them are even almost fair. Many of them have a 
figure of great beauty and natural elegance of movement, which 
their drapery and rich clothing well become… (“The Nautch 
Dancers,” New York Clipper, January 22, 1881, 345 [cited in 
Srinivasan, 2012, 55].) 
Of course, this description is steeped in Orientalist language of desire for the mysterious 
and exotic wonders of “the East,” but it also captures the excitement that preceded their 
arrival. One reviewer describes the interest in the “nautch girls” among the public as 
having been “excited to fever heat” (Locke, 1920, 31) (Srinivasan, 2012, 56). After the 
dancer’s first few performances however, the critical and public response changed 
drastically. Audiences left the theater thoroughly dissatisfied with the performance. The 
female “nautch” dancers failed to woo their audiences. One reviewer remarks: “I think 
the Nautch girls were a disappointment to most people. I don’t even know exactly what 
most people expected of them, but I am sure they did not come up to the general 
anticipation” (Courier des États-Unis, February 7 1881). According to another reviewer, 
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“the public fled the theater with words of scorn and smiles of derision” (Locke, 1920, 31) 
(Srinivasan 56). These reviews reveal an interesting incongruity between what audiences 
anticipated, the “figure of the female Indian dancer”, and the material bodies dancing on 
stage—actual female Indian dancing women. This disjunction illustrates the weight of the 
cultural stereotypes carried in and through embodied perception of the figure of the 
female Indian Dancer. 
 
The figure of the female Indian dancer was an important site of European and North 
American cultural production through the Nineteenth and Twentieth centuries, and was 
widely consumed as an Orientalist fantasy. One cannot overestimate the immense power 
of stereotypes such as this in their normalizing capacity. Stereotypes are not benign forms 
of representation. Rather, they “are capable of a visceral impact on judgment, which 
allows them to condition our judgment without our awareness” (Fricker, 2007, 37). 
Cultural stereotypes play an important role in guiding the perception of the other, 
dehumanizing, exploiting, and justifying the continued oppression of marginalized 
populations. In this section, I will utilize these discussions surrounding the figure of the 
female Indian dancer to open a site for phenomenological questioning. What role does 
habit play in the perception and perpetuation of cultural stereotypes such as this? I draw 
on the figure the female Indian dancer to explore this question. I will return to the above 
example to explore the role habit plays in connecting what is perceived as a racialized 
exotic other (here the figure of the female Indian dancer) by the dominant (white 
Western) subject, to its immediately felt effects on the racializing body.  
 
4.2.1 Defining the Other in the Colonial Imaginary 
 
Before offering an analysis of the colonial roots of the figure of the female Indian 
dancer, and outlining a brief history of its development and highlighting the context 
through which she became an object of colonial gaze, I outline the oppositional logic 
underlining processes of Othering. Scholars have shown the mechanics of Othering to be 
central to the interrelated processes of racialization, and orientalism. For Said, 
orientalism produces a “vision of reality whose structure promoted the difference 
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between the familiar (Europe, the West, ‘us’) and the strange (the Orient, the East, 
‘them’)” (1978, 43). Like racialization, orientalism impacts how the Other is perceived. 
As Al-Saji (2014) explains, “Othering involves a projective mechanism… by which 
what is undesirable in the self [here the Western subject] is projected onto the Other; the 
result is a negative mirroring whereby the Other is constituted as that which the self is 
not, or does not take itself to be” (136). Here, the dominant subject functions as a point 
of reference, a designator, and foundation of the world. The dominant subject imposes 
their own voice, tone, and meanings on to the Other. This reduces the Other to that 
which is projected upon them by the dominant subject. This returns us again to the image 
of the mirror, since within this framework the Other becomes the double of the subject, 
bouncing back like a mirror whatever meaning is projected upon them. In this 
movement, the alterity of the other is elided, and difference is collapsed, absorbed, and 
subsumed by the dominant subject, rendered invisible and unintelligible. The subject 
sees only their reflection, and there is no reciprocal gesture of recognition.  
 
This oppositional logic grounds the hierarchical relationship between the “Orient” and 
the “Occident”. Here, the East is conceived as that which Western identity disavows. 
Under these conditions, cultural differences are understood in terms of opposition and 
hierarchy, rendering them mutually exclusive. This is consistent with Said’s contention 
that Western orientalism reveals more about how the West wishes to imagine itself than 
the realities of those who come to represent the Other. For example, maintaining a 
construction of the colonized Other as “exotic,” “barbaric,” and “uncivilized” allowed 
the West to constitute its own identity as civilized and enlightened. This in turn 
reinforces imperialist attitudes of Western superiority, ultimately confirming for Western 
subjects the legitimacy of the colonial project. In other words, the misrepresentation of 
the Other serves the interests of the dominant.  
 
Feminist theories maintain that Othering of this kind enacts violence through 
objectifying misrepresentations, which furnish the creation of cultural stereotypes. 
Cultures, like identities, are dynamic, open, and multiplicitious, always exceeding our 
grasp on them. Indeed, as Spivak (1999) notes, “culture is alive and always on the run, 
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always changeful” (375). Stereotypes, however, belie this reality. As an arrested and 
fixed form of representation - a reified object - stereotypes reduce individuals and 
cultures to bits and pieces that are made to stand in for the whole. In this process, the 
internal nuances of a given culture are lost. Difference is homogenized and fixed. As 
Stuart Hall writes “stereotyping reduces, essentializes, naturalizes and fixes difference” 
(2003, 258). Under these conditions, differences calcify and become overdetermined. 
This is not simply a matter of the crudity of the stereotype as juxtaposed with the 
complexity of the actual peoples being characterized. Rather, “the colonial stereotype is 
complex, ambivalent.” (Bhabha, 1994, 100). Because stereotypes effectively serve to 
transform the Other into someone who is already known, Bhabha (1994) explains, 
stereotypes ambivalently signify that which is other, and yet “entirely knowable and 
visible” (101). This presents a deep sense of ambivalence within the dominant perceiver, 
since the stereotype serves to (partially, but not really) recognise difference while also 
disavowing difference through the insistence of already knowing the other (C.f. Bhabha, 
1994). Processes of decontextualization not only negate significance of the Other’s 
history, but functions to sustain rather than problematize the imaginary boundaries 
between “us” and “them.” 
 
Much analysis following Said has concentrated on orientalism as system of knowledge 
production. This focus limits scope of one’s analysis to the operations of institutions, 
discourses and texts. Analysis of embodied and sensuous dimensions of this 
phenomenon however, have been less prominent in the discussion. The 
phenomenological analysis that I give here builds off the insights of the work of feminist 
and critical race scholars who bring the insights of the phenomenological tradition to 
bear on questions concerning the role perception plays in racialization. Specifically, I 
draw on Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of habit and affect, to explore the consumption 
and appropriation of the figure of the female Indian dancer and the complex temporality 
of cultural stereotypes, which not only bear the weight of the past, but encroach upon a 
future as they are taken up in the present.  
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4.2.2 Situating the Figure of the Female Indian Dancer 
 
Phenomenologically, accounts of the past are understood as being bound to the present. 
Merleau-Ponty often describes the past, or history, as having weight. As he explains, the 
“past has a specific weight, that is not a sum of events, over there, far away from me, but 
rather the atmosphere of my present” (PhP 467). Understanding history as having 
weight, does not fix the past in an objective point of time, but rather as “a domain, which 
it dominates, where it reigns, where it is everywhere present without ever being about to 
say: it’s here” (VI working notes, 205). Donald Landes (2013) has reflected on “weight” 
in his work on Merleau-Ponty’s work on expression. In physics, he recalls, “weight” 
“refers to that which causes bodies to move along certain dimensions” (33). The 
meanings generated through colonial violence survive not as an object left behind - a 
remainder of something - or something that survives as a residue. Rather, their sense is 
deposited “as something to continue” (IP, 9). I come into a world where the figure of the 
female Indian dancer is already laden with meanings that have been carried forward from 
the colonial past to the living present. The attributed meanings of cultural difference 
carry forward in cultural stereotypes condensed into the figure of the Indian dancer.  
 
The figure of the female Indian dancer is informed by colonial encounters with devadasi. 
Despite this, however, I am cautious about drawing a direct connection between the two, 
because the terminologies used to refer to Indian dancers and dance practices during the 
colonial and post-colonial period is very messy. The phrase “Oriental dance” was 
adopted indiscriminately, encompassing all of Asian, Middle Eastern and South East 
Asian styles of dance. This problematically conflates the dance practices of different 
cultures and traditions. In British colonial literature of the nineteenth century, Indian 
dance practices were also often referred to as “nautch,” an anglicized word deriving from 
the Hindi/Urdu word nautch, meaning dance. This term was“applied generally to 
characterize all types of dance forms and dancing women from India” (Coorlawala, 
1992, 123). The phrase “nautch girls” became British shorthand for various forms of 
entertainment that colonial men and women witnessed during their travels to India 
(Coorlawala, 1992, 123–52). These phrases are limiting not only because they present 
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dance practices as ahistorical, but also because they fail to capture the complexity of the 
lifestyle and function of these performances within their respective cultures. “Nautch” 
obscures the plurality of Indian dance practices. For example, this term collapses 
together devadasi communities, who resided in Southern India and practiced sadir, with 
communities of tawaifs, who lived in Northern India and practiced kathak. The 
indiscriminate use of the term “nautch” by both British colonizers and the colonized 
alike makes it impossible to determine where the performers of so called “nautch” were 
from, and consequently we lose the specificity of their traditions. In light of this, and for 
the sake of clarity, in this section I use the more general terms “Indian dance” and 
“female Indian dancer”, rather than devadasi.96  
 
A stereotype cannot be reduced to the figure alone. Rather, the figure is always 
experienced with its background; a horizon that is always already charged with a sense. 
To see the stereotype as such, is to overlook the social, historical, cultural, and economic 
dimensions that contextualize the notion of the other that the stereotype perpetuates. As 
such, I aspire to do precisely the opposite, and bring to the forefront the context which 
continues to motivate the perception of the figure of the female Indian dancer. In the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century, “India was one of the Orient’s most popular 
products, created, marketed and consumed largely by a Western imagination” (Desmond, 
1991). Dance became a popular archetype in stereotyping India and was widely 
consumed as an Orientalist fantasy. Within this context, the figure of the female Indian 
dancer provided a provocative symbol of the “Oriental Other.” The Indian dancer 
embodied cultural difference, confirming for European and North American audiences 
their established perceptions of the Orient, (mis)understood as “exotic,” “barbaric,” and 
“uncivilized”.  
 
                                                   
96 I occasionally use the word “nautch” because it is very prevalent within colonial 
literature, and is hard to avoid using it completely. My own use of the word threatens to 
sustain this colonial legacy by continuing to conceal the distinctions between a wide-
range of Indian cultural practice. Although I continue to use this term, I do so sparingly, 
while acknowledging its complex and diverse meaning, and history. 
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Throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the figure of the Indian dancer 
proliferated, appearing within multiple sites of European cultural production. For 
example, Indian dancers, often referred to as “nautch girls”, were “displayed” at large-
scale exhibitions and world fairs. The practice of publically displaying dance as a 
cultural artifact from the colonies was a central mechanism for affirming Orientalist 
ideologies, and was bound up in the dynamic of Othering.97  Along with other dance 
styles from the “New World”, such as tango (c.f. Savigliano, 1995) and belly dance (c.f. 
Karayanni, 2004), Indian98 dance styles were featured at large-scale exhibitions and 
world fairs, and soon were being displayed at side-shows and traveling circuses in 
Europe and North America.99 As Dirks (2000) notes, World Exhibitions were 
inseparable from the colonial project that was simultaneously premised on conquest and 
acquisition of knowledge. He asserts that while, “brute torture on the body of the 
                                                   
97 During the nineteenth century, colonialists considered the art and artifacts of Other 
cultures were for the taking. As Deborah Root (1996) explains, “precisely because of 
Westerners supposed greater, scientific perspective entitled them to bring the arts of all 
cultures under their purview” (Root, 1996, 22).  As we will see, such acts of 
appropriation express the general attitude of ontological expansiveness underlining white 
Western subjectivity.  
98 Before India gained independence from the British in 1947 and the country was 
partitioned in to the distinct countries of India and Pakistan, differentiation between these 
countries was more fluid. For this reason here I am using the term “Indian” to refer to 
individuals from South Asia. 
99 Indian dancers in New York found ways to earn money by exhibiting their skilled 
performances in P.T. Barnum’s circus shows, at dime museums, and world fairs. On one 
hand, in these contexts individuals of South Asian decent were presented as examples of 
the “strange” and “exotic,”. However, John Tchen (2001) suggests that we ought not to  
deny the agency of nautch dancers as historical actors. While circuses, museums, and 
theaters did take advantage of nautch dancers, dancers also sometimes exploited 
exoticism in order to meet their own needs. Other Asian performers I the mid-to-late 
nineteenth century eroticized themselves in order to make a living. Some examples 
include Miss Prawn, Qumibo Appo, Chand and Eng (Tchen, 2001), and even those in 
Tong Hook Tong Chinese Theater Company (Lei, 2006). It is possible that nautch 
dancers may have chosen to exploit North American orientalist desires. Although 
Western tastes for orientalism drove the consumption of nautch dance the “authentic” 
performers were eventually driven out and white individuals began taking up their 
performance practices for themselves. However, as Debora Root (1996) has shown, the 
dynamics of displaying otherness still remains tied to the exhibition of colonial imperial 
power and constitutes an endeavor to extend and underline its authority by objectifying 
and dehumanizing the Other. 
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colonized was not the same as the public exhibition of a colonized body”, these two 
conventions of colonial power nevertheless “shared in more than they differed” (5). 
Appropriating and displaying the dance and preforming it in a context where it is meant 
to represent Indian cultures not only demonstrates the authority of the West but also 
speaks for the silent Orient (c.f. Mohanty, 1986). Indian dance(rs) were a curiosity and 
exotic commodity in this landscape.100  
 
Spanning the artistic, philosophical, and political realms of cultural life in Europe and 
North America, the figure of the Indian dancer seemed to pop up everywhere. At the turn 
of the twentieth century, Indian dancing girls figured prominently in works of fiction, 
travel, and missionary literature. These aesthetic representations in this period are 
informed by the alliances between Christian evangelism, colonial anthropology, and 
imperial medicine, which revolve around moral amelioration and are directed towards 
“reform” of devadasi communities. Much of these works focus specially on the morality 
engendered by dance practices of the devadasi.  
 
As Soneji (2012) points out, representations of the dance practices of devadasi, as with 
representations of sati, were often ubiquitously identified “with the civilizational 
depravity of ‘the oft-conquered people’ of India” (74). Dance scholars agree that within 
these literary contexts, depictions of Indian dancers are steeped in orientalist fear/desire 
for the “exotic” that devadasi embodied through their movement. Imagined as a sylph or 
a bayadere, Indian dancers were highly romanticized: 
 “the very word bayadere evokes even in the most prosaic and 
bourgeois minds an idea of sunshine, perfume, and beauty. 
Imaginations are stirred and dreams take shape. There is a 
                                                   
100 Ruth St. Denis first encountered Indian dancers at the World Fair at Coney Island in 
1904: “during these days someone took me to Coney Island… my who attention was not 
captured until I came to an East Indian Village which had been brought over in its 
entirety by the owners of the Hippodrome. Here, for the first time, I saw snake charmers 
and holy men and Nautch dancers, and something of the remarkable fascination of India 
caught hold of me” (St. Denis, 1939, 55). I should point out that her seminal work, 
Radha: The Mystic Dance of the Five Senses premiered in 1906… two years after this 
encounter at the World Fair.  
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sensation of dazzling light and through the pale smoke of 
burning incense appear the unfamiliar silhouettes of the East. 
Until now [the 1838 European tour of Indian devadasi] 
bayaderes had remained a poetic mystery like the houris of 
Muhammad’s paradise. They were more splendid, fairylike, 
fascinating. This scented poetry that – like all poetry – existed 
only in our dreams, has now been brought to us” (Gautier, 1886: 
39), [Cited in Thobani, 2017, 29].  
This account was given by French poet, art, and literary critique Theophile Gautier and 
exemplifies the sensual image of Indian dance circulating at the time. Gautier evokes 
seedy exotics in the mysterious imagery of perfume, smoke, and silhouettes. These 
flourishes tantalize the senses and evoke exotic splendor, all while conflating India with 
the Middle East.  
 
Ballets produced by and for Western dancers also integrated Indian dancers in their 
narratives as tragic characters and sought to imitate the “look” of Indian dancers. 
However, in these ballets orientalist sentiments appeared primarily through subject 
matter; dress, and décor, rather than movement style. As was the case in literary fiction, 
the figure of the Indian dancer was also frequently incorporated as a tragic heroine. More 
often than not, she was presented as a seductive victim usually dominated by a man 
whose rule is malign. As Jowitt (1988) aptly puts it, these ballets “doled out exoticism in 
judicious doses…”, evoking in audiences “a frisson of horrified delight” (53, 55). An 
aura of glamour hung around the figure of the Indian dancer, while the intimations of 
promiscuity simultaneously associated her with scandal. The descriptions of these 
performances reveal habitual exoticism through which this figure was perceived. For 
example, when describing the ballerina Vergina Zucchi’s performance as Padmana in the 
Ballet Brahma, created by Hippolyte Monplaisir in 1868, one critic is captivated by her 
“fierce, expressive eyes that shine like rubies in the dark, the sculptured pose of the 
body, the imperiously regal gestures transport the Spector into the azure regions of the 
ideal, into a fairyland among the passionate sultananas of the Thousand and One Nights” 
(cited in Jowitt, 1988, 55). Yet, again we encounter imagery of an exotic fantasy. Like 
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Gautier, this critic presents an image of India as a “fairyland”, which, interestingly, this 
critic also associates with Scheherazade’s Arabia. Like Gautier’s comparison between 
the bayadere and the houris of Muhammad’s paradise, this critic collapses a whole series 
of disparate cultural groups together. This is obviously ridiculous. These examples 
demonstrate the reach of this stereotype.101  
 
4.2.3 Habitual Orientation Towards the Figure of the Female 
Indian Dancer 
 
Perception is grounded in practice, on the very actions of looking, listening, and 
touching, as they are lived in and through our bodies. Perception is not an inner 
representation of an outside world, but rather is practical bodily involvement. 
Phenomenology helps us to understand how cultural differences enter in to the field of 
sensual experience and concern the whole sensing body. As explained in Haldrup et al. 
(2016), “One does not just perceive another body as a physical object; rather one is 
affected by the meaning of its appearance” (178). Against the complex ground 
                                                   
101 Through the figure of the female Indian dancer, one can also observe how meanings 
generated through colonial violence extend beyond the events of the imperial past. The 
figure of the female Indian dancer bears the weight of the past, which continues to be 
rearticulated in the present. This legacy continues to speak through the bodies of 
Western women who continue to take up fragmentary aspects of Indian culture, via 
dance and dress, in order to “spice up” their performances. Pop artists have capitalized 
on the continued depiction of India as exotic and mysterious to produce intrigue. From 
Madonna to Selena Gomez, Coldplay, and Beyoncé - all have incorporated aspects of 
Indian dance in music videos and performances in ways that reinforce and rearticulate 
orientalist logics, evoking the exotic imagery of India via the female Indian dancer. Iggy 
Azalea’s controversial 2013 music video for the song “Bounce” is a particularly jarring 
example. In the video, shots of a raucous party and a ritual of devotion called a puja are 
spliced between the faces of Indian men and children. Azalea, dressed in a sari, is 
surrounded by dancing Indian women who serve as little more than props or fashion 
accessories. Just when you think you have reached the pinnacle of myopic homogenized 
representations of cultural difference, Azalea shows up on an elephant in a gold crown. 
These representations are conceived though a white, Western lens reinforcing the racial 
and colonial logics that underlie how India and Indian women are perceived, and 
perpetuating predictable stereotypes of India as an exotic playground for rich white 
people to explore and exploit for cultural capital and economic gain. 
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articulated above, the Indian dancer became an overdetermined figure – her visibility 
moves beyond simply belonging to a different culture and she is rended a hyper-visible 
representation of the exotic other. As Al-Saji notes, racializing perception is marked by 
seeing “less”. Racializing perception, she argues, circumscribes the receptivity and 
affectivity of the perceiver; “the openness of vision to other ways of being, which may 
destabilize or shatter its perceptual schemata, delimited” (Al-Saji, 2010, 885). This 
defies what I established in Chapter One; that perception is a dynamic chiasmatic 
intertwining, and necessarily open to change. This is because Al-Saji (2010; 2014) 
frames racializing perception as delimiting the liveliness that normally defines 
perception. In other words, in this context, the capacity for vision to shift and change is 
stunted. Consequently, racialized bodies are not only seen as naturally inferior, they 
cannot be seen otherwise” (Al-Saji, 2010, 885; Al-Saji 2014). In this way, the figure of 
the female Indian dancer is invisible even as she is hyper-visible, with invisibility 
standing for the inability to perceive female Indian dancers as they are to themselves or 
to others. To see the figure of the female Indian dancer is precisely to not see the 
working of colonial power, orientalism, and racialization that institute the perception of 
this figure as such. The material effects of this can be seen in the ways that devadasi, as 
shown in the previous section, were repeatedly denied a self-originating voice in public 
debate about them, let alone political life more generally.  
 
However, it is not enough to say that the misrepresentations that weigh down the figure 
of the female Indian dancer straightforwardly repeat the misrepresentations of the past 
within the context of the future. Stereotypes sustain themselves through the very 
perceptions, representations, and affects they produce. This weight generates 
momentum, which propels misrepresentations towards a future. This folds back into my 
earlier discussions of habit in chapters one. First, it gestures to the notion of habit as 
habitual, whereby the perception of the figure of the female Indian dancer as exotic is 
routinized through repetition. And second, it gestures towards the way habit grounds 
orientation. Being habituated in this second sense refers “specifically to situations of 
being oriented in a general situation by having become familiar with its particular 
structure” (Casey, 2013, 212-213).  
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The figure of the Indian dancer is a signifier grounded in the racialized, gendered, social, 
and historical horizons that have given rise to the existential emergence of female Indian 
dancers in the present, as well as Western subjects. The meaning of the figure of the 
female Indian dancer is not intrinsic to the embodied being of a dancer in the present, 
but, following Yancy (2008), “has become a value-laden given, an object presumed 
untouched, and unmediated by various contingent discursive practices, history, time, and 
context” (3). Consequently, the figure of the Indian dancer imposes upon the viewer 
certain conclusions: she is exotic, desirable, horrific, a voiceless object as such. This 
construction forms the horizon for the embodied responses of Western audiences to this 
figure. The figure of the Indian dancer is already familiar. This familiarity marks the 
material bodies of Indian dancers in the present as “other” such that each time she 
appears she is seen in this way. In other words, the representation of female Indian 
dancers as exotic positions female Indian dancers as scripted in advance; their 
movements already come loaded with meaning. 
 
As Alcoff reminds us, we do not see our habits, we see through them (c.f. Alcoff, 2004). 
Colonialism, Orientalism, and Exoticism impose habitual modes of perceiving on to 
female Indian dancers.102 This does not operate by a rigid and linear causality, but 
instead motivates perception. Here, “a motive is not the cause of a resulting action, since 
its meaning cannot be defined apart from the action; on the other hand, the action is not a 
totally free response to the motive” (Lee, 2014, 242). Motivational relations arise within 
a situation, and depend upon the overlapping of the individual subject and the context. In 
other words, a perceiving subject responds to a situation that is already laden with 
meanings. As an over-determined and hyper-visible symbol of the exotic Other, the 
figure of the female Indian dancer sets out in advance how female Indian dancers will be 
perceived and motivates her continued perception as such. Furthermore, not only is the 
figure of the female Indian dancer over-determined, but it is also predetermined:  they 
                                                   
102 Of course, these habitual perceptions are also interlaced with gendered dimensions, 
which, if sometimes underemphasized, ought not to be forgotten, to say nothing of the 
heteronormative framework that organizes these gendered and racialized relations.  
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are presumed to be known before they actually are, and determined ahead of “what any 
genuine encounter with them may reveal, and ahead of how they may wish to present 
themselves” (67). In other worlds, female Indian dancers are weighed down in advance 
by the tropes established through racialization and orientalist othering, which institutes a 
tendency, or a habitual orientation, towards them.103 To illustrate this, I return to the 
Augutin Daly’s 1881 production of Zanina, and the negative response it received from 
North America audiences. 
 
Although the inclusion of Indian dancers in Augustin Daly’s 1881 production of Zanina 
sparked deep curiosity and interest among North American audiences, public response to 
their performance was unfavorable. The performance received poor reviews. The 
language used in these reviews is telling. One review complains that “the famous 
Nautch… turned out to be even more monotonous than the singing” (Brooklyn Daily 
Eagle, January 1881) [Cited in Srinivasan 2010, 57]. Another describes them as 
“grotesque” and “ugly”. Recall the reviewer who remarks: “I think the Nautch girls were 
a disappointment to most people” (Courier des Etas-Unis, February 7 1881) and the 
other who describes the audience as fleeing the theater with “words of scorn and smiles 
of derision” (Locke, 1920, 31) [Cited in Srinivasan, 2010, 56]. The sense of 
“disappointment” and “derision” observed here is telling. These descriptions capture the 
affective embodied responses experienced by Western audiences when faced with the 
tangible bodies of female Indian dancers. Although these are discursive traces, that the 
appearance of the female Indian dancer solicits such responses is precisely because it is 
already supported by the long history of constructing both female Indian dancers more 
generally, and the devadasi specifically, as exotic. Here we see how familiar the figure 
of the female Indian dancer was to Western audiences. Indeed, so familiar was this 
figure, that it became the standard by which these real Indian dancers were measured, 
                                                   
103 Merleau-Ponty’s account of habit highlights generativity and demonstrates that habits 
are not fixed or permanent, but flexible and subject to change. Although habits of 
perception inherited from colonial encounters still have an impact on the perception of 
Indian dancers today, I do not want to suggest that this inherited past forecloses the 
possibility for perception of Indian dance/dancers to be rearticulated, or that they have 
not already been reworked through resistance and self-critique.  
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both in India and in Europe. Little more than a month had passed since the nautch 
dancers left the New York stage before white women began mimicking their 
performances (Srinivasan, 2012; 2007). Evidently, Western audiences found the 
productions of white performers, such as “The Naughty Nautch Girls”, more titillating 
than those of actual Indian women (c.f. Odell, 1939).  
 
Srinivasan (2012) maintains that audiences’ sense of disappointment upon witnessing 
these performances reveal a palpable “disjunction between the discourse of the Oriental 
dancing girl that had been circulating and the racialized and gendered materiality of 
brown women’s dancing bodies on US stages” (Srinivasan, 2012, 53). Evidently, female 
Indian dancers were accepted or rejected based on how successfully they aligned 
themselves with the figure of the female Indian dancer and whetted European and North 
American appetites for the exotic. That the nautch dancers did not live up to the terms of 
Oriental Otherness expected also reflects the perceptual closure that characterizes 
racializing perception. As Al-Saji argues, racializing perception is defined by rigidity 
and affective closure. What is closed-down in racializing perception is its receptivity, or 
“its ability to be affected, to be touched, by that which lies beyond or beneath its habitual 
objectifying schemas” (Al-Saji, 2014). This places an important role in linking what is 
perceived as a racialized exotic other to its immediately felt effects on the racializing 
body. This immediacy is connected to phenomena of habit (see chapter one), and is 
central for the naturalization that sustains racializing habits of perception. The responses 
to the real material bodies of female Indian dancers given in the above reviews of their 
performances demonstrate that the presence of these dancers was at once seen and felt as 
intolerable. Here we see the way in which “racializing perception inscribes its cause in 
the racialized body” of the other [emphasis added] (Al-Saji, 2014, 140). In other words, 
the stereotypical figure is understood as the cause or catalysis of what is perceived. The 
result is that the audience’s repulsion towards the Indian dancer appears as if it has arisen 
from the dancer’s very presence as such. 
 
The audience’s response of disdain, disgust, desire, distrust, when faced with the female 
Indian dancers, not only casts these women as intolerable, but inscribes the cause of 
 151 
these affective responses on the dancers themselves. However, the figure is only 
perceived as the cause of desire and derision because the workings of racializing 
perception remain tacit or pre-reflective, through sedimentation and habituation. This 
response appears immediate, and this immediacy is part of what justifies the response. 
The very appearance of the figure of the female Indian dancer naturalizes what is seen 
and felt in her presence. Not only does this naturalize the perceived intolerability of the 
other, but it also relieves the dominant (white Western) subject and the larger social 
sphere from responsibility for their response.  
 
4.3 White Bodies, Indian Dances: Ontological Expansiveness on 
the Western Stage 
 
In 1906 Ruth St. Denis premiers Radha: The Mystic Dance of the Five Senses. As Radha, 
St. Denis dramatizes the pleasures of the senses, performing dances of sight, hearing, 
taste, and touch. As Salley Banes explains, 
The dance is primarily a solo for St. Denis, although it begins with a 
procession of male priests who serve to frame her dancing and to 
carry symbolic props. St. Denis, as the idol Radha, is seated in lotus 
position, absolutely immobile, on a pedestal (Banes, 1998, 85).  
St. Denis dances barefoot, the contours of her body visible as she dances. She curls her 
wrists, twisting and turning them around her as she spins in place, letting her skirt billow 
around her. Jane Desmond offers more detail of St. Denis’ performance. Desmond (1991) 
explains: 
When the priests are seated in a semi-circle, framing a space for 
Radha to enter, she comes to life. Watched by her priests, she 
enters the sacred space to begin the dance of the five senses 
(Desmond, 1991, 32).  
St. Denis’ movements are sensuous and expressive. She twills in ecstatic rapture, and 
falls to the floor. Her gestures trace a spectacle of sensuality and eroticism and claim 
freedom for the (white) female dancing body on stage. At the time of its performance, 
Radha was considered a stroke of genius. Between 1904 and 1915 the piece was 
performed over a hundred times in both North America and Europe (Scolieri, 2012, 98). 
The significance of Radha in St. Denis’ lexicon is further illustrated by its revival for her 
1940 “comeback” performance at Carnegie Hall in New York (Scolieri, 2012, 92).  
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St. Denis was one among a growing community of women in the early twentieth century 
who were taking up dance to rebel against choreographic traditions and gendered norms 
(Banes, 1998). Along with dancers such as Anna Pavlova, Loie Fuller, and Isadora 
Duncan, St. Denis is considered a “mother” of the America modern dance movement in 
North America. This movement explicitly pushed back against the oppressive demands 
of classical ballet technique104 as well as the dominant narrative themes that preoccupied 
ballet choreographers (i.e. marriage plots). Outside the confines imposed by ballet 
technique, modern dancers sought to redefine dance in progressive, liberatory, and 
feminist ways, by taking up new styles of movement to explore subjects that extend 
beyond marriage (c.f. Desmond, 1991; Daly, 1992; Banes, 1998). Although St. Denis 
was not a politically active feminist, her choreographies contributed to growing social 
discourse about women and changing social values surrounding marriage and 
sexuality.105 Although modern dancers, such as St. Denis, overturned gender hierarchies 
and claimed leadership positions as choreographers on the public stage, they also 
actively reinforced racial hierarchies as they did. Not only did these choreographers take 
up orientalist themes, but they directly drew from, and claimed ownership over the 
movement vocabularies and expressive practices of those marked as culturally other. St 
Denis specifically assumed the right to possess and profit from Indian dance traditions. 
Given this, one must ask: against whom does modern dancing enact its social/feminist 
critique?  
 
In the previous section, I discussed the proliferation of the figure of the female Indian 
dancer across various sites of European cultural production. I cited several examples of 
this figure’s appearance within literature and philosophy, as well as its integration in 
ballets and various theatrical productions. In these instances, the cultural practices are 
represented by those considered cultural outsiders and are examples of appropriation. 
                                                   
104 Dancers broke many rules of technique and appeared corsetless and barefooted on 
stage.  
105 In this context, modern dance performances not only reflected changing social values 
of the time, they also instituted new social relations, in part by “producing a new 
predominantly female audience” (Banes, 1998, 66). 
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However, in what follows I focus on the appropriation of a distinctive style of movement, 
i.e. the role that the appropriation of Indian dance played within the American modern 
dance tradition. Rather than attempting to solve the problem of cultural appropriation 
(which in any case cannot be conceived of as a singular project, but one that is sensitive 
to specificities of peoples with unique historical trajectories), I will suggest that we 
rethink the terms in which we address the questions and the ethical responsibilities 
entailed in its consideration. By focusing on intentionality, rather than intent, I call 
attention to a pre-reflective orientation to the world that underlies and compels 
appropriative acts among privileged subjects. Acts of cultural appropriation, I argue, 
express the uninhibited intentionality of ontological expansiveness, the “I can” that is 
adopted as the norm of being in the world for dominant privileged (white Western) 
subjects. I show that the ease with which members of dominant cultural groups exercise 
their “right” to possess and claim mastery over the expressive practices of cultural groups 
marked as Other. 
 
I begin by defining cultural appropriation, before highlighting the uninhibited 
intentionality that underlies it. This is followed by a brief discussion of appropriation in 
the context of the modern dance movement, followed by an analysis of the efforts of 
Ruth St. Denis to copyright her seminal work Radha (1906). I will demonstrate that Ruth 
St. Denis’s appropriation of Indian dance is consistent with an orientation towards the 
world defined by ontological expansiveness; she assumes the right to take up, posses, 
and occupy Indian dance practices.  
 
4.3.1 Cultural Appropriation 
 
Cultural appropriation is a pervasive and multidirectional phenomenon that is 
inescapably intertwined with cultural politics. There is a great deal at stake in 
determining where cultural appropriation begins and ends. It is critical that we ask 
ourselves how the boundaries of cultural appropriation are determined, by whom these 
lines are determined, and to what effect.  In its most basic definition, cultural 
appropriation refers to “taking - from a culture that is not one’s own”. What is “taken” 
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varies, but can include “intellectual property, cultural expressions or artifacts, history 
and ways of knowledge” (Zaff & Rao, 2008, 1). Such a definition bristles with 
uncertainty. One might ask, for example, what is meant by “taking”? To consume, to 
capture, to possess? On some level, taking implies the removal of something from its 
original place; a de-contextualization. For this reason, appropriation is often likened to 
theft. As with theft, which operates without the assumption of reciprocity, appropriation 
occurs without permission or the intent of return. 
 
Within Cultural Studies, interest in cultural appropriation has largely focused on its 
relation to exploitation and systemic inequality (c.f. Zaff & Rao, 2008; Ahmed, 2000). 
These studies prioritize the social, economic, and political contexts in which acts of 
appropriation occur and focus specifically on evaluating the impact and implications of 
such actions. Examining relations of power and privilege that underlie acts of 
appropriation thus form the primary basis for assessing the consequences of such acts. 
Acts of appropriation are deemed morally suspect when they occur in the context of 
asymmetrical power relationships, i.e. when someone from a dominant cultural group 
takes from a someone from a marginalized cultural group (c.f. Hart 1997; hooks, 1992). 
This has been shown to be particularly relevant for understanding the operation of 
colonial and post-colonial relations of power, since aspects of colonized cultures have 
long been extracted and exploited by the dominant colonizing culture in ways that serve 
the interests of the dominant. Critiques of cultural appropriation are premised on the 
understanding that such acts do harm to both the integrity and identities of marginalized 
cultural groups as well to the cultural objects caught in the fray. Harm is generated 
through erroneous depictions of the heritage from which a practice or object emerged, 
which can lead to distorted and deceptive depictions of a given culture (Ziff &Roa, 1997; 
hooks, 1992; Ahmed, 2000). We have already seen this through the figure of the female 
Indian dancer among Western audiences.  
 
Misrepresentation, however, is not a necessary condition for harms to be generated 
through the appropriation. The elevated social status that individuals of dominant 
cultural groups lends what Fricker calls “credibility excess,” where in their credibility is 
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wildly overemphasized (2007, 17). This concept is grounded in the understanding that 
one’s social identify has a meaningful and substantive impact on how one’s claims are 
evaluated. When members of a dominant cultural group speak, their voices are perceived 
as being more authoritative, and consequently carry greater weight. Alcoff (1991) raises 
this issue when she asserts that one’s social location “can serve either to authorize or 
disauthorize one’s speech” (7). Even if the content of one’s speech is accurate, when a 
member of the dominant culture speaks on behalf of members of a marginalized group 
their perceived credibility excess contributes to the conclusion that  individuals 
belonging to marginalized groups have no special credibility with respect to their own 
experiences. Under these conditions, marginalized communities are deprived of what 
Uma Narayan (1988) has called “the epistemic privilege of the oppressed” (35).106 
Loretta Todd (1990) touches on this issue when she says that “appropriation also occurs 
when someone else becomes the expert on your experience and is deemed more 
knowledgeable about who you are than yourself” (25). Fricker’s account of credibility 
deficits and excesses is significant because it demonstrates that even acts of cultural 
appropriation which are executed with accuracy harmful consequences (c.f. Matthes, 
2017).  
  
This way of understanding cultural appropriation is not without its problems. The 
concept is itself predicated on the distinction between cultural insiders and outsiders. A 
distinction such as this requires a set of criteria through which to distinguish cultural 
membership. However, constructing such boundaries poses a risk, since they have the 
propensity to falsely represent cultures as homogenous, static and monolithic. In other 
worlds, the practice of categorizing cultural insiders/outsiders itself is premised on 
essentialist assumptions about cultural identity and belonging that themselves can be 
damaging. As Narayan (2000) explains, essentialist generalizations “depict as 
homogenous groups of heterogeneous people whose values, interests, ways of life, and 
moral and political commitments are internally plural and divergent” (Narayan, 2000, 
                                                   
106 Narayan explains that “members of an oppressed group have more immediate, subtle 
and critical knowledge about the nature of their oppression that people who are non-
members of the oppressed group” (1988, 35).   
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88). In other words, reifying the boundaries that define cultural membership tends to 
perpetuate a normative view of “authentic” group members. This works to further 
disenfranchise those who either exist at the margins, or simply do not meet all the 
relevant criteria for group membership, or insider status. This reveals a tremendous 
overlap between the harms of cultural appropriation and those of cultural essentialism. 
 
4.3.2 Appropriation and the Uninhibited Intentionality of 
Ontological Expansiveness 
 
When evaluating acts of cultural appropriation, scholars focus primarily on power 
relations, and are less interested in explicit intent or awareness of those engaged in 
cultural appropriation. The intent of an artist, for example, is largely irrelevant when 
scholarly emphasis is placed on structures of power within which artists are situated, and 
the larger implications appropriation has for the perpetuation of existing relations of 
power (c.f. Hart, 1997; Zaff & Rao, 2008; hooks, 1992). Rather than centering my 
analysis on intent, I concentrate on intentionality. With this focus, I call attention to a 
pre-reflective orientation to the world that underlies and compels appropriative acts 
among privileged subjects. When members of a dominant cultural group assume the 
right to use, to take, or possess the expressive practices of those marked as culturally 
other, they are guided by habitual perception of the other as described above. As we have 
seen in chapter three, these habitual perceptions ground an orientation in and towards the 
world that is “ontologically expansive”. Acts of cultural appropriation, I argue, express 
the uninhibited intentionality of ontological expansiveness, the “I can” that is adopted as 
the norm of being in the world for dominant privileged (white Western) subjects. I show 
the ease with which members of dominant cultural groups exercise their “right” to 
possess and claim mastery over the expressive practices of cultural groups marked as 
Other. 
 
Johnathan Hart (1997) argues that cultural appropriation occurs “when a member of one 
[Subject/dominant/colonizing] culture takes a cultural practice or theory of a member of 
another culture [Other/colonized] as if it were his or her own or as if the right of 
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possession should not be questioned or contested” [emphasis added] (138). This 
description is revealing.107 First, it indicates that appropriation is not simply a matter of 
being “influenced” by one’s experience of cultural difference. Rather, it involves an 
active making of one’s own. Hart’s description gestures to an important facet of what 
occurs in this process, namely that the dominant subject proceeds without hesitation. As 
Hart describes it, the action of appropriation occurs “as if it were his or her own”. The 
style of “taking” then, is characterized by the fact that it occurs with ease. This suggests 
an uninhibited manner of approach; one that is not burdened by doubt and does not 
shrink behind insecurity or uncertainty; an uninhibited movement that unwaveringly 
unites intention with action.  
 
Shannon Sullivan’s concept of ontological expansiveness can be used to explore the 
dynamics of white embodiment in the context of cultural appropriation. As ontologically 
expansive, “white people tend to act and think as if all spaces – whether geographical, 
psychological, linguistic, economic, spiritual, bodily, or otherwise [i.e. artistic] – are or 
should be available for them to move in and out of as they wish” (Sullivan, 2006, 10). 
Here, Sullivan outlines a sense of bodily freedom, autonomy and entitlement. She 
describes a particular orientation towards the world where one is emboldedn by the 
belief that they are inherently and unquestioningly free to move confidently through a 
variety of different spaces. One’s own actions are uninhibited, unobstructed, and able to 
unfold fluidly. This speaks to the very manner of one’s engagement in the world; it 
                                                   
107 It is important to note that possession forms the basis for property ownership in 
Western contexts (C.f Rose, 1985). This is significant because, as Harris (1993) argues, 
there is an intimate connection between conceptions of racial identity and property. 
Indeed, Harris (1993) contends that rights in property are “contingent on, intertwined 
with, and conflated with race” (1714). Although Harris is speaking specifically to the 
conditions of chattel slavery and the occupation of Native land, her observations are 
relevant for a broader understanding of appropriation. As Harris (1993) explains, 
“possession – the act necessary to lay the basis for rights and property – was defined to 
include only the cultural practices of whites. This definition laid the foundation for the 
idea that whiteness – that which whites alone possess- is valuable and is property” 
(1721). The racialized dynamics of property inform the way that the law recognises and 
enforces rights to property, and also works to justify the seizure, possession and 
occupation of labour, land, as well as cultural objects.  
 158 
captures the mode of one’s embodied being and the expansive constitution of one’s 
world. Recall, that Sullivan defines ontological expansiveness as the tendency “of 
assuming and acting as if any and all spaces – geographical, psychological, cultural, 
linguistic or whatever – are rightfully available to and open for white people to enter into 
whenever they like” (Sullivan, 2014, 20). This expresses “a particular co-constitutive 
relationship between self and environment, in which the self assumes that it can and 
should have totally mastery over its environment” (Sullivan, 2006, 10). As I have shown, 
this sense of mastery is made manifest in and through an uninhibited movement, or a 
sense of ease. Merleau-Ponty positions intentionality in motility, or the bodily sense of “I 
can.” The “I can” of the body is precisely the experience of harmony between intention 
and action, projecting “the aim to be accomplished and connects the body’s motion 
towards that end in an unbroken directedness” (Young, 2005, 146). Of course, because 
the “I can” expresses a rationality between self and world, it reflects the conditions of the 
world as imposed limits on one’s sense of intentional action. This point is significant 
because of the way that social norms govern how one perceives their own possibilities of 
engagement in the world. The expansiveness that animates white bodies encapsulates a 
style of being in and towards the world that is unencumbered and reflects a sense of 
ease. 
 
The second part of Hart’s description (“as if the right of possession should not be 
questioned or contested”) also emphasizes the sense of ease with which dominant 
subjects take up the expressive practices of cultural Others (1997, 138). As opposed to 
the racialized Other, who Ahmed (2017) describes as “being in question,” the dominant 
white Western subject proceeds without question. As Ahmed (2017) explains, to be 
questioned, to be questionable, is a way of being told you do not belong, are not entitled 
to move into and take up space in the world (124). Marginalized subjects are rendered 
questionable, “as someone who can be questioned, as someone who should be willing to 
receive a question” (Ahmed, 2017, 117). The dominant subject, on the other hand, 
assumes belongingness, moves without the threat of being in question. This description 
gestures toward an unencumbered way of being in the world, which aligns appropriation 
with the uninhibited, or ontologically expansive, intentionality that characterizes 
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privilege. While I have shown that stereotypes and misrepresentations are grounded in an 
“I cannot”, here I show that cultural appropriation is also closely tied to the unobstructed 
and expansive “I can” of white privilege which sees itself as entitled to all spaces and 
does not hesitate to occupy them. 
 
4.3.3 “The Only Radha”: Ontological Expansiveness in American 
Modern Dance 
 
Salley Banes (1998) asserts that “modern dance itself was born at the turn of the century, 
in a crucible of hybridity” (260). The modernist imperative to “make it new,” she 
continues, was the catalyst for increasing cross-cultural encounters in the performing arts 
(Banes, 1998, 258). Many modern dancers and choreographers imitated the dance styles 
of other cultures or combined them with Western expressive styles, while “wrapping 
their resulting choreography in the discourse of the modern and the artistic” (Kraut, 
2016, 62). St. Denis’ choreographic works not only took on orientalist subjects or 
themes, but also abstracted elements of Indian dance technique. There is agreement 
among dance scholars that St. Denis was more than “influenced by” Indian dance 
techniques. St. Denis’ career featured many unequal collaborations with visiting 
performers from India, whose dances (along with the dancers of many other Asian 
cultures) she would come to appropriate and reconfigure through her own framework.  
 
The gendered and racial dimensions of modern dance do not operate in tandem. Rather 
they are inextricably linked, with each being a constituent component of the other. In 
fact, “differentiating themselves from racialized, sexualized dancing bodies is precisely 
what enables these women to gain legitimacy for themselves as artists (rather than 
objects) on the theatrical stage” (Kraut, 2016, 45). The otherness of Indian dance became 
a resource for these women, invoking culturally available categories of the Other 
allowed for them to advance their own interests and carve out unique positions for 
themselves as independent artists. These practices gesture to recent critiques of the ways 
in which Western women colluded with imperial practices and policies, challenging the 
view that colonialism was an exclusively masculine enterprise. Renia Lewis explores 
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this in Gendering Orientalism, where she expands Said’s understanding of Orientalism 
to demonstrate the different ways women were complicit in cultural imperialism. Lewis 
concentrates specifically on women artists who attain greater acclaim through their 
“involvement in imperial cultural production” (1996, 2). Imperialism, she concludes, 
“played a role in the very construction of professional and creative opportunities for 
European Women” (Lewis, 1996, 3).  This is exemplified by long and largely 
unquestioned history of white Western women appropriating elements of Indian dance in 
their performance repertoire in order to advance their own creative interests and 
positions. In this way, the ontological expansiveness of whiteness, directly affected how 
Indian dance circulated, and white Western female dancers became the privileged 
consumers and interpreters of “Oriental dance”.  
 
It is significant that St. Denis sought choreographic copyright for Radha. Of course, this 
required her to declare herself the sole author of this piece. In a letter to the editor of the 
Paris edition of the New York Harold entitled “The Only Radha”, St. Denis proclaims 
herself the “originator of a series of Hindoo dances” (1906, 8). The letter concludes with 
St. Denis stating that “mine is the ‘real and only’ ‘Radha’” (St. Denis, 1906, 8).  This 
claim of authorial status is significant because it suggests mastery and ownership, but 
also marks her distinction from the Indian dancers who remained unnamed and 
unentitled (c.f. Kraut, 2015). However, her authorial status and copyright claim would 
come under attack again in 1909, when Mohammed Ismail sued St. Denis alleging that 
he had originated and taught the material for Radha and that she owed him money for 
services rendered. Unsurprisingly, St. Denis entered a denial in the suit, countering that 
she “had danced her Oriental dances long before she ever saw him” (Kraut, 2015, 89). 
Srinivasan proposes that Ismail’s legal action against St. Denis be understood as a 
“performative gesture” that serves to “highlight the labour that otherwise remains 
unacknowledged by St. Denis” (Srinivasan, 2012, 84). Certainly, St. Denis was not alone 
in taking advantage of the popularity of Orientalist trends on both side of the Atlantic. 
But, as Kraut (2015) points out “it was precisely the ease with which dances that were of 
this vogue circulated across different bodies – both brown and white – that made asserts 
of possessing the “real and only” Radha… so meaningful” (87 [emphasis added]). 
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Evidently, the empowering potential of modern dance is limited to certain bodies, certain 
classes, and certain subjectivities, since in this context of empowerment can only be 
understood as such by fixing the identity of the female Indian dancer as the exotic Other. 
White Western modern dancers relied on essentialized racial distinctions between their 
own universal artistry and the putatively “primitive” dance practices of non-white 
subjects, while also claiming the right to represent those subjects in their choreography. 
Consequently, the subversive and empowering nature of their choreographies must be 
understood alongside the fact that it is only intelligible because of its reference to the 
“Other”, namely the racialized figure of the female Indian dancer. This not only shows 
up relations of power, but speaks to a pre-reflective style of comportment animating the 
lived bodies of those with social privilege (here white western women). Acts of cultural 
appropriation reflect the unobstructed bodily intentionality that reaches towards cultural 
difference without hesitation. Investigating the appropriation of Indian dance by white 
Western modern dancers provides another entry into understanding how ontological 
expansiveness takes hold in white bodies as a habit of perception. 
 
4.4 Living History 
 
In this chapter, I have turned to the past of dance to understand the implication of its 
performance in the present and reflect on own participation in Bharatanatyam. Reflecting 
on Bharatanatyam’s complex history in this way has challenged me to consider how 
these histories continue to be negotiated through living bodies in the present. I began by 
examining how British colonialism impacted dance in India. Tracing the suppression of 
the devadasis and their dance practices under colonial rule, I demonstrated that their 
dance practices became subject to the contradictory forces of reform and revival. In the 
next two sections of the chapter, I have explored how Merleau-Ponty’s work on habit 
and intentionality might lend insight into the perception of cultural stereotypes and the 
sense of mastery that defines acts of cultural appropriation. Drawing on historical 
literature, I demonstrated that habit plays an important role in grounding a habitual 
orientation towards the figure of the Indian dancer, by linking what is perceived as a 
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racialized exotic other (here the figure of the female Indian dancer) by the dominant 
(white Western) subject, to its immediately felt effects on the racializing body. Next, I 
explored the relationship between cultural appropriation and ontological expansiveness. I 
have shown that cultural appropriation expresses distinctive style of pre-reflective 
movement characterized by inhibition and ease.  
 
An important problem for feminist theory and politics is to find ways of understanding 
each other’s differences without assimilating, reducing, or explaining those differences 
away. These questions are all the more significant in this contemporary moment, where 
we are negotiating new contexts of cultural and creative exchange. However, if these 
new contexts are to broaden the possibilities of communication across difference, they 
must not only prompt one to think differently about the other, but about one’s self as 
well. Phenomenologically, accounts of the past are understood as being bound to the 
present. One can only approach history from the position of the present. However, the 
past is not just passively given; we take it up. As Merleau-Ponty explains, “the distant 
past, of course, also has its temporal order and a temporal position in relation to my 
present, but only insofar as it itself has been present… insofar as it has been carried 
forward until now” (PhP, 438). What is significant to me is the ethical imperative that 
Merleau-Ponty identifies with this way of understanding history. History, he maintains, 
“adds to my personal obligations the obligation to understand situations other than my 
own and to create a path between my life and the lives of others” (Merleau-Ponty, 1973, 
86). The contingency of the present ensures that the world need not be as it is, and shows 
us the importance of our own choices and actions.  
 
It is naive to say that we might will away the forces of violent histories of domination 
simply by recognising their force. To take account for one’s own situation in the broad 
sense, not simply the situation one creates from themselves through a series of actions, 
“one must consider the history into which one is born” (Lee, 2014, 248). The past does 
not exist as an inert weight. Rather, it is determined by the way it is taken up in the 
present. In other words, what is important is how we respond to the past/history. It is my 
ethical responsibility to reckon with the ways histories of colonial violence have played 
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out through Bharatanatyam, even though I am not directly complicit in creating these 
contexts, since these histories of injustice are a central component of creating a 
contemporary social situation in which my white body confers privilege simply by being 
white.  
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Slowing Down, Looking Back 
 
In reflecting on dancing, while sitting and writing, I am aware of how stiff my body is. 
When there are long stretches between times when I get to dance, I can feel myself 
become rusty. Like a hinge, I do not move into the dance as easily. This illustrates an 
important active component of habit; habits, as I stated in chapter one, are held not 
simple passively acquired. Indeed, Casey (2013) suggests that “if sedimentation is to be 
conceived as a precipitation of the past into the present, it is an active precipitation 
actively maintained” (214) [emphasis added]. I cannot help but reflect on how this more 
active interpretation of habit as held raises questions concerning responsibility.  In many 
respects, this project has been about taking responsibility for the situation I find myself 
in. Engaging with Bharatanatyam has made me think about the horizons that constitute 
one’s situation. Attending to these horizons compels an ethical responsibility to change 
ones’ own behavior. However, it would seem that individuals with social privilege are 
easily persuaded by the argument that they should not be held accountable to, or 
responsible for, situations not of their making. Typically, ascribing responsibility is 
framed around establishing guilt or fault for harm (Kruks, 2005). This perspective draws 
a causal connection between the actions of an individual or collective entity (such as a 
corporation), and a set of circumstances. Although, this way of understanding 
responsibility is useful in many contexts, it limits responsibility for a given situation to 
only those consequences of one’s own immediate personal decisions and acts within 
one’s own lifetime. This overlooks the multiple horizons that collectively constitute a 
given situation in the present. As I have shown, social meanings of colonial violence are 
not only embedded within broader social structural situations (in terms of institutions 
and laws) conscious, and unconscious beliefs and prejudices, they are also sedimented 
corporeally into the very ways in which one lives, in bodily movement. In what follows, 
I conclude by summarizing the project, and then suggest different avenues for further 
research.  
 
In chapter one, I began by contextualizing the phenomenological approach that I take up 
in relation to contemporary critical research on dance. Although discursive approaches to 
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dance have lent important insight into the social and cultural politics of dance, I showed 
that they tend to abstract dance from the dancing body itself. As I have argued, 
phenomenology is better suited to the study of dance as an embodied practice that is lived 
and gives priority to articulating self-movement. Given this, I have shown that Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty’s existential phenomenology offers a valuable alternative to discursive 
approaches to dance. This was followed by a detailed account of Merleau-Ponty’s 
understanding of habit as enabling a pre-reflective style of bodily comportment and 
motility in and towards the world. I used Merleau-Ponty understanding of habit, the body 
schema, and sedimentation to articulate the experiential phenomenon of flow while 
dancing, which established the way that habits enable pre-reflective bodily movement. 
This formed the theoretical foundation for remaining chapters.  
 
In chapter two, I shifted my attention to how we might access the generativity of habit. 
Taking up dance as a method of inquiry, I show how these habitual structures that are 
latent in our bodies can be resedimented through movement. Dancers’ skills involve 
cultivating a heightened sense of bodily awareness and a sensitivity to the flow of their 
own movement. Dancers’ are actively involved in embodied explorations of habitual 
movement and how it “might be optimised, modified, and changed” (Ravn, 2017, 59) 
(C.f. Ravn, 2017; Damkjaer, 2015; Ingerslev, 2013; Legrand and Ravn, 2009). This 
ability to register, disrupt and confront their own habitual dancing body is unique. Given 
this, I explored how learning Bharatanatyam disrupted my habitual movement in the 
world. Taking up this new dance style brought the pre-reflective styles of comportment 
already residing in my habitual dancing body to the forefront of my awareness. Learning 
Bharatanatyam required me to actively resist my inclinations towards familiar patterns of 
comportment. Relying on the insights revealed through this experience, I next identified 
two experiential phenomena central to the process of resedimenting habitual movement: 
disorientation and hesitation. I showed that by disrupting one’s sense of bodily spatiality, 
experiences of disorientation disrupt the ease, immediacy, and flow of pre-reflective 
movement. Next, I demonstrated that the feeling of delay arising in moments of 
hesitation disturbs one’s habitual sense of temporality. As I have argued, these 
experiences are significant because they can open the possibility for double 
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consciousness, which is a crucial tool for grounding critical reflection. The 
phenomenological analysis I developed in this chapter set up my investigation of the 
habitual movement in the context of white privilege in chapter three.  
 
Structural injustice not only creates victims of injustice, but also privileged subjects who 
benefit as a consequence of these structures. Chapter three extends my findings from 
chapter two to the context of racial inequality and white privilege. Building off the 
account of habit given in chapter two, I show that white privilege is lived “right here” in 
the folds and flesh of my body, guiding my perception and binding my intentions through 
action. This chapter demonstrated that the movement of white individuals is underlined 
by an expansiveness that is expressed through a pre-reflective style of bodily 
comportment and motility characterized by momentum, which captures an ease of 
movement. Momentum is felt as a style of comportment and motility that is 
unencumbered and uninhibited. This feeling of momentum captures the sense in which 
white bodies tend not to hesitate as they engage in intentional action. By framing 
whiteness in terms of habitual perception whiteness is positioned as a kind of doing, 
rather than a kind of being. This means that there is potential for whiteness to be taken up 
differently and produce different effects. My goal when investigating this momentum that 
takes hold in white bodies as a habit of perception has been to explore how we might 
replace this bad habit with a better one. Building on the role that disorientation and 
hesitation play in re-sedimented patterns of movement, I have argued that these 
experiences explicitly disrupt the sense of ease that normally animates white bodies as 
they move in and towards the world, and in so doing bring the pre-reflective dynamics of 
white privilege into appearance. I have shown that these experiences have potential for 
grounding white double consciousness.  
 
I am not the first white Western woman to take up Indian dance practices as a vehicle to 
explore questions of transformation and it is important to understand how histories of 
domination are implicated in my own engagement with Bharatanatyam. The 
contemporary practice of dancing Bharatanatyam reflects a long and complicated history 
of entanglements with colonial violence. Framed as an exercise in double consciousness, 
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in my final chapter I reckoned with these histories. I traced the suppression of the 
devadasis under British colonial rule and demonstrated the way their dance practices 
became subject to contradictory forces of reform and revival. This provided the needed 
historical context to analyze the workings of orientalism and racialization in the 
proliferation of the figure of the female Indian dancer as a cultural stereotype. Drawing 
on historical literature, I showed that the figure of the female Indian dancer was an 
important site of European and North American cultural production which was widely 
consumed as an Orientalist fantasy. Next I explored the role of habit in the perception and 
perpetuation this cultural stereotype, specifically by connecting what is perceived as a 
racialized exotic other (here the figure of the female Indian dancer) to the dominant 
(white Western) subject, to its immediately felt effects on the racializing body. This led 
into a discussion of cultural appropriation as a distinctive style of pre-reflective 
movement. I examined the role that the appropriation of Indian dance played within the 
American modern dance tradition and argued that the sense of mastery that defines acts 
of cultural appropriation is made manifest in and through uninhibited movement in and 
towards the world. Given this, I argued that acts of cultural appropriation express the 
uninhibited intentionality of ontological expansiveness, the “I can” that is adopted as the 
norm of being in the world for dominant privileged (white Western) subjects. 
 
One of the significant implications of this work, and that has sometimes been implicit 
throughout, is the value of dance as a method of inquiry. I have taken up dance in a 
unique way, showing the richness of bodily knowledge gathered through creative 
embodied practice. I took on a corporeal commitment, first by lending epistemic privilege 
to the living dancing body, trusting in the knowledge beneath my skin and between my 
toes, and second in a very practical sense, through my own bodily labour: tired muscles, 
sweating, straining, panting, gasping. Priya Srinivasan (2012) evokes the image of a 
sweating sari as metonym for the “dancing body as labour” (xi). She describes how the 
illusion of dance as effortless is undone by the sweat that exposes the exhaustion of 
performing an adavu in three different speeds: “the body oozes our inside juices onto the 
cotton or silk fabric of the sari, and the sky blue, leafy green, or sunset orange with ikat 
borders darken with our fluids” (xi). Taking up Bharatanatyam revealed to me the depth 
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of knowledge in sweat, and how to open up and expand this knowledge in my dancing 
feet. What this also revealed, however, was the disciplinary constraints imposed within 
and by academia. It is a struggle to make the knowledge in my dancing feet, and the 
insights into embodied existence they can reveal, legible in this context. I learned this 
through hesitation, by doubting myself. “I must be wrong, no one else around me is doing 
this…” But, as I have shown, if we take the phenomenology of embodiment seriously, 
there is real value in exploring, and attempting to understand, the knowledge within our 
bodies as we move in and toward the world. This is perhaps exemplified by examining 
individuals with bodily expertise—dancers, athletes, musicians, bakers, etc.—whose 
habitual modes of relating to their worlds reveal deep and extensive structures of 
knowledge that sometimes reach back across generations; knowledge that is not 
transmitted through text, or documentation, but through intercorporal relationships 
expressing different ways of being in the world. 
 
As with all projects, this one has developed its own momentum, bringing forth its own 
questions. The focus of my project has been on self-movement, and how individuals can 
slow the momentum of habitual whiteness. As such, I’ve largely explored the subjective 
dimensions of habit, movement, and racializing perception. While Merleau-Ponty’s work 
is often characterized in terms of its contributions to an understanding of embodied 
subjectivity, one of the crucial insights of his later works is the significant chiasmic 
relations between subjects that constitute subjectivity. This is to say that subjectivity—
both in terms of one’s experiences and one’s sense of self is constituted in part by its 
relation to others. As such, broadening the account I provided of the pre-reflective bodily 
dimensions of dance by incorporating and explicating the intersubjective dimensions of 
dance may lend further insights. While it has been beyond the scope of this present 
project, it would certainly be a valuable avenue for further research. For example, as I 
mentioned briefly in chapter two, I think one obvious next direction to take would be to 
incorporate the voices and perspectives of other dancers in my Bharatanatyam class in to 
my analysis. As indicated, this project has become clearer little by little over time and 
from within my own engagement with the dance style itself. Although interviews provide 
a rich source for understanding embodied experience I chose to limit the scope of this 
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project to focus on self-movement. I feel that insights gained from formal and informal 
semi-structured interviews with other dancers, for example, might allow me expand my 
analysis in different directions and explore more in-depth the important intersubjective 
dimensions of dance and their implications for slowing the momentum of habit and 
resedimenting new habits.  
 
Perhaps building off these thoughts of intersubjectivity and the individual, it’s important 
to note that feminist analyses of privilege, admittedly including the account that I have 
given here, tend to extend an individualism that feminist theory has long been suspicious 
of. Structures of power and privilege are systemic and structural. Many feminist scholars 
have demonstrated the ways that structural inequalities situate individuals within society 
differently. Many have shown the multiple ways that power distributes material 
resources, knowledge, respect, differentially along various axes of oppression (race, 
gender, sexuality, able-bodiedness, class). However, it is notable that often when 
feminists, particularly white feminists, come to reflect on their own privilege, the 
approach often goes in a different direction. The focus changes to the individual. This 
reality pulls my thought in two directions. First, given that identity is intersectional, the 
focus on the individual, especially when discussing phenomenology, can often have the 
unintended consequence of overshadowing or even erasing the experiences of other 
individuals living at different intersections of identity. For example, I have focused 
largely on my own experience learning a new form of dance. Yet, as an able-bodied 
white woman, my experiences will likely vary in important ways relative to a different 
intersectional identity. The experiences of people with disabilities may not line up with 
my own experiences. This is significant both in terms of providing an accurate 
phenomenology of human experience, and in terms of feminist concerns with social 
justice and equality. As such, expanding my account beyond the individual to incorporate 
the experiences of others would serve to bolster and deepen the phenomenology as well 
as make this work more consistent with the broader feminist projects of which it is a part.  
 
Second, Kruks (2005) observes that in these contexts, privilege generally “ceases to be 
thought about as structural” and instead is imagined as “the personal passion of an 
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autonomous self” (181). Given this, I find myself retuning to questions surrounding 
double consciousness and the efficacy of self-reflexivity. While double consciousness is 
useful for grounding critical reflexivity, political action is not a guaranteed outcome of 
self-reflexivity. If we maintain that a proactive position against racism requires political 
action, and self-reflexivity is not a productive means to this end, then self-reflexivity and 
double consciousness are only nominally useful for anti-racist projects (Srivastava, 2005, 
543). This realization can often result in the so-called “white paralysis” in which white 
individuals, understanding the impact and cost of their privilege, choose not to speak or 
act lest they contribute further to the perpetuation of structural oppression. In addressing 
this problem, it’s first worth noting the unfortunate ableist language used to articulate the 
otherwise significant issue of the white individual’s either voluntary or implicit 
withdrawal of agency. Importantly, this perceived cessation of momentum on the part of 
the white individual is also to a certain extent illusory. This is to say that the structures 
that support the institutions of white privilege continue to exist and push forward the 
projects of white individuals in those same trajectories so long as white individuals do not 
try to move forward and change those trajectories themselves.    
 
Given this, I am left to question what might a more political pursuit of double 
consciousness look like? I do not think there is a straightforward answer to this question.  
Yet, I believe that it has been important to implicate myself throughout this project. I 
have turned to a creative embodied practice in order to explore ways of moving out of so-
called white paralysis, since it not productive for anyone. In this way, this project is 
philosophical, political, and personal. Despite these criticisms, the project I have 
developed—providing an embodied articulation of dance, exploring complicity and 
questions of responsibility—have been with the goal of finding creative ways of moving 
forward. 
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